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Paper I: Corporate aging and internal resource allocation 
 
Demian Berchtold* 
 
Abstract 
 
Various observers argue that established firms are at a disadvantage in pursuing new growth 
opportunities.  In this paper, we provide systematic evidence that established firms allocate 
fewer resources to high-growth lines of business.  However, we find no evidence of 
inefficient resource allocation in established firms.  Redirecting resources from high-growth 
to low-growth lines of business does not result in lower profitability.  Also, resource 
allocation towards new growth opportunities does not increase when managers of established 
firms are exposed to takeover and product market threats.  Rather, it seems that conservative 
resource allocation strategies are driven by pressures to meet investors’ expectations.  Our 
empirical evidence, thus, favors the hypothesis that established firms wisely choose to 
allocate fewer resources to new growth opportunities as external pressures force them to focus 
on efficiency rather than novelty (Holmström 1989). 
 
Keywords: internal resource allocation, growth opportunities, firm age, takeover threat. 
JEL codes: G30; L20 
 
* Berchtold (corresponding author, demian.berchtold@ifm.unibe.ch) is from the Institut für Finanzmanagement, 
University of Bern.  I wish to thank Urs Peyer and Paola Sapienza for valuable comments.  All errors are mine. 
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1. Introduction 
We understand how to market, we know the technology, and production problems are not 
extreme.  Why risk money on new businesses when good, profitable, low-risk opportunities 
are on every side? 
This is a quote from a senior manager cited in the influential article of Hayes and Abernathy 
(1980).  On the basis of such experiences, the authors conclude that managers of large and 
established firms are tempted to allocate resources as a means to strengthen existing 
operations rather than seeking new opportunities.  Ample case studies exist that are in line 
with the authors’ perception.  A case in point is Intel, which initially failed to redirect its 
resources from its declining memory division towards the emerging microprocessor business 
with new and more profitable opportunities (Burgelman 1994).  The most prominent example 
is Xerox who failed to commercialize various valuable opportunities due to a failure to 
commit the necessary resources towards those opportunities (Gompers et al. 2005).  Yet, there 
is little systematic evidence of differences in internal resource allocation between established 
and newly listed firms.  In this paper, we aim to fill this gap.  To do so, we require data that 
allows us to divide resource allocation into low- and high-growth businesses.  The 
COMPUSTAT business segment file provides the required data.  Focusing on firms that 
report multiple lines of business in distinct industries allows us to explore what fraction of 
resources firms allocate towards business lines with relatively fewer or more growth 
opportunities.  We document that relative to newly listed firms, established firms redirect a 
significant portion of their internal resources from high- to low-growth businesses. 
We also aim to address the discussion concerning the efficiency of established firms’ resource 
allocation.  There is an ongoing debate about whether established firms miss valuable growth 
opportunities due to any sort of inefficiency in their resource allocation process.  A growing 
strand of the literature argues that established firms may wisely choose to allocate resources 
to strengthen existing operations rather than pursuing new growth opportunities (Gompers et 
al. 2005; Holmstrom 1989; Loderer et al. 2014).  One reason is that pursuing new growth 
opportunities may harm a firm’s core business.  A related reason is that managers are 
constrained in their capacity and should focus their limited attention to assets in place rather 
than exploring new growth opportunities (Loderer et al. 2014).  Following these arguments, it 
may be optimal for established firms to allocate fewer resources to high-growth businesses.  
We label this the efficiency hypothesis. 
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In contrast to the efficiency hypothesis, Mueller (1972) argues that established firms’ resource 
allocation is driven by managerial self-interests.  This is because available internal funds from 
previous successful innovations prevent managers of established firms to turn to external 
capital markets and be subject to their scrutiny.  It follows that managers of established firms 
may allocate too little resources to high-growth businesses because they are reluctant to 
evaluate new growth opportunities.  According to the agency hypothesis, established firms 
may allocate too little resources to high-growth businesses as their managers slack or prefer a 
quiet life (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003). 
To differentiate between these two alternative interpretations we investigate how profitability 
is related to the level of resources allocated to low- and high-growth divisions.  This empirical 
approach, however, may suffer from reverse causality or endogeneity.  Thus, we also exploit 
two quasi-experiments, the introduction of state-level business combination laws and the 
reduction of industry import tariffs, to investigate how takeover and product market threats 
affect resource allocation in established firms.  According to the agency hypothesis, lower 
threats would allow established firms to redirect more resources from high- to low-growth 
businesses for self-serving reasons.  The efficiency hypothesis predicts the opposite.1 
Our empirical investigation is based on a large sample of diversified U.S. firms over the years 
1979 to 2009.  The availability of business segment data allows us to examine the proportion 
of resources that are allocated to high-growth business.  The change in business segment 
reporting in June 1997 hampers comparability across segments and within segments over time 
(Hund et al. 2010; Whited 2006).  The former segment reporting standard required firms to 
break down accounting data into industry segments.  Under the new standard, firms report 
disaggregated data based on their internal organizational breakdown into separate business 
units.  Because we are interested in how firms allocate resources across distinct industries 
rather than organizational business units, we follow Gopalan and Xie (2010) and aggregate 
segment data of business units within the same industry.  To assess resource allocation we 
examine how segment capital expenditures2 normalized by segment sales are related to 
                                                 
1 Various observers argue that incentives to explore new growth opportunities increase with product market 
competition.  The rationale of value maximizing managers is to escape product market competition (Aghion 
et al. 2001). We acknowledge this alternative prediction under the efficiency hypothesis.  Nevertheless, 
import tariff reductions enable us to test the agency hypothesis. 
2 We use segment capital expenditures as a proxy for allocated resources.  Arguably, capital expenditures 
are the largest fraction of allocable resources.  Nevertheless, we also explore broader definitions of alloca-
ble resources such as adding segment R&D expenditures. 
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growth opportunities at the business segment level (Scharfstein 1998; Shin and Stulz 1998).  
We follow standard literature and approximate segment growth opportunities by the median 
Tobin’s Q of single-segment firms operating in the same industry. 
A univariate analysis reveals that established firms allocate relatively fewer resources to 
business lines with high growth opportunities than their younger counterparts.  Newly listed 
firms invest 10.4 percent of sales in high-growth segments and 8.1 percent in low-growth 
segments.  In contrast, established firms invest 7.5 percent in high-growth and 7.0 percent in 
low-growth segments.  The results are qualitatively the same if we look at industry-adjusted 
segment investment or industry- and firm-adjusted segment investment.  It seems that 
established firms allocate a lower proportion of resources to their high-growth segments. 
A more direct test requires that we aggregate a firm’s segment investment across business 
segments into a single firm-level measure of resource allocation.  Such a measure is 
introduced by Rajan et al. (2000) and Peyer and Shivdasani (2001) and equals the sum of 
excess investment in high-growth segments minus the sum of excess investment in low-
growth segments.  A low value implies that a firm’s resource allocation is less sensitive to 
growth opportunities.  Regression analysis reveals that established firms’ resource allocation 
is significantly less sensitive to growth opportunities and, thus, is consistent with our 
univariate analysis.  We interpret the empirical evidence as that established firms redirect 
resources from high- to low-growth segments.  Despite its attractiveness to measure aggregate 
resource allocation at the firm-level there are several drawbacks to this approach.  First, the 
measure is difficult to interpret (Çolak and Whited 2007).  Second, if we measure segment 
growth opportunities with error (Chevalier 2004; Whited 2001), then our firm-level measure 
of resource allocation sensitivity will suffer from measurement error as well.  Third, the firm-
level analysis does not allow controlling for segment characteristics that might be correlated 
with segment growth opportunities and segment investment levels. 
To circumvent these problems, we conduct our resource allocation analysis at the segment-
level and relate segment capital expenditures to segment growth opportunities.  We then 
estimate how the sensitivity of segment capital expenditures to growth opportunities (the so-
called Q-sensitivity) varies between newly listed and established firms.  Including segment 
fixed effects allows us to absorb any constant measurement error in segment growth 
opportunities.  Also, we are able to account for various segment characteristics that might 
impact resource allocation, e.g., segment size or segment profitability. 
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Our main finding is that established firms allocate fewer resources when segment growth 
opportunities are high.  The effect is economically meaningful.  The so-called Q-sensitivity of 
segment investments in newly listed firms is approximately three times larger than in 
established firms.  Our finding is robust to controlling for changes in conglomerates’ reported 
business segments over time and is not driven by an increase in organizational scope (Ozbas 
2005) or operational complexity (Boone et al. 2007; Coles et al. 2014).  A potential limitation 
of our approach is that segment capital expenditures do not include R&D expenditures or 
acquisitions and, thus, are incomplete measures of allocated resources.  Therefore, our results 
may be biased if, for example, acquisitions become more prevalent in established firms.  To 
address this issue, we use broader measures of resource allocation and add segment R&D to 
capital expenditures or use the annual percentage change in segment total assets.  By 
definition, the latter measure should include acquisitions at the segment level.  We obtain the 
same results when using these alternative measures of resource allocation.   
Another issue we address is whether any potential measurement error in segment Q is indeed 
constant over time and, thus, absorbed by fixed effects regressions.  Marginal growth 
opportunities could be lower in established firms as the more profitable projects are realized 
first (Li et al. 2009) or be higher as relative productivity goes up because of learning-by-doing 
(Bahk and Gort 1993).  Hence, fixed effects regressions may not solve the measurement error 
problem when using single-segment Q values as proxies for growth opportunities.  To get 
around this problem, we follow two different approaches found in the literature.  First, we 
regress single-segment firms growth opportunities on size and profitability and use that model 
to predict segment growth opportunities (Billett and Mauer 2003).  Second, we match 
segment growth opportunities by taking firm age into account (Borghesi et al. 2007).  The 
results do not change with either approach.  We also conduct a variety of robustness tests.  
Yet, our empirical results hold.  In summary, we find that established firms allocate fewer 
resources to new growth opportunities.  This is consistent with the hypothesis that established 
firms are at a relative disadvantage in exploring new opportunities, especially in high-growth 
industries (see Bernardo et al. 2009 and the cited literature therein). 
We then gauge the efficiency of established firms’ resource allocation practices.  It is 
common in the literature to interpret a lower Q-sensitivity as evidence of inefficient allocation 
of resources (Scharfstein 1998; Shin and Stulz 1998).  Poorer governance quality in 
established firms (Grabowski and Mueller 1975; Helwege et al. 2007; Holderness 2009) could 
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lead to inefficient resource allocation.  For example, managers of established firms with quiet-
life preferences may be “reluctant to undertake cognitively difficult activities” (Bertrand and 
Mullainathan 2003).  Alternatively, established firms may optimally choose to allocate fewer 
resources to high-growth segments.  Various observers argue that established firms focus on 
efficiency rather than novelty because they are designed to “serve production and marketing 
goals […]” (Holmstrom 1989; Miller and Friesen 1984).  Following these arguments 
established firms may focus on assets in place rather than on new growth opportunities 
(Loderer et al. 2014). 
To distinguish between these two alternative interpretations of the evidence, we explore how 
segment investment affects segment profitability in established firms.  We find no evidence 
that lower investment in high-Q segments worsens established firms’ profitability.  If 
anything, it seems that higher investment in low-Q segments improves established firms’ 
profitability.  This is consistent with the efficiency hypothesis that established firms focus 
more on improving the profitability of assets in place rather than on generating new growth 
opportunities.  In a similar vein, Cohen and Klepper (1996) find that large and established 
firms’ R&D efforts are directed towards improving manufacturing processes rather than 
developing new innovative products. 
As a further test to discriminate between the two hypotheses, we examine how exogenous 
shocks to established firms’ competitive environment affect their resource allocation.  We 
exploit the introduction of state antitakeover laws (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003) and 
industry-wide import tariff reductions (Frésard and Valta 2013; Guadalupe and Wulf 2010) as 
exogenous shocks to takeover and product market threats.  Under the agency hypothesis, 
lower takeover or product market threats should allow established firms to further deviate 
from high-growth businesses for self-serving reasons.   
The empirical evidence of the two quasi-experiments is inconsistent with the agency 
hypothesis.  First, we find that established firms that are shielded from the market for 
corporate control allocate more resources to segments with higher growth opportunities.  
Thus, it does not seem that quiet-life preferences explain why established firms are reluctant 
to fund new growth opportunities.  Rather, it seems that the lower resource allocation 
sensitivity to growth opportunities in established firms is driven by pressures to meet 
investors’ expectations (Holmstrom 1989).  Competition in the market for corporate control 
means that potential acquirers are continuously assessing the performance of managers.  This 
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may deter managers of established firms from exploring new growth opportunities which are 
more difficult to evaluate by acquirers (Loderer et al. 2014).  This is consistent with the 
efficiency hypothesis that established firms optimally choose to allocate fewer resources to 
high-growth opportunities. 
Second, more foreign competition leads established firms to allocate fewer resources to high-
growth segments.  Again, the evidence is inconsistent with the agency hypothesis that 
managerial slack in established firms explains low resource allocation to new growth 
opportunities.  A possible explanation is that established firms optimally focus on 
strengthening existing operations as probability of liquidation goes up (Fee and Hadlock 
2000; Schmidt 1997).  Yet, we are careful about interpreting our results in favor of the 
efficiency hypothesis.  According to Aghion et al. (2001), higher product market competition 
should lead established firms to explore new growth opportunities as a means to escape 
competition.  At the very least, we are able to discard the agency hypothesis. 
We make several contributions to the literature.  First, we document economically important 
differences in resource allocation between newly listed and established firms.  By using a 
large and broad sample of US firms we provide systematic evidence that established firms are 
reluctant to fund high-growth businesses and complement the case study literature (see, e.g., 
Burgelman 1994).  More importantly, we show that established firms’ reluctance to fund new 
growth opportunities does not seem to be driven by agency-related inefficiencies.  Thereby, 
we complement the study of Loderer et al. (2014) who argue that established firms optimally 
focus on exploiting assets in place rather than exploring new growth opportunities.  In their 
study, the authors provide indirect evidence by documenting that established firms spend less 
on capital as well as R&D expenditures and pay out more funds to the providers of capital.  
Instead of examining firm-level investments, our research setting allows us to study the 
proportion of total investments that are allocated to high-growth businesses. 
Second, our study is related to the literature arguing that established firms are at a 
disadvantage in exploring new growth opportunities.  Various reasons are explored, such as 
abandonment of high-risk strategies, the fear of cannibalization of existing products (Aron 
and Lazear 1990), an overreliance on existing customer needs (Christensen and Bower 1996), 
bureaucratic structures in the context of radical technological changes (Henderson 1993), or 
inefficient internal capital markets (see, among others, Rajan et al. 2000).  Closely related is 
the article of Holmström (1989) in which he highlights the role of external capital markets.  
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He argues that organizational impediments to innovative research are the outcome of capital 
market pressures to maintain a good performance reputation.  We add to his study and 
empirically link the incentive to fund new growth opportunities in established firms to 
pressures from the market of corporate control and the product market. 
Finally, our research study also has practical implications for regulatory policy and 
management consulting practices.  Motivating entrepreneurial activities is a crucial issue for 
management consultants and regulators as it is a key to survival and economic growth.  A 
better understanding of whether established firms’ exhausted set of growth opportunities is 
caused by any sort of inefficiency or rather the outcome of an optimal response to external 
pressures is therefore essential.  It sheds light on when it is optimal for established firms to 
motivate entrepreneurial activity through aggressive funding of new growth opportunities 
(Bernardo et al. 2009). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, we outline our research 
method.  In section 3, we describe our data and provide sample statistics.  In section 4, we 
compare resource allocation to growth opportunities between newly listed and established 
firms.  In section 5, we differentiate between the agency and efficiency hypothesis by relating 
resource allocation to profitability and exploiting two quasi-experiments.  In section 6, we 
conclude. 
 
2. Empirical method 
To examine internal resource allocation we investigate diversified firms’ segment capital 
expenditures across business segments with distinct growth opportunities.  We examine 
capital expenditures because of their importance.  By focusing on diversified firms we are 
able to distinguish between resource allocation to low-growth and high-growth opportunities.  
We follow standard procedure and use the median lagged Tobin’s Q of single-segment firms 
operating in the same industry as proxy for growth opportunities.  Industry classification is 
based on the narrowest SIC grouping (3-, or 2-digit) that includes at least 5 segment-matched 
single-segment firms with available data to compute lagged Tobin’s Q.  Having specified our 
proxy for resource allocation and growth opportunities, we describe in the following sections 
how we gauge the sensitivity between the two. 
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2.1. Correlation-based measure of resource allocation 
Rajan et al. (2000) and Colak and Whited (2007) propose a resource allocation measure that is 
based on the association between growth opportunities and resource allocation across 
business segments.  The advantage of using a firm-level measure is that we are able to capture 
the proportion of resources that a firm allocates to low- and high-growth businesses.  The 
measure equals the sum of excess investment in low- and high-growth segments.  More 
specifically, we compute the firm-level measure as follows: 
k n
jt ijt ijt ijt ijt
i 1 i n k 1
RINV w Inv w Inv ,
   
      (1) 
where Inv equals the firm- and industry-adjusted segment investment and w equals the 
fraction of segment sales to total firm sales.  The various indices identify observations of 
segment i within firm j in year t.  Note that a firm has n segments of which k are high-growth 
segments, i.e., segments with an Industry Q above the sales-weighted firm average.  By 
definition, RINV will be greater if firms invest less in low-Q segments and more in high-Q 
segments. 
To investigate differences in resource allocation between established and newly listed firms 
we estimate the following regression equation relating RINV to Firm age, measured as natural 
logarithm of one plus the number of years listed: 
jt t jt jt jtRINV Age X ,        (2) 
where indices identify a unique observation of firm j in year t.  We include the number of 
business segments in the set of control variables (X) because Colak and Whited (2007) show 
that RINV is negatively related to it.  We account for firm size, profitability, financial 
constraints, total resource allocation across segments, and firm-level growth opportunities.  
Finally, we also include year fixed effects. 
A problem of the outlined approach is that the standard proxy for segment growth 
opportunities may be quite poor (Graham et al. 2002).  If this proxy suffers from 
measurement error, so does our resource allocation variable RINV.  Furthermore, any 
unaccounted segment characteristics that might explain growth opportunities or resource 
allocation may introduce an omitted variable bias. 
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2.2. Regression-based measure of resource allocation 
We can circumvent the measurement error and omitted variable bias by using a regression-
based measure of resource allocation.  More specifically, we estimate a regression equation 
relating segment investment to growth opportunities and include segment fixed effects to 
account for time-invariant measurement error in growth opportunities and to absorb any 
constant unobserved segment characteristics.  The estimated coefficient on growth 
opportunities, the so-called Q-sensitivity of segment investments, shows the sensitivity of 
resource allocation to growth opportunities.  It is fairly common in the literature to use the Q-
sensitivity to gauge investment sensitivity to growth opportunities (Scharfstein 1998; Shin 
and Stulz 1998).  To investigate differences in internal resource allocation between 
established and newly listed firms, we divide our sample according to firm age into two 
subsamples and separately estimate the Q-sensitivity with the following regression equation: 
ijt ij t it 1 ijt ijtInv Q CF .          (3) 
The various indices identify observations of segment i within firm j in year t.  As mentioned 
above, the regression equation (3) relates segment resource allocation to growth opportunities.  
More specifically, segment resource allocation (Inv) is regressed on median industry growth 
opportunities (Q), segment cash flow (CF), segment fixed effects (α), and year fixed effects 
(δ).  We can then compare the estimated coefficient γ between the subsamples of business 
segments in established and newly listed firms. 
Alternatively, we extend the regression model (3) with an interaction term of the Q variable 
and firm age (A): 
ijt ij t 1 it 1 2 jt it 1 3 jt ijt ijtInv Q A Q A X .              (4) 
The coefficient of interest is γ2, the difference in the Q-sensitivity between more established 
and newly listed firms.  In regression equation (4) we include a set of control variables (X).  
At the segment level, we account for segment cash flow.  We also include segment absolute 
and relative size to account for size effects (Ozbas and Selvili 2009) and diversity in 
divisional resources (Rajan et al. 2000).  The final segment level control is segment 
depreciation.  We also include various control variables at the firm level.  First, we include a 
Herfindahl index on segment sales to account for organizational scope (Ozbas 2005; Ozbas 
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and Selvili 2009).  Second, we take into account firm-level financial constraints.  There are 
two opposing views about the role of financial constraints on a firm’s investment efficiency. 
One the one hand, due to information asymmetries financially constrained firms might find it 
costly to raise outside capital to pursue profitable growth opportunities (Baker et al. 2003).  
On the other hand, high levels of excess cash and unused debt capacity might lead entrenched 
managers to overinvest and engage in empire-building (Jensen 1986; Stulz 1990).  This is 
especially true for established firms where investment policies due to the available internal 
funding are less scrutinized by capital markets (Grabowski and Mueller 1975).  Hence, it is 
important to control for financial constraints because they may affect the Q-sensitivity of 
resource allocation.  As mentioned above, the inclusion of segment fixed effects helps absorb 
any unobservable time-invariant segment characteristics.  Finally, we also include year fixed 
effects to account for unobservable macro factors as well as time trends that might bias our 
estimate of Q-sensitivity. 
 
3. Data 
3.1. Sample selection 
Our sample builds on data from the COMPUSTAT Business Segment, COMPUSTAT/CRSP 
merged annual files.  The COMPUSTAT Business Segment file contains actual and restated 
segment data.  If a conglomerate restructures its business segments in a given year, it 
retrospectively reports segment data of the last two years using the new segment definitions.  
To avoid multiple counting of segment data, we neglect any retrospectively restated segment 
data.  Our initial sample covers the period 1979 – 2009. 
It is well known that COMPUSTAT segment data lacks comparability over time.  On the one 
hand, the introduction of SFAS 131 in June 1997 substantially changed the way firms define 
business segments (Dittmar and Shivdasani 2003).  Under SFAS 14 business segment 
reporting followed an industry approach as opposed to a management approach (Berger and 
Hann 2003), which enabled better comparability across segments and within segments over 
time (Hund et al. 2010; Whited 2006).  On the other hand, even under SFAS 14 firms had 
discretion in deciding which of their operations to report as separate segments.  For example, 
Denis et al. (1997) find that about one of four changes in the number of segments reflect 
purely reporting changes.  Also, Berger and Hann (2003) report that conglomerates in the pre 
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FASB 131-period used to aggregate segments to avoid reporting unprofitable segments.  To 
get around these problems, we follow Gopalan and Xie (2011) and aggregate a firm’s 
reported segment data within the same industry.  For example, in 1999 AAR Corporation 
reported one segment in the transportation equipment and supply industry (SIC 5088), i.e., 
Aircraft Services with assets worth USD 741 million.  In 2000, AAR Corporation changed its 
segment reporting in that industry.  The new reported segments are Aircraft and Engines with 
assets USD 309 million and Airframe and Accessories with assets USD 292 million.  To limit 
the bias due to such segment reporting changes over time we aggregate segment accounting 
data within the same SIC 3-digit industry.  Thus, in 2000 we aggregate the two reported 
segments of AAR Corp into one segment with assets worth USD 601 million. 
We limit our analysis to segment-years that report complete accounting data (sales, assets, 
capital expenditures, operating profits, and depreciation) and non-anomalous accounting data 
(positive sales, assets, and depreciation and non-negative capital expenditures) (Ozbas and 
Scharfstein 2010).  Since we investigate resource allocation in firms with distinct lines of 
business, we limit our analysis to firm-year observations operating in at least two different 
industries.  This leaves us with an initial sample of 98,482 segment-years. 
Following the empirical literature, we exclude foreign firms with American Depository 
Receipts (ADRs) (5,339 segment-years).  Similarly, we omit firm-years with total sales of less 
than USD 20 million (8,591 segment-years) and firm-years with at least one segment in the 
utility (SIC 4900 – 4941) or financial (SIC 6000 – 6999) sector (20,200 segment-years) 
(Berger and Ofek 1995).  Moreover, we cross-validate the COMPUSTAT segment file with 
the COMPUSTAT industrial file and exclude firm-years where the sum of segment assets 
(sales) deviates from total firm assets (sales) by more than 25 (1) percent (21,266 segment-
years) (Berger and Ofek 1995).  These selection criteria reduce our sample to 43,086 
segment-years.  For firm-years that meet the above criteria, we proportionally allocate any 
unallocated accounting data to each of its segments (Berger and Ofek 1995; Billett and Mauer 
2003).  For example, if firm assets exceed the sum of segment assets by 5 percent we increase 
each segment assets by 5 percent. 
Finally, we require that sample segments have sufficient data to compute our main variables 
for at least two sample years (Billett and Mauer 2003).  The final sample consists of 6,947 
tracked segments over 39,313 segment-years and 2,224 firms over 15,526 firm-years. 
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3.2. Sample characteristics 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of our variables from 1979 to 2009.  The sample starts 
in 1979 since we require lagged median industry Q.  Detailed variable definitions are in 
Table 11.  All continuous and unbounded variables are winsorized at the 1 percent and the 99 
percent level of their pooled distribution to account for outliers.  Panel A shows the 
descriptive statistics of the segment-level variables, which except for Segment size and 
Relative segment size are normalized by segment sales.  We normalize by sales because firms 
have less discretion in allocating sales across their segments than in allocating assets (Ozbas 
and Scharfstein 2010).  On average, segment capital expenditures (CAPEX) equal 8.4 percent 
of sales.  We also use broader definitions of segment resource allocation by either adding 
segment R&D to segment capital expenditures or by looking at the annual growth in segment 
assets.  On average, the former equals 8.7 percent and the latter 11.9 percent.  Mean segment 
growth opportunities (Industry Q) equal 1.4.  In addition to using standard median industry Q 
as proxy for segment growth opportunities, we consider alternative approaches motivated by 
the literature.  Billett and Mauer (2003) propose to predict segment growth opportunities 
based on segment characteristics.  Borghesi et al. (2007) suggest to use median industry Q of 
single-segment firms that are in the same age-cohort.  Those alternative measures of segment 
growth opportunities equal 1.37 and 1.46, on average. 
Panel B shows the descriptive statistics of the firm-level variables.  The average firm has 2.7 
segments, which is similar to other studies despite our aggregation approach (Berger and Ofek 
1995; Billett and Mauer 2003).  With an average firm age of 24 years our sample firms seem 
older than what Loderer et al. (2014) find.  This difference is likely due to the exclusion of 
single-segment firms, which tend to be younger.  Interestingly, we find that our firm-level 
measure of resource allocation (RINV) is negative, namely -0.002.  Thus, on average firms 
seem to allocate resources excessively to low-growth business segments.  In the following 
section, we investigate differences in resource allocation between established and newly listed 
firms. 
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4. Resource allocation to growth opportunities 
4.1. Univariate analysis 
As a first test of different resource allocation between established and newly listed firms, we 
compare the proportion of resources that are allocated to high- and low-Q segments between 
both groups.  We therefore split our sample into firms older and younger than the median firm 
age in a given year.  We define low-Q segments as segments with an industry Q lower than 
the firm’s sales weighted average Q of all business segments in a given year.  The results are 
shown in Table 2.  In Panel A, we show the results using raw investment levels.  We find that 
established firms invest less than newly listed firms do, both in low-Q and high-Q segments.  
The difference is especially large in high-Q segments suggesting that established firms 
allocate relatively fewer resources to high-growth business lines.  Moreover, the results are 
economically significant.  The investment difference between young and established firms in 
low-Q (high-Q) segments equals 1.1 (2.9) percentage-points or 13.6 (27.9) percent. 
We check whether our results are driven by differences in industry- or firm-characteristics and 
use industry-adjusted or industry- and firm-adjusted segment investment levels.  We repeat 
the above analysis with industry-adjusted investment levels in Panel B.  To do so, we subtract 
median investment levels of single-segment firms operating in the same industry.  In Panel C, 
we further deduct a firm’s weighted average industry-adjusted investment across all segments.  
We therefore aim to account for differences in resource allocation that are related to 
unobservable firm characteristics.  The results remain qualitatively the same in Panel B and C.  
We find that managers of established firms allocate relatively fewer resources to high-growth 
business segments.   
 
4.2. Correlation-based measure of resource allocation 
In this section, we estimate the regression equation (2) and investigate how RINV differs 
between established and newly listed firms.  The results are shown in Table 3.  In column (1) 
we simply regress RINV on Number of segments.  Consistent with Colak and Whited (2007) 
we find that the number of reported segments is negatively related to RINV.  In column (2), 
we add Firm age as explanatory variable.  The estimated coefficient of Firm age is negative 
and statistically significant.  Thus, established firms seem to redirect relatively more resources 
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from high- to low-growth segments.  In column (3), we account for firm size but find no 
evidence that resource allocation, as measured by RINV, differs between small and large 
firms.  We further include year fixed effects in column (4) and additional control variables, 
i.e, ROA, KZ-index, Leverage, Firm CAPEX, and lagged Tobin’s Q in column (5) and 
continue to find that resource allocation is less sensitive to growth opportunities in established 
firms. 
As mentioned previously, our empirical results so far may suffer from measurement error if 
median industry Q is a poor proxy for growth opportunities.  Moreover, the univariate 
analysis and the firm-level measure RINV do not account for differences in observable 
segment characteristics such as segment cash flow or any time-invariant unobservable 
segment characteristics.  In the following section, we use a regression-based measure of 
resource allocation to account for measurement error and omitted variable bias. 
 
4.3. Regression-based measure of resource allocation 
4.3.1. Main results 
We begin with a simple test of whether the Q-sensitivity of segment investments differs 
between established and newly listed firms.  Specifically, we divide all segment-years into 
subsamples of established and newly listed firms according to the median sample firm age in 
a given year, and estimate our regression model (3) for both groups separately.  The 
coefficient on Q, the Q-sensitivity of segment investments, shows whether and by how much 
segment investments increase with growth opportunities.  To account for serial correlation 
within segments over time we cluster standard errors at the segment level.3  The results are 
shown in Table 4.  We find that the estimated coefficient on segment Q in newly listed firms 
is significantly higher than in established firms.  It is also noteworthy that segment cash flow 
negatively affects investment levels and is statistically weak in the subsample of established 
firms.  Ozbas and Scharfstein (2010) also find that segment investments and segment cash 
flow are not positively related once segment fixed effects are included.  More importantly, the 
results show that the Q-sensitivity of segment investments in newly listed firms is three times 
larger than in established firms.  According to these results, when segment growth 
                                                 
3 Clustering at the firm level to account for correlated standard errors across segments within firms does not 
alter our results. 
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opportunities increase by a given amount, newly listed firms invest three times more than 
established firms.  Our results are not affected by how we divide the sample.  In other words, 
we alternatively classify a firm as established relative to the pooled sample median firm age 
or within a given industry (3-digit or 2-digit SIC code) and year.  We still find that the Q-
sensitivity of segment investments is significantly lower in established firms.   
Next, we estimate our regression model (4) with the interaction term on growth opportunities 
and firm age.  To simplify interpretation and allow cross-study comparisons we demean 
Industry Q and Firm age.  The results are shown in Table 5.  Column (1) shows the estimation 
results with Segment cash flow as control variable.  This is the standard regression equation 
found in the literature to gauge differences in segment Q-sensitivity (Ozbas and Scharfstein 
2010).  The estimated coefficient on Industry Q equals 0.028.  Since we demean the 
interaction variables the coefficient on Industry Q can be interpreted as the Q-sensitivity of 
segment investments at the sample mean of firm age.  Hence, the average firm in terms of 
firm age increases segment resource allocation by 0.028 when Industry Q increases by one 
unit.  The magnitude of the Q-sensitivity is close to what Ozbas and Scharfstein (2010) find.  
They find a Q-sensitivity of 0.025 for diversified firms.  More importantly, the estimated 
coefficient on the interaction term is negative and statistically significant.  Hence, the Q-
sensitivity of segment investment declines with firm age.  The effect is economically 
significant.  A one standard deviation increase of in the natural logarithm of firm age (0.8) 
reduces the coefficient on Q by 0.0176 (= -0.022×0.8) or 63 percent (= -0.0176 /0.028).  
Therefore, Q-sensitivity drops by 63 percent when there is a one standard deviation increase 
in the natural logarithm of firm age.  In column (2) we add all segment control variables, 
namely, segment absolute and relative size, and segment depreciation.  In column (3) we 
further account for Focus and firm-level financial constraints measured by the KZ-Index.  The 
estimated coefficient on the interaction term remains significantly negative.   
So far, our resource allocation measure captures capital expenditures.  Using an incomplete 
measure of resource allocation, however, may be a problem.  In column (4) we use the sum of 
segment R&D and capital expenditures as dependent variable and find similar results.  We 
should also include asset or firm acquisitions at the segment-level.  Phillips and Zhdanov 
(2013) show that large and established firms may not increase R&D in response to positive 
demand shocks but rather acquire small innovative firms.  Maksimovic and Phillips (2008) 
show that capital expenditures are quite similar across firm size and firm organization, while 
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acquisition rates differ significantly.  Arikan and Stulz (2011) also find a life-cycle of firm 
acquisitions.  According to these studies, not accounting for acquisitions and divestitures at 
the segment level might bias our results.  We therefore follow the literature and use the annual 
percentage change in book value of assets as a proxy for total investment (Baker et al. 2003).  
The results are in column (5).  Our findings do not change when we use this broader 
definition of resource allocation. 
Before we proceed, we want to examine the estimated coefficients of our control variables in 
the table.  First, the negative coefficient on Firm age implies that independently of available 
growth opportunities established firms invest less than newly listed firms.  Second, Segment 
cash flow is generally unrelated to segment investment.  This is in contrast to what Shin and 
Stulz (1998) find that abnormal cash flow shocks at the segment-level affect segment 
investments.  Ozbas and Scharfstein (2010) also find that segment cash flow is unrelated to 
segment investment when segment fixed effects are included.  However, when we measure 
allocated resources as annual change in assets we also find a statistically significant positive 
relation (column (5)).  Third, our results show that higher beginning-of-year assets are 
negatively related with segment investment.  This is in line with the finding of Duchin and 
Sosyura (2012).  Fourth, Relative segment size is weakly and negatively related to segment 
investment.  This is in contrast to theoretical considerations.  Yet, the sign of the estimated 
coefficient changes once we drop segment fixed effects.  There are many ways of interpreting 
the positive relation.  For example, relative segment size may capture a segment’s strategic 
importance (Glaser et al. 2013), lower information asymmetry (Ozbas and Selvili 2009), or 
the segment’s past return on investments (Graham et al. 2011).  Fifth, our results concerning 
the coefficient of Segment depreciation suggest that there seems to be a general tendency to 
restore assets in place (Ozbas and Selvili 2009).  Overall, the evidence on our segment control 
variables is largely consistent with other studies on segment investment (Duchin and Sosyura 
2012; Ozbas and Scharfstein 2010; Ozbas and Selvili 2009).  Regarding our firm control 
variables, the estimated coefficient on Focus is statistically significant and positive.  Thus, 
less diversified firms invest more.  The KZ-Index is negatively related to segment investment 
suggesting that higher financial constraints at the firm-level decrease segment investments.   
Overall, based on the similarity of our regression results with the empirical literature on 
segment investments we conclude that the documented lower Q-sensitivity in established 
firms is not attributable to sample selection bias.   
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4.3.2. Alternative measures of growth opportunities 
In this section, we aim to aim to address measurement error in Industry Q by using alternative 
measures of growth opportunities proposed by the literature.  First, Billett and Mauer (2003) 
argue that segment growth opportunities are likely to be a function of segment size and 
profitability.  Rather than using median industry Q, the authors assign different levels of 
segment growth opportunities within an industry based on segment size and profitability.  To 
do so, the authors estimate a regression equation that relates Q to size and profitability using 
single-segment firm observations.  With the estimated coefficients the authors can then make 
an out-of-sample prediction for diversified firms’ segment growth opportunities that account 
for segment size and profitability. 
Second, Borghesi et al. (2007) reason that segment growth opportunities are a function of firm 
age.  Firms go public with a lot of growth opportunities and, thus, have a high market 
valuation after their initial listing (Jain and Kini 1994).  As firms take the valuable growth 
opportunities first (Li et al. 2009), their set of growth opportunities is likely to fall with the 
number of years listed.  To account for different levels of segment growth opportunities, the 
authors match segment growth opportunities based on industry and age cohort.  Specifically, 
the authors divide all firms into young (1 – 5 years), mature (6 – 20 years), and old firms (21+ 
years).  Each segment is then matched to the median single-segment firm in a given industry 
and the same age cohort. 
We use these alternative measures of growth opportunities to re-estimate our regression 
equation (4).  This should help us get around measurement error in growth opportunities that 
are related to segment size and profitability or firm age.  The results are shown in Table 6.  
We use fitted Qs according to Billett & Mauer (2003) in column (1) and (2) and age-based Qs 
according to Borghesi et al. (2007) in column (3) and (4).  The estimated coefficient on the 
interaction term Industry Q × Firm Age is negative and statistically significant in all four 
columns.  Also, the economic significance of the age-related decline is similar in magnitude 
when using alternative industry Q specifications.  Hence, our results do not seem to be driven 
by failing to measure segment growth opportunities correctly. 
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4.3.3. Robustness tests 
We also conduct a variety of other robustness tests.  The results are in Table 7.  To begin 
with, our measure of segment investments may be incorrect due to normalizing capital 
expenditures with sales instead of assets.  In column (1) we re-estimate our segment 
investment regression using asset-normalized variables.  Our results are robust to normalizing 
segment capital expenditures by beginning-of-year assets. 
Second, some of the growth opportunities may be projects requiring SG&A or advertising 
expenditures.  Unfortunately, SG&A and advertising expenditures are not observable at the 
segment level.  The next best thing is to include firm-level SG&A and advertising 
expenditures as control variables.  The results are shown in column (2).  We find that resource 
allocation is less sensitive to growth opportunities even in established firms with similar 
SG&A and advertising expenditures than their younger counterparts. 
Third, we explore whether our results are driven by lower governance quality in established 
firms.  Helwege et al. (2007) and Holderness (2009) show that ownership concentration 
declines with firm age.  Hence, our documented age-effect may in fact be a governance-effect 
in the sense that resource allocation is less sensitive to growth opportunities in firms with less 
monitoring by institutional investors.  We therefore include Institutional ownership as 
additional control variable in column (3).  We continue to observe a lower Q-sensitivity in 
established firms.  Note that this tells us nothing about resource allocation efficiency in 
established firms.  We only check whether we pick up differences in resource allocation that 
are related to governance quality rather than firm age.  We address resource allocation 
efficiency in established firms in section 5. 
Finally, we check whether the introduction of SFAS 131 in June 1997 and the aggregation of 
segment accounting data within 3-digit SIC-codes affect our results.  Therefore, we re-
estimate regression equation (4) using non-aggregated segment observations and limit our 
sample to years prior to 1997.  As shown in column (4), we obtain qualitatively the same 
results if we limit our sample to non-aggregated business segment data prior to 1997.  In 
untabulated regressions, we further reduce potential bias from segment reporting changes by 
limiting our analysis to firm-years that report the same number of segments with identical 
segment IDs over two consecutive years.  Moreover, we allow segment fixed effects to vary 
whenever a firm changes its reported segments because Colak and Whited (2010) point out 
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that the proxy quality of median industry Q depends on the operating assets of the entire firm.  
Again, our results remain the same. 
 
5. Resource allocation efficiency 
In the previous section, we document that established firms allocate relatively fewer resources 
to high-growth businesses and relative more to low-growth businesses.  What remains 
unresolved is whether established firms allocate resources less efficiently than newly listed 
firms.  In this section, we explore whether our results reflect evidence of inefficient resource 
allocation practices in established firms or whether it is consistent with value maximizing 
behavior. 
On the one hand, one might argue that managers of established firms with presumably poor 
governance quality (Grabowski and Mueller 1975; Helwege et al. 2007; Holderness 2009) 
may be reluctant to exert great efforts to analyze new growth opportunities and implement an 
optimal investment policy.  Alternatively, entrenched managers in established firms may 
engage in socialism or nepotism when allocating resources. 
On the other hand, we might interpret our results in the spirit of Holmström (1989), namely, 
that established firms optimally choose to focus on managing existing lines of business and 
that, by doing so, they might neglect new growth opportunities.  Similarly, Loderer et al. 
(2014) advocate a limited managerial attention hypothesis to explain why established firms 
shift their focus towards managing existing assets more efficiently.  Thus, a lower resource 
allocation sensitivity may reflect established firms’ attempt to strengthen their existing 
operations by allocating fewer resources to new growth opportunities.  Following these 
arguments, established firms may wisely choose to redirect resources from high- to low-
growth businesses.  
 
5.1. Segment profitability 
To differentiate between these two mutually exclusive hypotheses, we explore how resource 
allocation in established firms affects segment profitability.  If our results are the consequence 
of inefficient behavior, we would expect resource allocation in established firms to worsen 
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segment profitability.  More specifically, we would expect lower investment levels in 
established firms to worsen profitability in high-Q segments as valuable growth opportunities 
are foregone.  In low-Q segments, we expect higher investment levels of established firms to 
worsen segment profitability.  However, if established firms optimally choose to allocate 
fewer resources to high-growth opportunities, we would expect lower segment investment in 
established firms’ high-Q segments to have a positive impact on segment profitability.  Under 
the efficiency hypothesis we would also expect higher segment investment in established 
firms’ low-Q segments to have a positive impact on segment profitability. 
To test our predictions, we estimate a regression model that relates segment profitability to 
segment investment and its interaction with firm age.  We do so for low- and high-Q 
segments, separately.  We include a set of control variables.  First, we account for segment 
growth opportunities.  Note that we already control for different growth opportunities by 
dividing the sample into low- and high-Q segments.  By including Industry Q as control 
variable we further account for differences in growth opportunities within both subsamples.  
We also account for segment size, segment R&D expenditures, lagged segment sales growth, 
firm focus, and financial constraints.  The results are shown in Table 8.  The dependent 
variable is Segment cash flow.  In column (3) and (4) we normalize segment profitability by 
beginning-of-year segment assets.  To be consistent, we also normalize segment capital 
expenditures and R&D by beginning-of-year segment assets.  In column (1) and (3) are the 
results for low-Q segments and in column (2) and (4) for high-Q segments.   
In general, we find no evidence of inefficient resource allocation in established firms.  If 
anything, it seems that established firms optimally choose to allocate more resources to low-Q 
segments.  We find a positive and statistically significant coefficient on the interaction term 
Segment CAPEX × Firm age in the subsample of low-Q segments in column (3).  Consistent 
with the efficiency hypothesis, it seems that established firms create value by increasing 
segment investment in low-growth businesses.  However, the efficiency hypothesis also 
predicts that lower segment investment in established firms’ high-Q segments increases 
segment profitability.  We fail to find empirical evidence thereof.  The estimated coefficient 
on the interaction term is statistically insignificant in the subsample of high-Q segments. 
Overall, the estimation results are statistically weak.  When using sales-normalized variables 
in column (1) and (2) we find no relation between segment investment and segment 
performance.  Also, the sign of the estimated coefficients depends on whether we normalize 
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our variables by segment sales or beginning-of-year assets.  Finally, reverse causality and 
endogeneity may be of concern when investigating the relation between segment investment 
and segment profitability.  We conclude that the segment performance analysis may not be 
appropriate to differentiate whether resource allocation in established firms is a consequence 
of inefficient behavior or optimal redirecting of resources towards low-growth businesses.   
In the following section, we choose a quasi-experimental setting to shed light on what causes 
established firms to reduce resource allocation sensitivity to new growth opportunities. 
 
5.2. Quasi-experiments 
In the final section, we exploit exogenous shocks to the competitive environment to 
understand why established firms allocate fewer resources to high-growth business segments.  
We explore whether the market for corporate control and product market competition affects 
established firms to engage in more conservative resource allocation practices.  The agency 
hypothesis predicts that lower takeover or product market threats induce entrenched managers 
of established firms to put less effort in assessing growth opportunities.  As a consequence, 
we expect a decline in resource allocation sensitivity to growth opportunities when 
established firms are insulated from takeover or product market threats. 
It is less clear what the efficiency hypothesis predicts regarding the impact of competitive 
threats on established firms’ resource allocation, especially in the case of product market 
competition.  We first discuss the market of corporate control. 
 
5.2.1. Market for corporate control 
We examine how the introduction of business combination laws affects resource allocation in 
established firms.  Under the agency hypothesis, we would expect resource allocation in 
established firms to worsen when entrenched managers are insulated from the market of 
corporate control.  This argument builds on the study of Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003).  
The authors investigate how the introduction of state antitakeover laws affects firm’s 
investment behavior and find that the destruction of old plants as well as the creation of new 
plants fall after the passage of state antitakeover laws.  The authors interpret the change in 
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investment behavior as that a lower takeover threat allows managers to enjoy a quiet life by 
undertaking fewer “cognitively difficult activities”.  Because managers of established firms 
are presumably less monitored (Grabowski and Mueller 1975; Helwege et al. 2007; 
Holderness 2009) lower resource allocation sensitivity in established firms may be the 
outcome of quiet-life preferences of entrenched managers.  If this is the case, we would 
expect established firms’ resource allocation sensitivity to growth opportunities to worsen 
after the passage of state antitakeover laws. 
Alternatively, the efficiency hypothesis predicts no such decline in established firms’ resource 
allocation sensitivity to growth opportunities when takeover threat is reduced.  A growing 
strand of the literature argues that after listing managers should focus on exploiting the initial 
growth opportunity set rather than exploring new growth opportunities (Ferreira et al. 2012; 
Holmstrom 1989; Loderer et al. 2014).  The shift in managerial attention away from high-
growth businesses should be more pronounced when pressures from capital markets are high.  
Takeover pressure induces managers to focus on short-term profits at the expense of riskier 
long-term investments (Stein 1988).  Pursuing high-growth opportunities is also riskier and 
requires tolerance for short-term failure (Manso 2011).  Takeover threats reduce that tolerance 
and, thus, may explain why established firms follow more conservative strategies by 
allocating more resources to low-growth lines of business.  Following these arguments, we 
would predict an increase in established firms’ resource allocation sensitivity to growth 
opportunities after the passage of state antitakeover laws. 
Empirically, we re-estimate our main regression equation (4) and include a triple interaction 
term of Industry Q, Firm age, and the dummy variable bBC indicating whether business 
combination laws (BC laws) have been passed in a firm’s state of incorporation.  The results 
are shown in Table 9 displaying the estimated coefficients on all interaction terms and its 
various components.  In column (1) we find, consistent with the result of Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2003) that BC laws do not affect plant-level capital expenditures, that the level 
of segment investment is unrelated to bBC.  Further, the estimated coefficient on the 
interaction term Industry Q × bBC is negative and statistically significant.  It seems that firms 
incorporated in states that passed BC laws are more reluctant to assess available new growth 
opportunities for resource allocation purposes.  This is in line with quiet-life preferences 
affecting resource allocation when the monitoring role of the market for corporate control is 
weak (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003).  However, the positive estimated coefficient on the 
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triple interaction term suggests that the introduction of state antitakeover laws impacts 
established firms’ resource allocation differently.  Established firms incorporated in states that 
passed BC laws increase resource allocation sensitivity to growth opportunities. 
We interpret the empirical results as follows.  Lower takeover threats seem to have two 
opposing effects on established firms’ resource allocation.  First, after the passage of state 
antitakeover laws managers enjoy a quiet life by undertaking fewer “cognitively difficult 
activities”, such as analyzing new growth opportunities and negotiating year-to-year changes 
in resource allocation.  Second, lower takeover threats also allow established firms to be less 
conservative and allocate more resources to growth opportunities.  This is in line with Loderer 
et al. (2014) showing that the decline in Tobin’s Q over time is alleviated in firms that are 
incorporated in states that passed BC laws.  Our results complement their finding by showing 
that established firms’ indeed seem to allocate a high proportion of their resources to high-
growth businesses after the introduction of state antitakeover laws. 
In column (2) we repeat our empirical analysis without firms incorporated in Delaware 
because those firms may have chosen to reincorporate in Delaware due to more favorable 
legislation.  This may bias our results to the extent that established firms with less 
conservative resource allocation practices seek takeover protection by reincorporating in 
Delaware.  The estimated coefficient on the triple interaction term is similar in magnitude but 
with a p-value of 0.078 statistically less significant.  However, this is not surprising given that 
sample size is more than halved.  We conclude that takeover pressure negatively affects 
resource allocation to growth opportunities in established firms.  The empirical evidence, 
thus, is in favor of the efficiency hypothesis rather than the agency hypothesis. 
 
5.2.2. Product market competition 
Our second quasi-experiment exploits large industry-specific import tariff reductions (Frésard 
and Valta 2013).  Import tariff reductions increase competition from foreign firms and, thus, 
reflect an exogenous shock to product market competition.  Investigating how an exogenous 
increase in product market threat affects established firms’ resource allocation sensitivity 
should help us differentiate between our two hypotheses.  Assuming that established firms’ 
resource allocation is driven by entrenched managers and less shareholder monitoring, we 
would expect product market competition to reduce such inefficiencies (Hart 1983).  Thus, 
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the agency hypothesis predicts that established firms’ resource allocation sensitivity increases 
after large import tariff reductions. 
As mentioned previously, it is less clear how product market competition should affect 
established firms’ resource allocation sensitivity under the efficiency hypothesis.  There is an 
ongoing debate in the literature concerning the role of product market competition in 
connection with incentives to explore new growth opportunities.  On the one hand, product 
market competition could reduce incentives to explore new growth opportunities (Aghion and 
Howitt 1992).  Knowledge spillovers to competitors and cannibalization of the innovators’ 
products may deter established firms from allocating resources to high-growth businesses.  
On the other hand, product market competition may induce established firms to seek new 
growth opportunities as a means to escape the consequences of increased competition 
(Aghion et al. 2001).  Thus, there seems to be contrasting views of how product market 
competition should affect established firms’ incentives to explore growth opportunities. 
At the very least, we are able to investigate whether the empirical evidence on resource 
allocation and product market competition is in line with the predictions based on the agency 
hypothesis.  Empirically, we follow the literature and argue that import tariff reductions 
constitute an exogenous shock in product market competition (Frésard and Valta 2013; 
Guadalupe and Wulf 2010).  Adding tariff reductions to our regression model (4) allows us to 
investigate how an exogenous shock to competition affects established firms’ resource 
allocation sensitivity to growth opportunities.  We use industry-specific import tariff 
reductions to specify whether a firm’s main industry experienced such a reduction in the past.  
Frésard and Valta (2013) provide industry-years with significant import tariff reductions.  The 
data is available for manufacturing industries with product-level import data.  For our sample 
with available import tariff data, we then investigate whether established firms exposed to 
foreign competition allocate more resources to high-growth businesses as predicted by the 
agency hypothesis. 
The regression results using import tariff reductions are shown in Table 10.  Due to the 
reduced sample size we first re-estimate our regression model without adding tariff 
reductions.  The estimation results are in column (1).  We find a positive estimated coefficient 
on Industry Q, suggesting that resource allocation increases with available growth 
opportunities.  However, statistical significance is lower compared to previous results in 
Table 5, presumably, due to reduced sample size and difficulties in measuring growth 
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opportunities.  These issues might also explain why the estimated coefficient on the 
interaction term Industry Q × Firm age is almost zero and statistically insignificant. 
In column (2) we include bTariff and its interactions with Industry Q and Firm age.  The 
estimated coefficient on Industry Q is larger in magnitude but slightly lower in statistical 
significance.  The estimated coefficient on the interaction term Industry Q × Firm age 
remains statistically insignificant.  Interestingly, however, the estimated coefficient on the 
triple interaction term Industry Q × Firm age × bTariff is negative and statistically significant 
at the 10-percent level.  The empirical evidence is inconsistent with the agency hypothesis.  
Rather, it seems that established firms exposed to foreign competition allocate fewer 
resources to available new growth opportunities.  All other coefficients are statistically 
insignificant.  Hence, segment capital expenditures are only affected through the channel of 
growth opportunities.  To sum up, the findings in Table 10 suggest that lower resource 
allocation sensitivity in established firms does not seem to be driven by managerial slack.    
One concern of our analysis is that import tariff reductions may affect growth opportunities as 
well.  This will especially be a problem if tariff reductions affect growth opportunities 
differently in newly listed and established firms.  In unreported analysis, we find no evidence 
that import tariff reductions impact growth opportunities.  Thus, we discard this alternative 
interpretation. 
Taken together, the empirical evidence in Table 9 and 10 is in favor of the efficiency 
hypothesis.  It follows that established firms seem to wisely choose to allocate resources more 
conservatively, presumably, due to competitive pressures and associated survival concerns. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we ask whether internal resource allocation practices in established firms differ 
from newly listed firms.  According to the literature established firms are at a disadvantage in 
pursuing new growth opportunities (see Gompers et al. 2005 and the cited literature therein).  
We empirically explore whether established firms allocate fewer resources to high-growth 
lines of business.  First, we show that established firms seem to redirect resources from high-
growth to low-growth segments.  Second, controlling for various factors that impact resource 
allocation we find that segment capital expenditures are less sensitive to growth opportunities 
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in established firms.  Moreover, the effect is economically significant.  The resource 
allocation sensitivity in newly listed firms is approximately three times larger than in 
established firms.  Third, we find no evidence of inefficient resource allocation practices in 
established firms.  Instead of pursuing new growth opportunities, established firms seem to 
allocate resources as a means to strengthen performance of existing business.  We find some 
evidence that the impact of segment capital expenditures on segment profitability in low-
growth segments is higher in established firms.  Finally, we also use two quasi-experiments to 
test whether there is any evidence that the focus by established firms away from high-growth 
to low-growth businesses is evidence of poor allocation of resources.  The evidence rejects 
that hypothesis.  Using the introduction of state antitakeover laws that protect management, 
we find that a lower takeover threat increases (rather than decreasing) established firms’ 
resource allocation to new growth opportunities.  Moreover, using import tariff reductions we 
show that increased product market competition leads to lower (rather than higher) resource 
allocation towards new growth opportunities.  Overall, our empirical evidence supports the 
hypothesis that established firms are structured to serve production and marketing goals 
which compromises the pursuit of new growth opportunities (Holmstrom 1989). 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the segment and firm variables.  Segment variables are shown in Panel A and firm 
variables in Panel B.  Variable definitions are shown in Table 11.  The data refer to segments of conglomerates from 1979 to 
2009.  All continuous and unbounded variables are winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile of their pooled distribution. 
 Mean Median Std. Min Max N 
 
Panel A: Segment variables 
Segment CAPEX 0.084 0.036 0.174 0.000 1.295 42,700 
Segment R&D 0.002 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.064 43,086 
Segment CAPEX and R&D 0.087 0.037 0.178 0.000 1.322 42,700 
Segment asset growth 0.119 0.050 0.394 -0.599 2.409 38,946 
Industry Q 1.401 1.293 0.486 0.749 3.318 41,819 
Fitted Q 1.456 1.412 0.477 0.273 2.974 33,820 
Age-based Q 1.368 1.249 0.496 0.733 3.380 36,319 
Segment cash flow 0.108 0.103 0.203 -1.095 0.782 43,082 
Segment size (Mio. USD) 575.6 98.33 1,384 1.243 9,262 38,957 
Relative segment size 0.399 0.321 0.291 0.014 1.000 38,957 
Segment depreciation 0.054 0.031 0.080 0.002 0.545 43,084 
Segment ROA 0.162 0.148 0.175 -0.509 0.885 38,942 
Segment sales growth 0.149 0.077 0.436 -0.569 2.882 38,917 
       
Panel B: Firm variables 
Number of segments (industries) 2.714 2.000 0.987 2.000 10.000 16,209 
Firm age (years) 24.025 19.000 18.149 1.000 76.000 16,209 
Focus 0.582 0.557 0.187 0.135 1.004 16,209 
KZ-Index -0.890 -0.136 3.321 -17.333 4.661 15,734 
SG&A 0.268 0.227 0.188 0.016 0.951 15,603 
Advertising 0.009 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.132 16,209 
Institutional ownership 0.396 0.383 0.260 0.003 0.971 11,575 
RINV -0.002 -0.001 0.038 -0.185 0.163 16,209 
Firm size 1,688 316.0 4,001 12.81 28,804 16,209 
ROA 0.156 0.153 0.094 -0.088 0.435 15,818 
Leverage 0.285 0.265 0.173 0.000 0.818 16,209 
Firm CAPEX 0.069 0.040 0.090 0.004 0.563 16,072 
Tobin’s Q 1.333 1.174 0.570 0.647 3.775 16,145 
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Table 2: Resource allocation in high- and low-Q segments 
Table 2 displays the mean investment levels in high- and low-Q segments for young and old firms.  We divide the sample in 
newly listed and established firms according to median firm age in a given year.  Segments are classified as low-Q if its 
industry Q is below the sales-weighted average of all segment industry Qs in a given firm-year.  Variable definitions are 
shown in Table 11.  We adjust segment CAPEX by subtracting the median industry level of single-segment firms in Panel B 
and by subtracting a firm’s sales-weighted average of industry-adjusted segment CAPEX in Panel C.  All continuous and 
unbounded variables are winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile of their pooled distribution.  Statistical significance of 
differences in mean levels is based on two-tailed t-tests.  Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), 
and 10% (*) level. 
 Low-Q segment High-Q segment Difference 
Panel A: Segment CAPEX 
Newly listed firms 0.081 0.104 0.023*** 
Established firms 0.070 0.075 0.005*** 
Difference 0.011*** 0.029***  
    
Panel B: Industry-adjusted segment CAPEX 
Newly listed firms 0.020 0.026 0.006** 
Established firms 0.016 0.008 -0.008*** 
Difference 0.004** 0.018***  
    
Panel C: Firm- and industry-adjusted segment CAPEX 
Newly listed firms 0.011 0.015 0.004** 
Established firms 0.011 0.002 -0.009*** 
Difference 0.000 0.013***  
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Table 3: Firm-level evidence 
In Table 3 we investigate firm-level evidence of low resource allocation sensitivity to growth opportunities.  Variable 
definitions are shown in Table 11.  All specifications include year fixed effects.  All continuous and unbounded variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile of their pooled distribution.  Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and 
reported in parentheses.  Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level. 
 RINV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Number of segments -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Firm age  -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.002*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Firm size   0.000 0.000 0.000 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA     -0.012** 
     (0.006) 
KZ-Index     -0.000* 
     (0.000) 
Leverage     -0.000 
     (0.003) 
Firm CAPEX     0.023* 
     (0.013) 
Tobin’s Qt-1     0.001 
     (0.001) 
      
Year fixed effects No No No Yes Yes 
      
Observations 15,901 15,901 15,901 15,901 15,281 
Adj. R-squared 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.006 
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Table 4: Q-sensitivity in newly listed and established firms 
Table 4 investigates the difference in Q-sensitivity between young and old firms.  The dependent variable is segment 
CAPEX.  We estimate the regression equation (3) relating segment investment to growth opportunities for newly listed and 
established firms, separately.  We use median firm age in a given year to divide firm-years into subsamples of newly listed 
and established.  To examine whether the difference in estimated coefficients between newly listed and established firms is 
statistically significant, we estimate a pooled regression with interaction variables between the two explanatory variables and 
a binary variable indicating whether a segment is part of an established firm.  Variable definitions are shown in Table 11.  We 
include year and segment fixed effects.  All continuous and unbounded variables are winsorized at the 1st and the 99th 
percentile of their pooled distribution.  Standard errors are clustered at the segment level and reported in parentheses.  
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level. 
  Industry Q  Segment cash flow  
 N Coefficient (SE)  Coefficient (SE) Adj-R2 
Newly listed firms 21,259 0.042*** (0.007)  -0.044** (0.022) 0.67 
Established firms 20,179 0.014*** (0.005)  -0.036* (0.020) 0.68 
Difference  ***   Insignificant   
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Table 5: Q-sensitivity over time 
Table 5 displays the results of our main segment investment regression model.  The dependent variable is segment CAPEX in 
column (1) to (3), segment CAPEX and R&D in column (4), and segment asset growth in column (5).  Variable definitions 
are shown in Table 11.  We center the variables firm age and industry Q at the sample mean.  All specifications include year 
and segment fixed effects.  All continuous and unbounded variables are winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile of their 
pooled distribution.  Standard errors are clustered at the segment level and reported in parentheses.  Asterisks denote 
statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level. 
 Segment CAPEX Segment CAPEX and R&D  
Segment asset 
growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
Industry Q 0.028*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.034***  0.075*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.010) 
Industry Q × Firm age -0.022*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.021***  -0.030*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)  (0.011) 
Firm age  -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.026*** -0.026***  -0.054** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)  (0.023) 
Segment cash flow -0.025* -0.008 -0.009 -0.012  0.194*** 
 (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)  (0.026) 
Segment size  -0.008*** -0.007** -0.008**  -0.283*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.012) 
Relative segment size  -0.001 -0.013* -0.010  -0.075** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)  (0.030) 
Segment depreciation  0.632*** 0.627*** 0.667***  -0.226* 
  (0.087) (0.086) (0.089)  (0.124) 
Focus   0.048*** 0.046***  0.207*** 
   (0.011) (0.011)  (0.044) 
KZ-Index   -0.001*** -0.001**  -0.012*** 
   (0.000) (0.000)  (0.002) 
       
Segment fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
       
Observations 36,164 36,164 36,164 36,164  36,475 
Adj. R-squared 0.669 0.683 0.684 0.683  0.232 
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Table 6: Alternative measures of growth opportunities 
Table 6 displays the results of our segment investment regression model using alternative measures of segment growth 
opportunities.  We use fitted Qs in column (1) and (2) and age-based Qs in column (3) and (4).  Variable definitions are 
shown in Table 11.  We center the variables firm age and industry Q at the sample mean.  All specifications include year and 
segment fixed effects.  All continuous and unbounded variables are winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile of their 
pooled distribution.  Standard errors are clustered at the segment level and reported in parentheses.  Asterisks denote 
statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level. 
 Segment CAPEX 
 Using fitted Qs Using age-based Qs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Industry Q 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.023*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Industry Q × Firm age -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.014*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Firm age  -0.030*** -0.029*** -0.017** -0.014** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
Segment cash flow -0.024 -0.007 -0.025 -0.004 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) 
Segment size  -0.006*  -0.006* 
  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Relative segment size  -0.018**  -0.015* 
  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Segment depreciation  0.584***  0.658*** 
  (0.094)  (0.097) 
Focus  0.050***  0.047*** 
  (0.012)  (0.012) 
KZ-Index  -0.001***  -0.001*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
     
Segment fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 32,425 32,425 31,468 31,468 
Adj. R-squared 0.676 0.676 0.664 0.681 
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Table 7: Robustness tests 
Table 7 displays the robustness tests of our main segment investment regression model.  In column (1) we use asset-
normalized segment variables.  In column (2) we include firm-level SG&A and advertising expenditures as control variables.  
In column (3) we account for institutional ownership.  In column (4) we re-estimate our main segment investment regression 
using non-aggregated segment data prior to 1997.  Variable definitions are shown in Table 11.  We center the variables firm 
age and industry Q at the sample mean.  All specifications include year and segment fixed effects.  All continuous and 
unbounded variables are winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile of their pooled distribution.  Standard errors are 
clustered at the segment level and reported in parentheses.  Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), 
and 10% (*) level. 
 Segment CAPEX 
 Asset-normalized variables 
Account for alternative 
resources at the firm-
level 
Account for institution-
al ownership 
Non-aggregated seg-
ment data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Industry Q 0.025*** 0.033*** 0.035*** 0.044*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Industry Q × Firm age -0.012*** -0.023*** -0.024*** -0.030*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Firm age  -0.019*** -0.024*** -0.029*** -0.045*** 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) 
Segment cash flow 0.059*** -0.013 -0.020 -0.014 
 (0.006) (0.013) (0.015) (0.017) 
Segment size -0.018*** -0.006** -0.006* -0.014*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Relative segment size -0.003 -0.010 -0.015 -0.018** 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Segment depreciation 0.994*** 0.575*** 0.681*** 0.555*** 
 (0.050) (0.090) (0.095) (0.113) 
Focus 0.018** 0.037*** 0.057*** 0.067*** 
 (0.007) (0.011) (0.013) (0.015) 
KZ-Index -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
SG&A  -0.075***   
  (0.013)   
Advertising  0.032   
  (0.156)   
Institutional ownership   0.048***  
   (0.013)  
     
Segment fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 36,156 34,809 26,126 27,496 
Adj. R-squared 0.541 0.690 0.695 0.697 
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Table 8: Segment performance analysis 
Table 8 displays the results of our segment performance analysis.  The dependent variable equals segment cash flow.  We 
look at low-Q segments in column (1) and (3) and at high-Q segment in column (2) and (4).  In column (3) and (4) we 
normalize segment cash flow, segment CAPEX, and segment R&D by beginning-of-year assets.  Variable definitions are 
shown in Table 11.  We center the variables firm age and segment CAPEX at the sample mean.  All specifications include 
year and segment fixed effects.  All variables are winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile of their pooled distribution.  
Standard errors are clustered at the segment level and reported in parentheses.  Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 
1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level. 
 Segment cash flow Segment cash flow (normalized by beginning-of-year assets) 
 Low-Q High-Q Low-Q High-Q 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Firm age -0.009 -0.012 -0.032* -0.023 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019) 
Segment CAPEX -0.005 -0.088 0.384*** 0.306*** 
 (0.050) (0.059) (0.041) (0.041) 
Segment CAPEX × Firm age -0.069 -0.007 0.110** 0.079 
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.051) (0.053) 
Industry Q 0.036*** 0.012* 0.036*** 0.004 
 (0.012) (0.007) (0.011) (0.006) 
Segment size 0.008 0.000 -0.057*** -0.051*** 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
Relative segment size -0.050*** -0.002 -0.019 -0.034 
 (0.018) (0.026) (0.022) (0.027) 
Segment R&D -0.032 -0.088 0.226 0.519 
 (0.555) (0.266) (0.447) (0.409) 
Segment sales growtht-1 0.020*** 0.010 0.031*** 0.014** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Focus 0.020 -0.016 0.001 -0.038 
 (0.026) (0.030) (0.030) (0.033) 
KZ-Index -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.009*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
     
Segment fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 13,705 12,943 13,705 12,943 
Adj. R-squared 0.614 0.590 0.514 0.528 
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Table 9: Business combination laws 
Table 9 displays the results of our segment investment regression model using a difference-in-difference approach of whether 
firms are incorporated in states that passed antitakeover laws or not.  In column (1) we use the full sample whereas in column 
(2) we exclude firm-year observations where state of incorporation is Delaware.  Control variables are the same as in Table 5.  
Variable definitions are shown in Table 11.  We center the variables firm age and industry Q at the sample mean.  All 
specifications include year and segment fixed effects.  All continuous and unbounded variables are winsorized at the 1st and 
the 99th percentile of their pooled distribution.  Standard errors are clustered at the segment level and reported in parentheses.  
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level. 
 Segment CAPEX 
 Full sample Without firms incorporated in Delaware 
 (1) (2) 
Industry Q 0.040*** 0.040*** 
 (0.007) (0.011) 
Industry Q × Firm age -0.027*** -0.026*** 
 (0.007) (0.010) 
Industry Q × Firm age × bBC 0.017** 0.020* 
 (0.008) (0.011) 
Firm age -0.023*** -0.026*** 
 (0.007) (0.010) 
bBC -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.005) (0.006) 
Industry Q × bBC -0.022*** -0.032*** 
 (0.007) (0.010) 
Firm age × bBC 0.003 -0.006 
 (0.005) (0.007) 
   
Other controls Yes Yes 
Segment fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
   
Observations 32,483 13,773 
Adj. R-squared 0.681 0.660 
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Table 10: Import tariff reductions 
Table 10 shows the results of our segment investment regression model estimated in industries that experienced an import 
tariff reduction over our sample period.  Control variables are the same as in Table 5.  Variable definitions are shown in 
Table 11.  We center the variables firm age and industry Q at the sample mean.  All specifications include year and segment 
fixed effects.  All continuous and unbounded variables are winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile of their pooled 
distribution.  Standard errors are clustered at the segment level and reported in parentheses.  Asterisks denote statistical 
significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level. 
 Segment CAPEX 
 (1) (2) 
Industry Q 0.008** 0.013* 
 (0.004) (0.007) 
Industry Q × Firm age 0.001 0.010 
 (0.005) (0.007) 
Industry Q × Firm age × bTariff  -0.014* 
  (0.008) 
Firm age 0.010 0.010 
 (0.008) (0.008) 
bTariff  0.001 
  (0.004) 
Industry Q × bTariff  -0.004 
  (0.007) 
Firm age × bTariff  0.001 
  (0.006) 
   
Other controls Yes Yes 
Segment fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
   
Observations 4,504 4,504 
Adj. R-squared 0.792 0.792 
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Table 11: Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
Segment variables  
Segment CAPEX Segment capital expenditures (capx) normalized by segment sales (sale).  The data are from COMPUSTAT. 
Segment R&D Segment R&D expenditures (rd) normalized by segment sale (sale).  We replace missing R&D observations with zero.  The data are from COMPUSTAT. 
Segment CAPEX and R&D 
The sum of segment capital expenditures (capx) and segment R&D (rd) normalized by 
segment sales (sale).  We replace missing R&D observations with zero.  The data are from 
COMPUSTAT. 
Segment asset growth The annual percentage change in segment book value of assets (at).  The data are from COMPUSTAT. 
Standard Q 
Lagged median Tobin’s Q of single-segment firms operating in the same industry.  Tobin’s 
Q is computed as market value of assets divided by book value of assets (at).  Market value 
of assets equals market value of equity (csho×prcc_f) plus book value of assets (at) minus 
book value of equity (ceq) minus deferred taxes (txdb).  The data are from COMPUSTAT. 
Fitted Q Predicted lagged Tobin’s Q using the approach of Billett and Mauer (2003). 
Age-based Q Lagged median Tobin’s Q of single-segment firms being in the same age-cohort and operat-ing in the same industry.  The variable is further described in Borghesi et al. (2007). 
Segment cash flow Segment EBITDA normalized by segment sales (sale).  EBITDA equals operating profit (ops) plus depreciation (dp).  The data are from COMPUSTAT. 
Segment size The natural logarithm of beginning-of-year segment assets, computed as end-of-year assets (at) plus depreciation (dp) minus capital expenditures.  The data are from COMPUSTAT. 
Relative segment size Beginning-of-year segment assets divided by the sum of a firm’s beginning-of-year assets.  The data are from COMPUSTAT. 
Segment depreciation Segment depreciation (dp) normalized by segment sales (sale).  The data are from COM-PUSTAT. 
Segment sales growth The annual percentage change in segment sale (sale).  The data are from COMPUSTAT. 
  
Firm variables  
Number of segments 
The natural logarithm of the number of reported segments with distinct 3-digit SIC codes.  
We aggregate reported segments within the same 3-digit SIC codes.  The data are from 
COMPUSTAT. 
Firm age 
The natural logarithm of firm age.  Age is computed as one plus the difference between the 
year under investigation and the firm’s year of birth.  The year of birth is computed as the 
minimum value of: (a) the first year the firm appears on the CRSP tapes; (b) the first year 
the firm appears on the COMPUSTAT tapes; and (c) the first year for which we find a link 
between the CRSP and the COMPUSTAT tapes. 
Focus 
Focus is measured with a Herfindahl index, HI, based on the sales (sale) in the firm’s dif-
ferent business segments:  
N 2
ii 1HI p  , 
where N is the number of reported segments with distinct 3-digit SIC codes, the subscript i 
identifies the segments, and pi is the fraction of the firm’s total sales in the segment in question.  We aggregate segment sales within 3-digit SIC codes.  The data are from COM-
PUSTAT. 
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Variable Definition 
KZ-Index 
The Kaplan and Zingales (1997) measure of a firm’s financial constraints.  We follow 
Lamont, Polk, and Saá-Requejo (2001) and compute the KZ-Index as: -0.001909 
[(ib+dp)/ppentt-1] + 0.2826389[Tobin’s Q] + 3.139193[(dltt+dlc)/(dltt+dlc+seq)] – 39.3678[(dvc+dvp)/ppentt-1] – 1.314759[che/ att-1].  The data are from COMPUSTAT. 
Institutional ownership Percentage of total institutional ownership (instown_perc).  The data are from 13F INSTI-TUTIONAL OWNERSHIP. 
SG&A Selling, general, and administrative expenses (xsga) normalized by sales (sale).  The data are from COMPUSTAT. 
RINV 
RINV is defined as the sum of industry- and firm-adjusted segment CAPEX in a firm’s 
high-Q segments minus the sum of industry- and firm-adjusted segment capital expendi-
tures in a firm’s low-Q segments: 
k n
jt it jt it it
i 1 i n k 1
RINV w Inv w Inv ,
   
     . 
where n is the number of total segments, k is the number of high-Q segments, w equals the 
percentage of segment sales to firm sales (sale), and Inv equals the firm- and industry-
adjusted segment CAPEX.  We industry-adjust segment CAPEX by subtracting median 
industry segment CAPEX of all single-segment firms.  Industry classification is based on 
the narrowest SIC grouping with at least five matched single-segment firms.  Firm- and 
industry-adjusted segment CAPEX equals then segment CAPEX minus the sales-weighted 
average of industry-adjusted segment CAPEX within a firm.  The data are from COM-
PUSTAT. 
Firm size The natural logarithm of the firm’s book value of assets (at).  The data are from COM-PUSTAT. 
ROA Firm operating profits before depreciation and amortization (oibdp) normalized by begin-ning-of-year firm assets (at).  The data are from COMPUSTAT. 
Leverage The ratio of a firm’s long-term debt (dltt + dlc) to assets (at).  The data are from COM-PUSTAT. 
Firm CAPEX Firm capital expenditures (capx) normalized by sales (sale).  The data are from COM-PUSTAT. 
Tobin’s Q 
The ratio of a firm’s market value of assets to the book value of assets (at).  The market 
value of assets equals the sum market value of equity (csho × prcc_f) and the market value 
of debt (at – ceq – txdb).  The data are from COMPUSTAT. 
bBC 
A dummy variable indicating whether state antitakeover laws have been introduced in a 
firm’s state of incorporation (incorp).  The data are from Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) 
and COMPUSTAT. 
bTariff A binary variable indicating whether in a given industry-year an import tariff reduction has been passed or not.  The data are from Frésard and Valta (2012). 
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1. Introduction 
According to Kaplan and Weisbach (1992), divestitures reflect a strategic repositioning of 
firms.  The evidence in John and Ofek (1995), according to which firms divest assets in 
response to inefficient and value-reducing diversification, is consistent with that.  So are the 
findings in Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) that divestitures improve the allocation of 
resources as predicted by a simple model of profit maximization.  Çolak and Whited (2007), 
however, fail to find evidence of an improvement in investment efficiency after divestitures.  
We propose a simple model that explains the strategic repositioning and reconciles it with the 
evidence.   
Our investigation builds on Loderer et al. (2014), who show that, after listing, firms optimally 
focus on their core competences to exploit the opportunities offered by those assets in place.  
In the process, they trim their organizations to serve production and marketing goals 
(Holmstrom 1989), inducing what has been referred to elsewhere as organizational 
“rigidities” (Leonard-Barton 1992).  These rigidities are organizational rules and incentives 
that allow firms to optimally exploit their assets in place.  The focus on assets in place makes 
the exploration of new growth opportunities progressively less profitable.  The managers of 
established (older) firms, therefore, rationally choose to focus their attention on exploiting 
assets in place and to spend less time on exploring growth opportunities.  Under this 
managerial attention hypothesis (MAH), established firms engage in divestitures to free up 
management time needed for refining and exploiting core competences.  However, such 
strategic repositioning does not occur in reaction to ex ante inefficiencies in the firm’s 
investment policy or to lack of profitability.  It simply reflects the attempt to maintain current 
profitability.   
As outlined in more detail below, the MAH has distinct testable implications for the 
characteristics of divesting firms, the divestiture motive, the type of divested assets, as well as 
the post-divestiture investment policy.  In that order, its main empirical predictions are that 1) 
established firms are the predominant sellers of assets, 2) established firms sell assets to focus 
on core competences, 3) established firms sell peripheral assets, especially if they have a 
comparative disadvantage at managing those assets, and 4) established firms return the 
divestiture proceeds to the providers of capital instead of investing them into new growth 
opportunities.  We study a large sample of asset sales by US firms reported on SDC Platinum 
over the years 1985 to 2010 and find strong empirical support for these predictions. 
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Unconditionally, firms in the upper quartile of the age distribution are responsible for 53% of 
all divestitures and 66% of the divested asset values.  The corresponding figures for firms in 
the lower tail are only 12% and 7%, respectively.  Moreover, the unconditional annual 
probability of divesting an asset is 17% for the oldest firms, compared with 4% for the 
youngest firms.  This age effect is separate from other factors that have been found to affect 
divestitures.  Conditionally on a broad set of control variables, the odds ratio of divesting 
increases by 18% if firm age increases by one standard deviation.  In particular, divestitures 
by established firms are not driven by factors such as firm size, profitability, financing 
constraints, positive demand shocks (Maksimovic and Phillips 2001), high liquidity 
(Schlingemann et al. 2002), and past diversifying acquisitions (John and Ofek 1995; 
Maksimovic et al. 2011).  Not only does the probability of a divestiture increase with age, but 
also the size of the divested assets goes up.  Established firms are more likely to engage in 
large asset sales, both in absolute terms as well as in terms of relative values.  Moreover, we 
find statistically the same age effect when we group the sample into small and large firms.  
Therefore, divestitures are indeed an older firm phenomenon.   
The second set of testable implications of the MAH relates to the main motive of divestitures.  
According to the hypothesis, organizational rigidities induce established firms to sell assets to 
free management time that can then be dedicated to core competences.  Consequently, 
established firms in which management time is more of a binding constraint should sell more 
assets.  One way to test this prediction is to look at the firms’ degree of organizational 
complexity.  In complex organizations, managers spend a significant fraction of their time 
coordinating tasks and processes.  In established firms, divestitures can help reduce that 
complexity and thereby lower coordination costs (Rawley 2010).  We therefore expect that 
the divestiture intensity of established firms is positively related to the degree of 
bureaucratization.  The data support this prediction.  We follow Miller and Friesen (1984) and 
Sorensen and Stuart (2000), among others, and use the firm’s selling, general, and 
administrative (SG&A) expenses as a proxy for organizational rules and processes.  We find 
that a unit standard deviation increase in SG&A increases the age effect by as much as 39%.   
Another way to test the prediction is to look at the firms’ competitive environment.  Because 
managerial capacity is scarcer in a dynamic environment, organizational rigidities are more of 
a disadvantage for firms that operate in industries where technological change is imminent.  
Consequently, the divestiture activity of established firms should be livelier in innovative and 
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more competitive industries.  We use the industry median R&D expenditures, normalized by 
assets, as a proxy for industry innovation (Mulherin and Boone 2000) and find that it 
significantly accelerates the age effect in divestitures.  The economic magnitude of the effect 
is palpable as well.  A one standard deviation increase in industry innovation increases the age 
effect by 29%.   
In contrast, the need to divest to free up managerial capacity is less pressing for firms that 
operate in industries protected by barriers to entry.  Established firms in such industries 
should feel less pressure to focus on core competences and therefore exhibit lower divestiture 
intensity.  Following Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011), we use the industry’s capital intensity 
as a proxy for supply-side entry barriers.  The presence of these entry barriers significantly 
lowers divestitures by established firms.  Economically, a one standard deviation increase in 
industry capital intensity decreases the age effect by 18%.   
The third set of testable implications of the MAH relates to the type of divested assets.  If 
established firms sell assets to better focus on core competences, they should be more likely 
to divest peripheral activities than core activities.  To identify peripheral divestitures, we 
compare the industry classification of the selling subsidiary with that of its ultimate parent.  
We assume a divested asset is not part of the firm’s core activities if the selling subsidiary 
operates in a different Fama and French (1997) 48 industry than the ultimate parent.  In line 
with our predictions, non-core divestitures are significantly more likely in established firms.  
The odds ratio of divesting non-core assets increases by 25% with a unit standard deviation 
increase in firm age, that of core assets by only 11%.  The same result holds when estimating 
a bivariate model with sample selection (Heckman 1979) for divesting firms. 
Holding on to non-core activities is particularly unattractive if the difference between the own 
ability to exploit the asset and the potential buyer’s ability to exploit that asset is large.  To 
manage the asset competitively, management would have to dedicate a disproportionate 
fraction of its time to managing it.  Efficiency considerations therefore imply that established 
firms sell non-core assets in areas where their comparative management disadvantage is large.  
We find that to be the case.  Conditional on a non-core asset sale, established firms divest 
assets in industries with higher growth opportunities and higher R&D intensity than their 
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main industry.  Therefore, it does not look as if established firms hold on to non-core assets as 
options to leave the original business.1  
Konica Minolta’s divestiture of their camera business provides a good illustration of these 
considerations.  In 2006, three years after Konica merged with Minolta to boost its ability to 
compete in the digital camera business, the firm sold its camera business altogether to Sony.  
Konica and Minolta’s explanation was that “in today’s era of digital cameras […] it became 
difficult to timely provide competitive products even with our top optical, mechanical and 
electronic technologies.” Apparently, Konica Minolta felt unable to respond to the 
digitalization of cameras.  Selling the growth option rather than exploiting it looked like the 
better alternative.  Sony, who already produced so-called point-and-shoot digital cameras, 
successfully exploited Konica Minolta’s camera technologies and launched its first single-lens 
reflex (SLR) camera.  In the following years, Sony was the fastest growing company in that 
market. 
The evidence so far is that established firms divest assets to improve the focus on their core 
competences.  The last set of testable implications of the MAH addresses the post-divestiture 
activities.  Established firms experience a decline in growth opportunities (Loderer et al. 
2014).  If they divest to free up managerial capacity, they will not invest the proceeds in non-
core activities, but they will also have limited possibilities to invest them in profitable core 
investment opportunities.  Hence, they will not divest to finance new growth, on average (see 
also Phillips and Zhdanov 2013).  Instead, they will return the divestiture proceeds to 
investors.  This is what we find.  We estimate a Heckman selection model that relates post-
divestiture activities to firm age.  Consistent with our predictions, established firms are 
significantly less likely to engage in asset acquisitions or full-firm acquisitions after a 
divestiture.  The effect holds for both diversifying and non-diversifying acquisitions.  
Established firms also scale back their internal growth attempts, as manifested by a decline in 
their R&D expenditures.  In contrast, debt repayments increase and dividend payments go up.  
Therefore, we conclude that established firms choose to return the divestiture proceeds to 
their providers of capital instead of investing them into new ventures. 
Taken together, we find strong empirical support for the MAH of divestitures.  Alternative 
interpretations of the age effect we document are difficult to reconcile with the evidence in its 
                                                 
1 Schlingemann et al. (2002) and Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003) also report that firms often divest seg-
ments in high-growth industries. We show that such behavior is driven by established firms. 
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entirety.  In particular, we know from previous literature that firm age is related to the degree 
of financing constraints (Hadlock and Pierce 2010) and that financially constrained firms are 
more likely to engage in assets sales (Borisova and Brown 2013).  However, because 
established firms are generally viewed as being financially less constrained than young firms, 
they should actually exhibit a lower propensity to divest.  That is inconsistent with the 
evidence.  Firm age could also correlate with post M&A divestitures.  It is well-known that 
divestitures increase after takeovers (see, among others, Maksimovic et al. 2011).  Therefore, 
firm age could, in principle, reflect post-takeover restructurings.  Established firms are more 
likely to have engaged in past mergers and acquisitions.  Consistent with the literature, we 
find that past takeovers accelerate divestitures.  However, we show that this effect cannot 
explain the positive age-dependence of divestitures.  Moreover, the positive age effect on 
divestitures remains positive and significant also when restricting the sample to single-
segment firms and when focusing on firms without any prior M&A or asset acquisition 
activities in the years leading up to the divestiture.   
Arguments similar to ours have been made to explain alternative restructuring activities, 
including spin-offs and entrepreneurial spawning.  Ito (1995) and Chesbrough (2003) argue 
that firms tend to spin-off innovative activities because the structures in place may be an 
obstacle to pursuing these activities successfully.  However, spin-offs are relatively rare 
restructuring events, at least in the U.S. (Ito 1995).  In the context of entrepreneurial 
spawning, Gompers et al. (2005) argue that innovative employees increasingly leave 
established firms to start their own venture.  Such behavior is consistent with the predictions 
of the MAH.  If firms increase the focus on core activities as they get older, it follows that 
they also let go of employees whose skills and incentives are incompatible with that core.  
Entrepreneurial spawning is one way that could happen.  Interestingly, however, Habib et al. 
(2013) argue that older firms should spawn less.  We argue that established firms rationally 
choose to dispose of peripheral activities.  These tests have no counterpart in the literature 
inspired by entrepreneurial spawning.   
Finally, our study is related to the extensive literature in organizational theory that started 
with March (1991) and postulates that organizations face a trade-off between exploring new 
ideas and exploiting existing competences (see also Bernardo and Chowdhry 2002).  Our 
evidence implies that firms, on average, do not pursue a dual strategy of “organizational 
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ambidexterity” but rather choose to scale down exploratory activities as they grow older.  
Divestitures are an economically important way to achieve such strategic repositioning.   
We add to the existing literature in various ways.  First, our study contributes to a better 
understanding of corporate divestitures.  Previous studies focus on internal and external 
capital market inefficiencies as primary drivers of divestiture decisions.  We propose a simple 
hypothesis that predicts substantial divestiture activity also by firms without ex ante 
investment inefficiencies.  The key to our hypothesis is that the core competences of firms 
shift from exploring new ideas to exploiting assets in place as they mature.  Second, 
consistent with our hypothesis, we document that divestitures are an established firm 
phenomenon.  The age effect we uncover is economically significant and cannot be explained 
by alternative explanations proposed by the literature.  Third, we show that the purpose of 
divestitures in established firms is to free up managerial capacity to dedicate to the firm’s 
core.  Fourth, we also contribute to the evidence that established firms do not change their 
core competences over time.  They choose to sell non-core assets even if these assets are 
located in industries with higher growth prospects than the firm’s core industry.   
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 presents the data and the empirical strategy in more 
detail.  Section 3 documents that divestitures are an established firm phenomenon.  Section 4 
shows that established firms divest assets to free management time.  Section 5 shows that the 
propensity to divest non-core assets increases with firm age.  Section 6 investigates how firms 
use the proceeds from divestitures.  Section 7 tests alternative interpretations of the evidence.  
Finally, Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. Data and empirical strategy 
2.1. Sample description 
We use the SDC Platinum database to extract data on asset sales.  Following 
Warusawitharana (2008), we include all transactions classified by SDC as either “Acquisition 
of Assets” or “Acquisition of Certain Assets” starting in 1985.  Our sample period ends in 
2010.  The literature applies several additional sample selection criteria, which we adopt.  
First, we exclude transactions where the seller and the acquirer share the same CUSIP number 
(Gormley and Matsa 2011).  Second, we omit uncompleted transactions.  Third, we require 
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that the seller’s ultimate parent is a publicly listed firm with available data on CRSP and 
COMPUSTAT.  We match the SDC database to the COMPUSTAT/CRSP merged database 
using the 6-digit CUSIP of the seller’s ultimate parent and the historical NCUSIP on CRSP.  
Moreover, we check the match by comparing company names provided in SDC and CRSP.   
Our initial sample consists of all firms with available data on the COMPUSTAT/CRSP 
merged database as well as the COMPUSTAT segment files (excluding ADRs).  As in Berger 
and Ofek (1995), we exclude firm-years if the sum of segment sales deviates from total firm 
sales by more than 1%.2 Moreover, we require that firm-years have positive assets and 
positive sales.  Finally, we exclude firm-years that are categorized as financial firms or 
regulated utilities, according to the Fama-French 48 industry classification, as well as firm-
years with at least one segment in the utility (SIC 4900 – 4941) or financial (SIC 6000 – 
6999) sector.  These screens lead to a final sample of 70,220 firm-years, with sufficient data 
to compute all relevant variables.  Our sample includes a total of 13,001 divestiture 
transactions with an average deal size of USD 62.8 million.   
 
2.2. Basic regression models 
To test the predictions from the MAH for divestitures, we model the divestiture of a particular 
asset by firm i in year t as a function of Firm age, our main explanatory variable, a number of 
control variables (X) suggested by the literature, as well as industry fixed effects (α) and year 
fixed effects (δ).  Since divestitures presumably react to their determining factors with a lag, 
all regression arguments are lagged by one year throughout the analysis: 
it j t it 1 it 1 ijtDivestiture Firm age X           (1) 
We measure divestitures in three different ways: The first and main measure is a binary 
variable that identifies firm-years with at least one reported asset sale on SDC Platinum 
(bDivestiture).  In this case the regression model takes the form of a logistic regression.  The 
second measure counts the number of reported divestitures in any given firm-year (Num 
Divestitures).  This model is estimated with negative binomial regressions.  The third measure 
                                                 
2 Any unallocated sales are proportionally allocated to the firm’s individual segments (Berger and Ofek 
1995; Billett and Mauer 2003). To limit bias from segment reporting changes (Berger and Hann 2003; 
Dittmar and Shivdasani 2003), we follow Gopalan and Xie (2011) and aggregate a firm’s segment account-
ing data over all segments that share the same 3-digit SIC code. 
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reflects the relative value of the divested assets by dividing the total reported value of all asset 
sales during a particular year by the firm’s beginning-of-year market capitalization (RelVal 
Divestitures).  This model is estimated with a generalized linear model (glm) with a binomial 
distribution and a logit link function (Papke and Woolridge 1996).  To account for serial 
correlation in the error term, we cluster standard errors at the firm level throughout our 
investigation (Petersen 2009). 
Our main variable of interest is Firm age, measured as the natural logarithm of the number of 
years since listing.  The MAH predicts that older firms are more likely to divest assets.  We 
control for various variables that affect divestitures according to the literature.  First, Datta et 
al. (2003) find that the seller’s managerial performance is an important determinant of the 
divestiture decision.  Their proxy for managerial performance is Tobin’s q.  Tobin’s q also is 
a proxy for the firm’s growth opportunities (Hayashi 1982).  Second, the literature finds that 
firms are more likely to divest assets following poor firm performance (John et al. 1992) and, 
more recently, following negative shocks in productivity (Warusawitharana 2008; Yang 
2008) or demand (Maksimovic and Phillips 2001).  We include return on assets (ROA) as a 
proxy for firm performance and productivity.  Third, as organizations increase in size, 
managerial diseconomies of scale may occur (Mueller 1969).  Thus, firms may divest simply 
to return to optimal size (Warusawitharana 2008).  Therefore, we control for firm size, 
measured with the natural logarithm of book value of assets.  Fourth, Lang et al. (1995) argue 
that asset sales provide funds when alternative financing channels are too expensive due to 
transaction costs and information asymmetries.  To control for financing needs, we include a 
measure of a firm’s financing gap (Çolak and Whited 2007), firm leverage, as well as cash 
reserves.  Sixth, the literature finds that divesting firms exhibit slower growth and lower 
investments than non-divesting firms (Çolak 2010; Schlingemann et al. 2002).  Hence, we 
control for historical sales growth as well as capital expenditures and R&D expenditures.  
Seventh, firms sell assets in response to inefficient and value-reducing diversification (John 
and Ofek 1995).  To account for this, we include a Herfindahl index of segment sales as well 
as the firm’s excess value as measured in Berger and Ofek (1995).  Eighth, the takeover 
literature finds that divestitures are a common post-takeover restructuring activity (Bhagat et 
al. 1990; Bhide 1989; Maksimovic et al. 2011).  Post-merger divestitures may comply with 
antitrust legislation or be used to retire takeover related debt (Kaplan and Weisbach 1992).  
Alternatively, firms could dispose of specific assets after an acquisition because they do not 
fit their strategy.  Consistent with this hypothesis, Maksimovic et al. (2011) find that firms 
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sell assets within three years after a merger.  In the spirit of Maksimovic et al. (2011), we 
include the relative value of firm acquisitions over the previous three years as a control.  
Finally, we add industry and year fixed effects (Warusawitharana 2008).  Year fixed effects 
help us account for the fact that more assets are reallocated in expansion years (Maksimovic 
and Phillips 2001) as well as for the refocusing wave of the late 1980s (Berger and Ofek 
1999).  As we have already mentioned, all control variables are measured in the fiscal year 
prior to the divestiture.  Moreover, to reduce the influence of outliers, we winsorize all 
continuous and unbounded variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  Detailed variable 
definitions are in Table 10 at the end of the paper.  In all our tables, the reported statistical 
significance tests are two-tailed.   
 
2.3. Summary statistics 
Table 1 reports summary statistics of the main variables between 1985 and 2010.  Panel A 
shows the summary statistics for the measures of divestiture activity.  In any given year, the 
unconditional probability of a divestiture is 8.3%.  The mean number of assets sold is 0.124 
per year and these assets account for 0.8% of the firm’s market value of equity.  Conditional 
on a divestiture, we find that the average number of transactions is 1.5 per year.  In that case, 
the divested assets account for 9.5% of firm market value (not reported in a separate table).  
Panel B reports the summary statistics of the firm control variables.   
 
3. Firm age and divestitures 
We start our empirical investigation by looking into the relation between firm age and 
divestiture activity.  The main prediction of the MAH is that older firms should be more likely 
to divest.  The first subsection shows univariate analyses of the divestiture activity across age 
cohorts.  The second subsection turns to multivariate regressions.  The third subsection 
provides an additional test of the prediction that the importance of divestitures is greater in 
older firms.  In addition, it provides additional evidence that the age effect is not a firm size 
effect.   
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3.1. Univariate analysis 
Table 2 compares the sample firms’ divestiture activity across four age cohorts that reflect 
similar numbers of observations, namely ages 1 to 4, 5 to 9, 10 to 19, and older than 19, 
respectively.  We know from Table 1 that the unconditional probability of an asset sale is 
8.3% per year.  Table 2 shows that this probability increases to 17% for the oldest firms (age 
20 or more) and drops to 4% for the youngest firms (age 1 to 4).  Old firms are also the main 
seller of assets in terms of transaction value.  They account for 65.8% of the cumulative 
transaction value whereas the youngest firms account for only 6.5%.  Note, however, that the 
oldest firms are also considerably larger, on average, as they represent 61.4% of the 
cumulative market value of the sample firms.  In contrast, the youngest firms represent only 
9.2% of the cumulative market value.  However, as shown below, the divestiture activity of 
the oldest firms remains disproportionally high also when we control for firm size. 
Panel B focuses on divestitures of non-core assets.  The MAH predicts that old firms are 
particularly active sellers of non-core assets.  We classify a divestiture as non-core if it is 
conducted by a subsidiary that operates in a different Fama-French 48 industry than its 
ultimate parent.  We observe 5,681 such non-core divestitures (44% of all divestitures).  The 
panel shows that the overwhelming majority of all non-core divestitures are conducted by 
firms older than 20 years.  This age cohort also accounts for 61.9% of the transactions and 
76.5% of the transaction value.  The transaction value exceeds the old firms’ fraction in 
market share by a factor 1.25.  Non-core divestitures by younger firms are comparatively less 
frequent.  For example, the youngest firms, which represent 9.2% of the market capitalization, 
account for less than 5% of the transaction value.  Therefore, divestitures indeed appear to be 
an older firm phenomenon, especially when it comes to non-core assets.   
 
3.2. Multivariate analysis 
Table  shows that the positive age dependence of divestitures also holds in a multivariate 
context.  In regression 1, the dependent variable is a binary variable that identifies firm-years 
with asset sales (bDivestiture).  In that regression, Firm age is positive and highly significant.  
Moreover, with an odds-ratio of 1.179 (column 2), the effect of a one standard deviation 
change in age is among the most powerful determinants of asset divestitures.  Only Firm size 
(odds ratio of 2.5) and Financing gap (odds ratio of 1.285) have a higher effect.  ROA, Focus, 
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and Excess value are approximately as important, and Tobin’s q, Sales growth, and the firm’s 
investment policy (R&D and CAPEX) are less important.   
Regressions 3 and 4 measure divestitures alternatively with the number of divestitures and the 
relative value of divested assets and find consistent evidence.  Divestiture frequency and 
importance increases significantly with firm age. 
The coefficients of the control variables are generally consistent with previous studies on 
asset sales.  Profitability, sales growth, growth opportunities, and excess value lower the 
propensity to sell assets, which is consistent with the q-theory of investments 
(Warusawitharana 2008).  The negative coefficient of profitability is particularly interesting 
because it confirms that poor performance increases the probability of divestiture.  We also 
find that focused firms sell fewer assets.  In contrast, larger firms and firms with limited 
financial resources (Financing gap, Leverage, Cash) are more likely to divest.  This is 
consistent with the belief that financially constrained firms divest more.  As the results show, 
however, the financing constraints effect is separate from the age effect.  CAPEX is also 
negatively associated with divestitures, which could be another indicator of the financing 
constraints motive of asset sales.  Finally, and consistent with Maksimovic et al. (2011), we 
find that firms are more likely to divest assets in the years following firm acquisitions.   
Panel B shows that the results are robust to alternative age measures.  In regression 1, we 
allow for an inverse U-shaped relation between age and divestitures and therefore use listing 
age (in years) as well as its squared term.  The linear effect is positive and significant whereas 
Firm age-squared takes on a negative and significant coefficient.  The coefficients imply a 
turning point around listing age 70.3  This corresponds to the 99th percentile of the sample 
distribution of age.  Therefore, the marginal effect of age diminishes at old age, but it does not 
become negative.  Regression 2 measures age with a binary variable that identifies firms older 
than the median firm in the same industry-year (bOld).  Being an old firm increases the odds 
ratio of asset divestitures by 1.24.  Finally, regression 3 uses piecewise linear age measures 
and confirms that divestitures are an old-firm phenomenon.4  
                                                 
3 We use non-rounded coefficients to compute the turning point of the age-effect. 
4 Because Sales growth is the average growth rate over the preceding three years, the youngest firm in our 
regression has listing age 4. The cutoff-points we choose for the piecewise-linear regressions correspond to 
the first, second, and third quartile of the age distribution of all firm-years that enter the regression. The 
results are robust to alternative cutoff-points. 
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In untabulated regressions, we also use the firm’s net acquisition rate as a proxy for its 
divestiture activity.  Following Warusawitharana (2008), this variable takes a value of –1 if 
the transaction value of the divestitures exceeds the transaction value of the asset acquisitions 
in any given firm-year, a value of 1 if the transaction value of the acquired assets exceeds that 
of the divested assets, and a value of 0 otherwise.  We find that the net acquisition rate drops 
as firms get older and that established firms are significantly more likely to be net sellers of 
assets than young firms.   
 
3.3. Large divestitures and divestitures by large firms  
Before we turn to the specific predictions of the MAH concerning divestiture motives and 
types of divested assets, we want to buttress the evidence that the relevance of divestitures 
increases with company age, and that the age effect is not a firm size effect.  The results are 
reported in Table 4.  Panel A looks at large divestitures, defined alternatively as transactions 
with a value higher than USD 100 million, USD 10 million, and 5% of the market value of 
equity.  Transactions for which no value is reported are classified as small divestitures (Netter 
et al. 2011), though the results remain the same when we exclude these transactions.  For each 
definition, we estimate separate regressions for small and large divestitures on the 
determining factors.  Regardless of size definition, we find that both large and small 
divestitures increase with company age.   
Panel B compares the divestiture behavior of small and large firms.  In small firms, age is 
associated with a 12% increase in the odds ratio of a divestiture.  In large firms, the 
corresponding increase in the odds ratio is 20%.  While numerically larger, the effect is 
statistically the same.  Therefore, we conclude that the positive age-dependence of 
divestitures does not reflect a size effect. 
 
4. Firm age, organizational rigidities, and divestitures 
The MAH predicts that established firms sell assets to free up management time that can be 
used to manage core competences.  Consequently, established firms in which management 
time is a more binding constraint should be particularly active sellers of assets.  The following 
subsections test this prediction and find supportive evidence.   
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4.1. Organizational complexity and divestitures in established firms 
First, we investigate whether the divestiture intensity of established firms increases in the 
degree of organizational complexity.  In complex organizations, much of management’s 
attention is diverted to coordinating activities.  Holmstrom (1989) argues that in established 
firms this development is rational because it serves production and marketing goals.  
Divestitures help firms reduce organizational complexity and lower the associated 
coordination costs (Rawley 2010).  We therefore expect that established firms with 
comparatively complex organizations are more likely to divest assets.  Following Miller and 
Friesen (1984) and Sorenson and Stuart (2000), among others, we use the firm’s selling, 
general, and administrative expenditures (SG&A) as a measure of the firm’s administrative 
rules and procedures, normalized by sales.   
To find out, we add the firms’ SG&A as well as an interaction term with firm age to the 
standard regression model 1 from Table 3.  Regression 1 in Table 5 shows the results.  In that 
regression, the coefficient of SG&A alone is statistically zero, indicating that complex 
structures per se do not induce divestitures.  Firm age maintains its positive and significant 
coefficient.  More importantly, and consistent with our predictions, however, the interaction 
term of the two variables takes on a significantly positive coefficient.  The economic effect is 
quite remarkable.  According to our estimates, a one standard deviation increase in SG&A 
(0.614) increases the age-effect by 0.098 (= 0.614 × 0.160) or by 39% (= 0.098 / 0.250).  
Therefore, we conclude that established firms with complex organizational structures 
significantly scale up their divestiture activities, as predicted by the MAH. 
 
4.2. Industry environment, structural rigidities, and divestitures 
Another way to test whether established firms divest assets to relax constraints on 
management time is to look at the firm’s competitive environment.  Firms that operate in 
innovative industries face a higher risk of obsolescence (Audretsch 1995; Reinganum 1985).  
To fight obsolescence, management has to dedicate more of its time to optimizing assets in 
place.  It follows that managerial capacity is scarcer in an environment where technological 
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change is fast-paced, which is why the divestiture activity of established firms should be 
particularly brisk in innovative industries. 
To find out, we measure the industry’s innovation intensity with the median R&D-to-assets 
ratio (Industry R&D).  We identify industries at the SIC 4-digit level in any given year.  The 
results are robust to the use of alternative classifications, including the SIC 3-digit or the 
Fama-French 48 industry level.  In regression 2 of Table 5, we extend our standard model 
with the addition of the variable Industry R&D as well as an interaction term between 
Industry R&D and Firm age.  The coefficient of Industry R&D is positive and significant, 
indicating that the divestiture activity per se is higher in innovative industries.  This shows 
that industry shocks spur the reallocation of assets (Harford 2005).  Most important, however, 
the interaction term between the two variables is positive and significant, consistent with our 
prediction.  According to our estimates, a one standard deviation increase in Industry R&D 
increases the age-effect by 29%.5  
By the same argument we just made, firms that operate in industries protected by entry 
barriers should be less threatened by obsolescence and, therefore, feel less pressure to free up 
management time to optimize assets in place.  We would therefore expect established firms to 
be less active divestors if they operate in protected industries.  We follow Bhattacharyya and 
Nain (2011) and measure supply-side entry barriers with the industry-wide ratio of total assets 
to total sales in a particular SIC-4digit industry (Capital intensity).  Regression 3 of Table 5 
extends the standard regression with Capital intensity as well as its interaction term with Firm 
age.  In line with our predictions, the interaction term has a negative and significant 
coefficient, particularly in a one-tailed test.  A one standard deviation increase in Capital 
intensity decreases the age-effect by 18%.6 Note that Capital Intensity itself has no impact on 
the likelihood of a divestiture.   
Finally, in column 4, we include both measures of industry dynamics as well as their 
interaction terms with firm age.  The results remain qualitatively the same.  Industry 
innovation accelerates the age effect in divestitures whereas industry entry barriers slow it 
down.   
                                                 
5 The standard deviation of Industry R&D is 0.062. Hence, the age-effect increases by 0.073 (= 
0.062×1.179) or by 29% (= 0.073 / 0.249). 
6 The standard deviation of Capital intensity is 0.660. Hence, the age-effect decreases by 0.042 (= 0.660×-
0.063) or by 18% (= 0.042 / 0.231). 
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5. Corporate aging and non-core assets sales 
The evidence so far is that established firms step up their divestiture activities to free scarce 
managerial capacity.  The MAH predicts that the managers of established firms dedicate that 
capacity to managing core competences.  Consequently, we would expect that established 
firms are particularly likely to sell assets that are not part of the firm’s core business.  The 
univariate analysis in Table 2 has shown that such non-core divestitures are indeed an older 
firm phenomenon.  This section first investigates the relation between firm age and non-core 
divestitures in a multivariate context.  Then we test whether established firms sell non-core 
assets in industries where they have a comparative disadvantage at managing the asset.   
 
5.1. Multivariate analysis 
Panel A of Table 6 distinguishes between core and non-core divestitures based on the selling 
subsidiary’s industry affiliation.  As before, an asset divestiture is considered non-core if the 
selling entity is a subsidiary that operates in a different industry than its ultimate parent.  We 
estimate separate logistic regressions for core and non-core divestitures.  For reading 
convenience, we do not report the coefficients of the control variables. 
The results are consistent with our predictions.  Firm age significantly increases the 
probability of both core and non-core divestitures.  The economic effect, however, is 
considerably stronger in the context of non-core divestitures.  When we define core at the 
Fama-French 48 industries level, a unit standard deviation increase in Firm age increases the 
odds ratio of a core divestiture by 11% (regression 1) whereas that of a non-core divestiture 
increases by 25% (regression 2).  The results are qualitatively the same when we identify core 
activities at the SIC 2-digit (regression 3 and 4) or the SIC 3-digit level (regressions 5 and 6).   
Panel B shows that the results are robust to alternative definitions of core and non-core 
divestitures.  We alternatively identify non-core divestitures as a) transactions where the 
acquiring firm (as opposed to the selling subsidiary) operates in a different industry than the 
selling firm; b) transactions that increase the strategic focus of the selling entity, as measured 
with a segment sales-weighted Herfindahl index; and c) transactions that are followed by a 
reduction in the seller’s number of reported segments.  Regardless of how we define non-core 
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divestitures, they are associated with a stronger age effect than core divestitures, consistent 
with the MAH. 
In untabulated regressions, we also estimate a probit model that addresses the potential 
problem of sample selection with a Heckman two-stage procedure (Heckman 1979; Miranda 
and Rabe-Hesketh 2006).  In this procedure, we first model the decision to divest and then 
estimate a second-stage regression for the subsample of divesting firms to examine the choice 
between core and non-core divestitures.  We find that established firms are more likely to sell 
non-core assets than core assets even after correcting for potential sample selection.   
 
5.2. Non-core assets sales in dynamic industries 
Non-core asset sales of established firms should be particularly frequent if the assets in 
question are located in innovative and rapidly growing industries.  As the firm focuses its 
organization on production and marketing goals in the core industry, it is at a comparative 
disadvantage to explore new ideas outside that core.  To remain competitive, the management 
would have to spend a disproportionate amount of time on managing such non-core assets.  It 
is therefore more profitable to divest these assets.   
To test this prediction, we estimate a Heckman selection model that relates divestitures in 
rapidly growing non-core industries to firm age with limited information maximum likelihood 
(LIML).  The Heckman selection model enables us to investigate whether established firms 
divest assets in high-growth industries conditional on the decision to divest non-core assets.  
In the first stage, we model the decision to divest non-core assets, using Firm acquisitions as 
instrumental variable.  This variable strongly predicts non-core divestitures but it does not 
appear to affect the choice between high- and low-growth divestitures.7  In the second stage 
regression, we then investigate whether, conditional on a non-core divestiture, firms divest 
assets that are located in non-core industries with high growth opportunities.  Because the 
dependent variable in that regression is dichotomous, we use a probit model specification.  
Table 7 shows the results.   
                                                 
7 In untabulated regressions, we add Firm acquisition as a control variable to the outcome regression. Its coeffi-
cient is statistically zero.  
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Regression 1 defines core and non-core assets based on the selling subsidiary’s Fama-French 
48 industry code.  A high-growth divestiture is assumed if the subsidiary’s industry has a 
higher median Tobin’s Q than its ultimate parent’s industry has.  Regression 2 replicates the 
analysis with industry definitions based on SIC 3-digit codes.  Regardless of industry 
definition, we find that old firms are significantly more likely to sell non-core assets that are 
located in comparatively high-growth industries.  The significant coefficient of rho indicates 
that without the Heckman correction there would be a sample selection problem.  Therefore, 
firms that divest non-core assets are not a random subsample.  In untabulated regressions, we 
replicate the analysis for non-core divestitures in industries with higher R&D-intensity than 
the ultimate parent’s main industry.  Consistent with our predictions, the evidence is that 
established firms are more likely to divest non-core assets that are located in R&D-intensive 
industries.   
 
6. Use of proceeds from asset sales 
The evidence so far is that firms divest assets to free management time to focus on exploiting 
core competences.  The last step of the investigation asks how established firms use the 
divestiture proceeds.  Since established firms tend to have lower Q ratios (Loderer et al. 
2014), they are less likely to invest them in core activities.  At the same time, they will not 
invest them in non-core activities, since that is what they want to avoid in the first place.  We 
therefore expect established firms to return the money to the providers of capital.  That is 
what we find. 
Table 8 estimates a Heckman selection model that relates various post-divestiture activities to 
firm age.  In the first stage of the model, we estimate the standard divestiture model from 
Table 3.  The second stage then examines how, conditional on divesting, firm age is related to 
various corporate policies.  Firm acquisitions is the instrument to predict divestitures in the 
first-stage regression.  We therefore exclude this variable from the second stage.  The policies 
we consider in the second stage are asset acquisitions in column 1, diversifying firm 
acquisitions in column 2, non-diversifying firm acquisitions in column 3, capital expenditures 
in column 4, R&D expenditures in column 5, debt repayment in column 6, and payouts to 
shareholders in column 7.  All dependent variables are measured in the year of the divestiture.  
The results remain qualitatively the same if we measure the dependent variables in the years 
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following the divestiture.  In columns 1 to 3, where the dependent variables are dichotomous, 
we implement the Heckman probit model with LIML estimation and report the correlation 
between the error terms of the first-stage and second-stage regression (rho).  In columns 4 to 
7, where the dependent variables are continuous, we use Heckman’s (1979) two-step 
procedure and report the estimated coefficient of Inverse Mills ratio in the second-stage 
regression.   
The evidence is consistent with the predictions of the MAH.  Old firms do not scale up their 
investment activities in reaction to divestitures.  To the contrary, we find that their propensity 
to acquire assets and other firms drops significantly after a divestiture.  Therefore, the finding 
of Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) that divestitures are used to finance subsequent acquisitions 
does not seem to apply to older firms.  Moreover, older firms significantly reduce their R&D 
expenditures after divestitures.  Instead, they return more money to the providers of capital.  
Both debt repayments and dividend payouts increase significantly after divestitures. 
 
7. Alternative interpretations 
In the last step of the investigation, we turn to potential alternative interpretations of the age 
effect on divestitures.  First, we ask whether the effect can be explained by differences in 
financing constraints between young and old firms.  Then we test whether the age effect is 
driven by the unwinding of past mergers and acquisitions.   
 
7.1. Firm age and financing constraints 
The financing constraints interpretation of the evidence can easily be dismissed.  As Hadlock 
and Pierce (2010) show, financing constraints decline significantly with firm age.  The 
financing constraints hypothesis would therefore predict that established firms are less likely 
to engage in asset sales than young firms are.  The evidence, we saw is therefore at odds with 
this hypothesis. 
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7.2. Firm age and post-merger restructurings 
The second alternative interpretation we entertain relates to the observation that divestitures 
are a common mechanism to unwind diversification or dispose of assets that were previously 
acquired in a takeover (see, among others, Maksimovic et al. 2011).  According to Arikan and 
Stulz (2011), the acquisition rate of firms does not fall with age.  Still, because they have been 
around for a longer time, established firms are more likely to have acquired other firms or 
assets in the years leading up to the divestiture we observe.  Therefore, the age effect we 
observe could, in principle, be spurious and be caused by post-takeover restructuring 
activities.   
Table 9 tests this alternative interpretation.  In regression 1, we ask how firm and asset 
acquisitions during the three years preceding the divestiture year affect the age-dependence of 
divestiture decisions.  To find out, we extend our standard regression with an interaction term 
between Firm age and Firm acquisitions.  We also interact Firm age with Asset acquisitions.  
Consistent with previous studies, we find that both Asset acquisitions and Firm acquisitions 
accelerate the divestiture intensity, as measured by their positive and significant coefficients.  
Moreover, the two interaction terms with Firm age are statistically zero, indicating that the 
divestiture activity of established firms is not livelier following firm and asset acquisitions.  
More importantly for our purposes, Firm age maintains its positive and significant coefficient.  
The size of that coefficient is the same as in the standard regression from Table 3.  
Consequently, post-takeover restructurings are not responsible for the age effect we observe.   
We reach similar conclusions when we limit the sample to firms without any previous 
acquisition activities according to SDC Platinum.  Regression 2 omits all firms with at least 
one previous firm acquisition, and regression 3 omits all firms with at least one firm or asset 
acquisition.  In both regressions, the coefficient of Firm age is positive and highly significant.  
Finally, regression 4 limits the attention to firms with only one reported segment on the 
COMPUSTAT Business Segment tapes.  Also in that regression, Firm age is positive and 
significant.  This confirms that past acquisitions cannot explain the positive age-divestiture 
relation we uncovered. 
 
 
 60 
 
8. Conclusions 
This paper asks whether divestiture decisions are consistent with the managerial attention 
hypothesis advanced by Loderer et al. (2014).  We test whether established firms use 
divestitures to free up management time and increase their focus on core competences.  We 
find strong empirical support for these predictions. 
First, we show that both the probability to divest and the relative value of the divested assets 
increase significantly with firm age.  The economic effect is considerable, as a one standard 
deviation increase in firm age is associated with an 18% increase in divestiture probability.  
Second, we show that the divestiture evidence is consistent with the prediction that 
established firms attempt to free scarce management time.  The divestiture activity of 
established firms intensifies at times when managerial capacity is particularly scarce and 
slows down when managers feel less competitive pressure.  Third, the evidence supports the 
proposition that established firms divest assets to increase their focus on core competences.  
They are the main sellers of non-core assets and they dispose of peripheral activities even if 
these activities are located in industries with better growth prospects than the firm’s core 
industry.  This implies that firms, on average, do not keep non-core assets as options to exit 
the original business.  Finally, established firms do not use the divestiture proceeds to finance 
new growth opportunities.  Instead, they return that money to the providers of capital. 
According to the MAH, the managers of established firms rationally choose to dispose of 
assets that have a poor strategic fit with the firm’s core.  This hypothesis can explain why a 
substantial part of divestitures is conducted by financially unconstrained firms and why such 
divestitures do not necessarily lead to observable efficiency gains for the selling firm (Çolak 
and Whited 2007).  The reason for the latter is that the refocusing is meant to maintain 
profitability, something that is consistent with no changes in post-divestiture profitability.   
Our study has implications for the life cycle of listed firms.  Combined with the findings in 
Loderer et al. (2014), the regularities that seem to crystalize are as follows.  Firms list to 
exploit available growth opportunities.  They therefore choose to focus more on their assets in 
place than on generating new growth opportunities.  This specialization affects their 
organization and their incentive systems and acts as a filter for the type of employees they 
attract.  They become very efficient at what they do but comparatively strategically and 
operationally inflexible.  In the process, to free up valuable managerial capacity to dedicate to 
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assets in place, they divest assets, particularly valuable non-core assets.  The saying that 
“cobblers should stick to their last” fully applies to listed corporations as well.  Eventually, 
they are taken over or fail (Loderer and Waelchli 2014). 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for our variables.  The data refer to firm-years between 1985 and 2010.  Panel A 
summarizes the three measures of divestiture activity and Panel B the firm characteristics.  Variable definitions are in Table 
10.  All firm characteristics are measured at the fiscal year ending prior to the divestiture announcement.   
 Mean Median Std. Min Max N 
 
Panel A: Asset sales variables 
bDivestiture 0.083 0.000 0.275 0.000 1 105,018 
Num divestiture 0.124 0.000 0.529 0.000 16 105,018 
RelVal divestitures 0.008 0.000 0.050 0.000 0.424 104,410 
       
Panel B: Firm characteristics 
Firm age (years) 13.44 9.000 13.61 1.000 70.00 105,406 
Tobin’s Q 2.104 1.468 1.885 0.552 12.32 104,759 
ROA 0.069 0.115 0.245 -1.045 0.574 95,886 
Assets (million) 764.2 91.64 2,259 1.472 16,463 105,401 
Financing gap 0.084 -0.003 0.323 -0.418 1.778 98,095 
Leverage 0.229 0.184 0.222 0.000 1.011 105,398 
Cash 0.190 0.095 0.222 0.000 0.895 105,380 
Sales growth 0.857 0.291 2.416 -0.852 18.55 78,327 
CAPEX 0.079 0.047 0.098 0.001 0.599 94,916 
R&D 0.056 0.000 0.109 0.000 0.631 99,946 
Focus  0.920 1.000 0.177 0.146 1.000 105,406 
Excess value 0.116 0.035 0.712 -1.386 1.386 102,582 
Firm acquisitions 0.034 0.000 0.125 0.000 1.810 105,406 
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Table 2: Univariate analysis of asset divestitures 
The table shows how the number of asset sales, the value of divested assets, and the probability of an asset sale varies with 
firm age.  We group all firm-year observations into four age-categories of approximately equal sample size.  The data refer to 
firms from 1985 to 2010.  Panel A refers to all divestitures.  Panel B looks at non-core divestitures.  We identify a divestiture 
as core if the selling subsidiary operates in the same industry as its ultimate parent.  Otherwise, we assume a non-core 
divestiture.  We use the Fama and French 48-industry classification.   
 Fraction of firm-year observations 
Number of asset 
divestitures 
Transaction value 
(billions) 
Cohort size 
(market value, 
billions) 
Size-adjusted 
transaction value 
(Value/Cohort 
size) 
Probability of an 
asset divestiture
       
Panel A: All divestitures 
All firm-years 100.0% 13,001 816.4 180,357.8 - 8.26% 
 Distribution Distribution Distribution Distribution Distribution Distribution 
1 to 4 28.3% 12.1% 6.5% 9.2% 0.71 4.18% 
5 to 9 23.7% 15.3% 11.0% 10.4% 1.06 6.07% 
10 to 19 25.5% 19.9% 16.7% 19.0% 0.88 7.23% 
20 or more 22.5% 52.7% 65.8% 61.4% 1.07 16.89% 
       
Panel B: Non-core divestitures (using subsidiary information & FF48-industry classification) 
All firm-years 100.0% 5,681 330.5 180,357.8 - 3.86% 
 Distribution Distribution Distribution Distribution Distribution Distribution 
1 to 4 28.3% 10.0% 4.9% 9.2% 0.53 1.60% 
5 to 9 23.7% 11.8% 6.0% 10.4% 0.58 2.25% 
10 to 19 25.5% 16.3% 12.6% 19.0% 0.66 2.81% 
20 or more 22.5% 61.9% 76.5% 61.4% 1.25 9.61% 
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Table 3: Determinants of divestitures 
Panel A of the table shows the estimation results of the main regression equation relating asset sales to firm age.  In column 
1, the dependent variable is a binary that identifies firm-years with asset sales (bDivestiture).  For ease of interpretation, 
column 2 reports the odds-ratios for a unit standard deviation increase in the respective variable.  In column 3, the dependent 
variable measures the number of asset divestitures in any given year.  The model is implemented using a negative binomial 
specification.  In column 4, the dependent variable is the relative value of the divested assets and the model is implemented 
with a fractional logit glm specification.  Panel B replicates regression 1 of Panel A for alternative age measures.  We use the 
number of years since listing and its square term in column 1, a binary variable indicating whether a firm is older than the 
median firm in a given industry-year in column 2, and linear spline variables of number of years since listing in column 3.  
Variable definitions are in Table 10.  Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses.  Asterisks 
denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level. 
Panel A: Firm age and divestitures 
 bDivestiture Num Divestitures RelVal Divestitures 
 Coefficient Odds ratio   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
       
Firm age 0.229*** 1.179 0.196*** 0.112*** 
 (0.029)  (0.027) (0.041) 
Tobin’s Q -0.023 0.963 -0.013 -0.599*** 
 (0.016)  (0.016) (0.060) 
ROA -0.881*** 0.824 -1.006*** -1.618*** 
 (0.131)  (0.127) (0.166) 
Firm size 0.458*** 2.539 0.485*** 0.141*** 
 (0.013)  (0.012) (0.017) 
Financing gap 0.903*** 1.285 0.905*** 0.823*** 
 (0.075)  (0.071) (0.092) 
Leverage 0.638*** 1.150 0.710*** 1.998*** 
 (0.088)  (0.083) (0.125) 
Cash -0.760*** 0.858 -0.827*** -0.434** 
 (0.138)  (0.135) (0.199) 
Sales growth -0.023** 0.946 -0.025*** -0.015 
 (0.009)  (0.009) (0.012) 
CAPEX -0.784*** 0.933 -0.756*** -0.747** 
 (0.256)  (0.251) (0.378) 
R&D 0.067 1.007 0.078 0.737* 
 (0.266)  (0.259) (0.382) 
Focus -1.059*** 0.820 -1.011*** -1.195*** 
 (0.095)  (0.085) (0.125) 
Excess value  -0.309*** 0.813 -0.304*** -0.401*** 
 (0.034)  (0.033) (0.055) 
Firm acquisitions 1.228*** 1.181 1.136*** 1.080*** 
 (0.085)  (0.074) (0.115) 
     
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes Yes 
     
Observations 70,220  70,228 70,224 
Pseudo-R2 0.165  0.148  
Log likelihood    -2,797.03 
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Panel B: Alternative age measures 
 bDivestiture 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Firm age (years) 0.020***   
 (0.004)   
Firm age-squared -0.0001**   
 (0.0001)   
bOld  0.214***  
  (0.037)  
Firm age 1 to 6   0.023 
   (0.039) 
Firm age 7 to 12   0.014 
   (0.012) 
Firm age 13 to 21   0.018** 
   (0.007) 
Firm age 22 or more   0.008*** 
   (0.002) 
    
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
    
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 70,220 70,220 70,220 
Pseudo-R2 0.165 0.164 0.165 
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Table 4: Divestitures by size 
The table enquires into the relation between firm age, size, and divestitures by replicating the standard regression model from 
Table 3 (regression 1) for different subsamples of firms.  Panel A looks at the propensity to engage in large divestitures.  The 
size cutoffs we consider are USD 100 million, USD 10 million, and 5% of the market equity, respectively.  We identify large 
divestitures with a binary variable that equals 1 if the cumulative value of the divested assets in a firm-year exceeds the 
respective size cutoff.  Small divestitures refer to cumulative divestiture values below the respective size cutoff.  Divestitures 
with missing transaction values are considered small divestitures (Netter et al. 2011).  Panel B then compares the divestiture 
activity of small, medium-sized, and large firms.  We compute the size breakpoints every year using the terciles of the 
industry-adjusted book value of assets (based on the Fama-French 48 industry classification).  Odd-numbered columns show 
the regression coefficients and even-numbered columns report the corresponding odds ratios for a unit standard deviation 
increase in the variable.  All variable definitions are in Table 10.  Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported 
in parentheses.  Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level.   
Panel A: Firm age and large divestitures 
 Cutoff = 100 million Cutoff = 10 million Cutoff = 5% of market equity 
 Small divestitu-re 
Large divestitu-
re 
Small divestitu-
re 
Large divestitu-
re 
Small divestitu-
re 
Large divestitu-
re 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
         
Firm age 0.204*** 0.133** 0.207*** 0.176*** 0.224*** 0.149*** 
 (0.029) (0.063) (0.032) (0.039) (0.034) (0.038) 
Tobin’s Q -0.035** 0.039 -0.006 -0.054* 0.075*** -0.430*** 
 (0.016) (0.049) (0.017) (0.031) (0.016) (0.047) 
ROA -0.646*** -1.774*** -0.590*** -1.037*** -0.304* -1.664*** 
 (0.133) (0.312) (0.152) (0.188) (0.177) (0.162) 
Firm size 0.362*** 0.929*** 0.323*** 0.568*** 0.559*** 0.195*** 
 (0.013) (0.031) (0.014) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) 
Financing gap 0.882*** 0.480** 0.834*** 0.794*** 0.798*** 0.786*** 
 (0.075) (0.220) (0.086) (0.116) (0.105) (0.093) 
Leverage 0.568*** 1.406*** 0.281*** 1.106*** -0.015 1.587*** 
 (0.089) (0.225) (0.099) (0.130) (0.108) (0.119) 
Cash -0.728*** -0.472 -0.762*** -0.658*** -0.963*** -0.362* 
 (0.137) (0.389) (0.154) (0.208) (0.172) (0.192) 
Sales growth -0.018** -0.042 -0.025** -0.017 -0.024** -0.020* 
 (0.009) (0.026) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) 
CAPEX -0.978*** 1.028* -1.276*** -0.005 -1.019*** -0.216 
 (0.264) (0.553) (0.316) (0.347) (0.321) (0.333) 
R&D 0.085 0.235 -0.287 0.750* 0.175 0.404 
 (0.272) (0.646) (0.301) (0.388) (0.325) (0.369) 
Focus -0.862*** -1.389*** -0.778*** -1.106*** -0.784*** -1.242*** 
 (0.093) (0.176) (0.102) (0.120) (0.111) (0.122) 
Excess value -0.292*** -0.251*** -0.281*** -0.288*** -0.212*** -0.366*** 
 (0.034) (0.089) (0.038) (0.053) (0.041) (0.051) 
Firm acquisitions 0.904*** 1.509*** 0.873*** 1.147*** 1.004*** 1.173*** 
 (0.091) (0.150) (0.100) (0.108) (0.097) (0.117) 
       
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 70,220 70,220 70,220 70,220 70,220 70,220 
Pseudo-R2 0.115 0.318 0.096 0.197 0.189 0.107 
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Panel B: Divestitures by firm size 
 bDivestiture 
 Small firms Medium firms Large firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
         
Firm age 0.184*** 1.120 0.168*** 1.118 0.231*** 1.196 
 (0.065)  (0.051)  (0.041)  
Tobin’s Q -0.095*** 0.818 -0.060 0.922 0.037 1.049 
 (0.029)  (0.039)  (0.026)  
ROA -0.831*** 0.790 -1.307*** 0.787 -1.291*** 0.851 
 (0.209)  (0.236)  (0.264)  
Firm size 0.480*** 1.770 0.431*** 1.594 0.535*** 2.085 
 (0.048)  (0.053)  (0.029)  
Financing gap 0.947*** 1.437 0.999*** 1.234 0.554*** 1.087 
 (0.113)  (0.136)  (0.148)  
Leverage 0.918*** 1.227 0.729*** 1.178 0.544*** 1.117 
 (0.171)  (0.138)  (0.141)  
Cash -0.354 0.925 -1.196*** 0.781 -0.855*** 0.868 
 (0.235)  (0.242)  (0.232)  
Sales growth -0.014 0.960 -0.023 0.945 -0.026 0.950 
 (0.015)  (0.017)  (0.016)  
CAPEX -1.807*** 0.847 -0.856** 0.924 -0.305 0.976 
 (0.583)  (0.434)  (0.383)  
R&D -0.513 0.936 0.084 1.008 0.664 1.051 
 (0.451)  (0.502)  (0.455)  
Focus -1.186*** 0.842 -1.072*** 0.831 -0.968*** 0.803 
 (0.232)  (0.155)  (0.128)  
Excess value -0.319*** 0.779 -0.275*** 0.839 -0.300*** 0.846 
 (0.064)  (0.061)  (0.053)  
Firm acquisitions 1.048*** 1.108 0.942*** 1.126 1.382*** 1.263 
 (0.246)  (0.173)  (0.110)  
       
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
       
Observations 23,686  23,184  23,350  
Pseudo-R2 0.096  0.093  0.141  
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Table 5: Firm age, managerial capacity, and divestitures 
The table investigates whether established firms with scarce managerial capacity are more likely to divest assets.  We 
estimate the standard logit regression.  In regression 1, we add the firm’s SG&A expenditures as well as an interaction term 
between SG&A and Firm age.  Regression 2 augments the standard regression by Industry R&D and its interaction term with 
Firm age, whereas regression 3 adds the industry’s Capital intensity along with the interaction term with Firm age.  Finally, 
regression 4 combines the arguments from regressions 2 and 3.  SG&A, Industry R&D and Capital intensity are demeaned at 
their pooled distribution.  Variable definitions are shown in Table 10.  Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and 
reported in parentheses.  Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level. 
 bDivestiture 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Firm age 0.250*** 0.249*** 0.231*** 0.251*** 
 (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
SG&A 0.059    
 (0.041)    
SG&A × Firm age 0.160***    
 (0.049)    
Industry R&D  1.424***  1.419*** 
  (0.466)  (0.468) 
Industry R&D × Firm age  1.179***  1.316*** 
  (0.449)  (0.454) 
Capital intensity   0.017 0.001 
   (0.034) (0.034) 
Capital intensity × Firm age   -0.063* -0.077** 
   (0.034) (0.034) 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 64,905 70,220 70,220 70,220 
Pseudo-R2 0.162 0.165 0.165 0.166 
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Table 6: Core and non-core divestitures 
The table shows the estimation results of the main regression equation for core and non-core asset sales.  We estimate the 
equation using a logit specification.  In Panel A, the dependent variable is a binary variable that indicates whether a 
subsidiary divests assets in a given year or not.  Divestitures are related to core assets in uneven columns and non-core assets 
in even columns.  In Panel B, we use alternative measures to distinguish core and non-core divestitures.  In the first model, 
non-core divestitures are transactions where the ultimate parent of the acquirer operates in a different SIC-3digit industry 
than the ultimate parent of the seller.  In the second model, non-core divestitures are transactions that increase the seller’s 
strategic focus, as measured with the segment-sales weighted Herfindahl index.  In the third model, a non-core divestiture is 
assumed if the number of reported segments decreases after the divestiture.  Variable definitions are in Table 10.  Standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses.  Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% 
(**), and 10% (*) level. 
Panel A: Non-core divestitures using subsidiary industry information  
 
Transaction is non-core if the 
selling subsidiary and its ultimate 
parent operate in different FF48 
industries 
Transaction is non-core if the 
selling subsidiary and its ultimate 
parent operate in different SIC 2-
digit industries 
Transaction is non-core if the 
selling subsidiary and its ultimate 
parent operate in different SIC 3-
digit industries 
 Core Non-core Core Non-core Core Non-core 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
    
Firm age 0.143*** 0.307*** 0.146*** 0.299*** 0.113*** 0.283*** 
 (0.035) (0.040) (0.035) (0.039) (0.038) (0.036) 
       
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 70,220 70,220 70,220 70,220 70,220 70,220 
Pseudo-R2 0.142 0.204 0.144 0.197 0.126 0.206 
 
Panel B: Alternative measures of core and non-core divestitures 
 
Transaction is non-core if the 
acquirer and the seller operate in 
different 3-digit SIC industries 
Transaction is non-core if the 
seller’s ultimate parent experiences 
an increase in the sales-weighted 
Herfindahl index after the divesti-
ture 
Transaction is non-core if the 
seller’s ultimate parent experiences 
a reduction in the number of re-
ported segments after the divesti-
ture 
 Core Non-core Core Non-core Core Non-core 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Firm age 0.097* 0.237*** 0.086 0.207*** 0.158*** 0.199*** 
 (0.050) (0.036) (0.061) (0.054) (0.053) (0.077) 
       
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 70,220 70,220 15,022 15,246 15,276 15,276 
Pseudo-R2 0.135 0.201 0.136 0.112 0.177 0.053 
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Table 7: Company age and the probability of divesting non-core, high Q assets 
The table shows the results of a Heckman probit selection model that relates high Q divestitures to firm age for firms that 
divest non-core assets.  Given that a firm divests non-core assets, we investigate the decision to sell assets with higher or 
lower investment opportunities than in a firm’s core business.  The dependent variable in the first stage regression is a binary 
variable that identifies firm-years with non-core asset sales using subsidiary industry information.  The dependent variable in 
the second stage regression indicates whether the subsidiary’s industry Q is higher than the ultimate parent’s industry Q.  We 
compute industry Q as the median Q of all firms with no divestiture in a given industry-year.  We require at least 5 firm-year 
observations to compute industry Q.  We use the Fama-French 48-industry classification in column 1 and the SIC 3-digit 
classification in column 2.  Industry dummies are based on the Fama-French 48-industry classification in all specifications.  
Variable definitions are in Table 10.  Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses.  Asterisks 
denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level. 
 Second stage regression 
Dependent variable 
Transaction is high Q if the selling subsidi-
ary operates in a FF48 
industry with industry Q above that of its 
ultimate parent 
Transaction is high Q if the selling subsidi-
ary operates in an SIC 3-digit industry with 
industry Q above that of its ultimate parent
 (1) (2) 
   
Firm age 0.191*** 0.229*** 
 (0.034) (0.054) 
Tobin’s Q -0.079*** -0.162** 
 (0.029) (0.063) 
ROA -0.279 -0.441 
 (0.241) (0.401) 
Firm size 0.188*** 0.151*** 
 (0.014) (0.036) 
Financing gap 0.118 0.057 
 (0.154) (0.212) 
Leverage 0.020 -0.216 
 (0.134) (0.192) 
Cash -0.774*** -0.795*** 
 (0.190) (0.287) 
CAPEX -0.352 0.535 
 (0.366) (0.677) 
R&D 0.226 -0.328 
 (0.398) (0.665) 
Focus -0.418*** -0.133 
 (0.094) (0.173) 
Excess value 0.063 0.021 
 (0.050) (0.089) 
Rho 0.959*** 0.732*** 
 (0.020) (0.130) 
   
Observations 1,458 1,263 
   
 First stage regression 
Dependent variable bDivestiture non-coret bDivestiture non-coret 
   
Firm age 0.162*** 0.099*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) 
Firm acquisitions 0.322*** 0.519*** 
 (0.074) (0.085) 
   
Other controls Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
   
Observations 59,088 58,325 
Censored observations 57,630 57,062 
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Table 8: Post-divestiture investments 
The table shows the results of the Heckman selection regression model relating various post-divestiture activities to firm age.  
The post-divestiture activities we consider are asset acquisition in column 1, diversifying firm acquisition in column 2, non-
diversifying firm acquisition in column 3, capital expenditures in column 4, R&D expenditures in column 5, debt repayment 
in column 6, and payout to shareholders in column 7.  In the first-stage regression we estimate the main regression equation 
from Table 3.  Variable definitions are in Table 10.  Standard errors in columns 4 – 7 are clustered at the firm level and 
reported in parentheses.  Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level. 
 Second stage regression 
Dependent variable bAsset acqui-sition 
bDiversifying 
firm acquisi-
tion 
bNon-
diversifying 
firm acquisi-
tion 
CAPEX R&D Debt repay-ment Payout 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
       
Firm age -0.110*** -0.082* -0.104*** -0.000 -0.006*** 0.005** 0.032*** 
 (0.028) (0.045) (0.031) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
Tobin’s Q 0.093*** 0.087*** 0.118*** 0.004*** 0.018*** -0.007*** 0.008*** 
 (0.020) (0.028) (0.019) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
ROA 0.595*** -0.174 0.536** 0.141*** -0.081*** -0.003 0.090*** 
 (0.196) (0.367) (0.232) (0.008) (0.007) (0.012) (0.020) 
Firm size 0.026 0.078* 0.014 0.008*** -0.009*** -0.002 0.013*** 
 (0.023) (0.044) (0.031) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Financing gap -0.537*** -1.249*** -0.618*** 0.059*** 0.006  -0.027** 
 (0.116) (0.305) (0.172) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.012) 
Leverage -0.600*** -0.811*** -0.433*** 0.004 -0.032*** 0.098*** -0.032*** 
 (0.099) (0.163) (0.126) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.011) 
Cash 0.085 -0.268 0.917*** -0.038*** 0.150*** -0.003 -0.054*** 
 (0.158) (0.280) (0.186) (0.008) (0.006) (0.012) (0.018) 
CAPEX -0.229 -0.989* 0.264  0.054*** -0.183*** -0.130*** 
 (0.253) (0.584) (0.326)  (0.010) (0.019) (0.028) 
R&D -0.334 0.237 -0.661 0.048***  0.008 -0.019 
 (0.320) (0.509) (0.416) (0.016)  (0.024) (0.036) 
Focus -0.076 -0.486*** 0.646*** -0.006 0.026*** 0.004 -0.061***
 (0.093) (0.168) (0.098) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.010) 
Relval divest -0.603*** 0.045 -0.410* -0.003 -0.009 0.147*** 0.010 
 (0.144) (0.243) (0.209) (0.007) (0.006) (0.012) (0.017) 
Inverse Mills ratio    0.044*** -0.041*** 0.008 0.023** 
    (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.010) 
Rho -0.668*** -0.367** -0.700***     
 (0.061) (0.157) (0.076)  
        
Observations 5,594 5,594 5,594 5,574 5,594 5,392 5,591 
        
 First stage regression 
Dependent variable bDivestituret bDivestituret bDivestituret bDivestituret bDivestituret bDivestituret bDivestituret
        
Firm age 0.135*** 0.131*** 0.132*** 0.130*** 0.130*** 0.129*** 0.130*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Firm acquisitions 0.658*** 0.691*** 0.684*** 0.682*** 0.685*** 0.678*** 0.683*** 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
        
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Observations 60,351 60,351 60,351 60,331 60,351 60,149 60,348 
Censored observations 54,757 54,757 54,757 54,757 54,757 54,757 54,757 
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Table 9: Divestitures and the impact of previous firm and asset acquisitions 
The table investigates whether the main results are driven by past acquisitions.  Regression 1 replicates the standard 
regression estimated for the full sample of firms, augmented by Asset acquisitions and the interaction terms Asset 
acquisitions × Firm age and Firm acquisitions × Firm age.  Regression 2 only includes firms for which SDC Platinum 
reports no firm acquisitions during the years prior to the divestiture year.  Regression 3 also drops firms that engaged in at 
least one asset acquisition in the years prior to the divestiture year.  Finally, regression 4 considers the subsample of firms 
that only report one segment on the Compustat Segment tapes.  Variable definitions are in Table 10.  Standard errors are 
clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses.  Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 
10% (*) level. 
 bDivestiture 
 Full sample 
Subsample of firms 
without previous firm 
acquisitions 
Subsample of firms 
without previous firm 
or asset acquisitions 
Single-segment firms
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Firm age 0.242*** 0.177*** 0.171** 0.243*** 
 (0.031) (0.047) (0.075) (0.035) 
Tobin’s Q -0.014 -0.075*** -0.116** -0.031* 
 (0.016) (0.028) (0.049) (0.018) 
ROA -0.878*** -0.634*** -0.476 -0.786*** 
 (0.131) (0.195) (0.316) (0.150) 
Firm size 0.460*** 0.281*** 0.188*** 0.452*** 
 (0.013) (0.021) (0.032) (0.016) 
Financing gap 0.943*** 0.968*** 1.107*** 0.962*** 
 (0.074) (0.107) (0.171) (0.086) 
Leverage 0.555*** 0.785*** 0.843*** 0.756*** 
 (0.089) (0.138) (0.214) (0.102) 
Cash -0.690*** -0.818*** -0.395 -0.637*** 
 (0.138) (0.205) (0.307) (0.157) 
Sales growth -0.035*** -0.038** -0.071** -0.016 
 (0.010) (0.016) (0.034) (0.010) 
CAPEX -0.837*** -1.063*** -1.113* -0.723** 
 (0.255) (0.390) (0.649) (0.294) 
R&D 0.064 0.738* 0.399 -0.158 
 (0.265) (0.414) (0.665) (0.297) 
Focus -1.044*** -0.948*** -0.864*** (dropped) 
 (0.094) (0.158) (0.240)  
Excess value -0.316*** -0.340*** -0.384*** -0.341*** 
 (0.034) (0.055) (0.090) (0.042) 
Asset acquisitions 1.055*** 1.731*** (dropped)  
 (0.103) (0.165)   
Firm acquisitions 1.136*** (dropped) (dropped) 1.292*** 
 (0.089)   (0.105) 
Asset acquisitions × Firm age -0.080    
 (0.128)    
Firm acquisitions × Firm age 0.113    
 (0.106)    
     
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 70,220 41,909 26,939 53,401 
Pseudo-R2 0.168 0.087 0.067 0.129 
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Table 10: Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
Transaction variables  
bDivestiture 
Dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm divests assets (asset acquisition and 
acquisition of certain assets where firm is listed as ultimate parent of the target) in a given 
year or zero otherwise.  The data are from SDC Platinum. 
Num Divestitures 
A count variable that takes the value of the number of asset divestitures (asset acquisition 
and acquisition of certain assets where firm is listed as ultimate parent of the target) a firm 
conducts in a given year.  The data are from SDC Platinum. 
RelVal Divestitures 
Total transaction value of divestitures (asset acquisition and acquisition of certain assets 
where firm is listed as ultimate parent of the target) normalized by beginning-of-year 
market value of equity (csho × prcc_f).  Missing transaction values are replaced with zero.  
The data are from SDC Platinum and COMPUSTAT. 
bAsset acquisition Dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm acquirers assets in a given year or zero otherwise.  The data are from SDC Platinum. 
Asset acquisitions 
The sum of relative value of acquired assets over the previous three years.  The relative 
value of acquired assets equals the total transaction value of asset acquisitions (asset ac-
quisition and acquisition of certain assets where firm is listed as acquirer or ultimate par-
ent of the acquiror) normalized by beginning-of-year market value of equity (csho × 
prcc_f).  Missing transaction values are replaced with zero.  The data are from SDC Plati-
num and COMPUSTAT. 
bDiversifying firm acquisition 
Dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm acquirers a firm in another industry 
in a given year or zero otherwise.  Industry definition is based on 3-digit SIC codes.  The 
data are from SDC Platinum. 
bNon-diversifying firm acqui-
sition 
Dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm acquirers a firm in the same industry 
in a given year or zero otherwise.  Industry definition is based on 3-digit SIC codes.  The 
data are from SDC Platinum. 
Firm acquisitions 
The sum of relative value of acquired firms over the previous three years.  The relative 
value of acquired firms equals the total transaction value of firm acquisitions (acquisition 
of majority interest or merger where firm is listed as acquirer or ultimate parent of the 
acquiror) normalized by beginning-of-year market value of equity (csho × prcc_f).  Miss-
ing transaction values are replaced with zero.  The data are from SDC Platinum and 
COMPUSTAT. 
  
Firm characteristics  
Firm age 
The natural logarithm of firm age.  Age is computed as one plus the difference between 
the year under investigation and the firm’s year of birth.  The year of birth is computed as 
the minimum value of: (a) the first year the firm appears on the CRSP tapes; (b) the first 
year the firm appears on the COMPUSTAT tapes; and (c) the first year for which we find 
a link between the CRSP and the COMPUSTAT tapes. 
bOld 
A dummy that takes the value of one if a firm is older than the median firm age in a given 
industry-year and zero otherwise.  Industry definition is based on the Fama-French 48 
classification. 
Firm age X to Y Spline variable of firm age from X to Y years. 
Tobin’s Q 
The ratio of a firm’s market value of assets to the book value of assets (at).  The market 
value of assets equals the sum market value of equity (csho × prcc_f) and the market value 
of debt (at – ceq – txdb).  The data are from COMPUSTAT. 
ROA Firm operating profits before depreciation and amortization (oibdp) normalized by firm assets (at).  The data are from COMPUSTAT. 
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Variable Definition 
Firm size The natural logarithm of the firm’s book value of assets (at).  The data are from COM-PUSTAT. 
Financing gap 
The ratio of a firm’s financing gap to assets (at) as defined in Colak and Whited (2007).  A 
firm’s financing gap equals the difference between capital expenditures (capx) and the 
sum of cash flow (ni + db) and net debt issue (dltis – dltr).  The data are from COMPUS-
TAT. 
Leverage The ratio of a firm’s long-term debt (dltt + dlc) to assets (at).  The data are from COM-PUSTAT. 
Cash The ratio of a firm’s cash reserves (che) to assets (at).  The data are from COMPUSTAT. 
Sales growth Cumulative sales (sale) growth over the previous three years.  The data are from COM-PUSTAT. 
CAPEX Firm capital expenditures (capx) normalized by beginning-of-year assets (at).  The data are from COMPUSTAT. 
R&D 
Firm R&D expenditures (xrd) normalized by beginning-of-year assets (at).  We set miss-
ing observations to zero and include a dummy indicating missing observations.  The data 
are from COMPUSTAT. 
Focus 
Focus is measured with a Herfindahl index, HI, based on the sales (sale) in the firm’s 
different business segments:  
N 2
ii 1HI p  , 
where N is the number of reported segments with distinct 3-digit SIC codes, the subscript i 
identifies the segments, and pi is the fraction of the firm’s total sales in the segment in 
question.  We aggregate segment sales within 3-digit SIC codes.  The data are from 
COMPUSTAT. 
Excess value 
The excess value, EV, is defined as natural logarithm of the ratio of a firm’s market value 
of assets, V, to the sum of its imputed stand-alone market values of assets, I(V): 
N
ii 1
i
V VEV ln ,  where I(V) S IndI(V) S
            . 
A segment’s imputed value is computed as segment sale (sale) multiplied with the median 
industry market value-to-sales ratio of single-segment firms operating in the same indus-
try.  We aggregate segment sales within 3-digit SIC codes.  Industry classification is based 
on the narrowest SIC grouping (3-digit or 2-digit) with at least five matched single-
segment firms.  The data are from COMPUSTAT. 
Debt repayment Net debt repayment (dltr – dltis) normalized by assets.  The data are from COMPUSTAT. 
Payout The sum of dividends (dvc + dvp) normalized by firm operating profits before deprecia-tion and amortization (oibdp).  The data are from COMPUSTAT. 
SG&A Selling, general, and administrative expenses (xsga) normalized by sales (sale).  The data are from COMPUSTAT. 
  
Industry characteristics  
Industry R&D 
Median R&D expenditures (xrd) normalized by beginning-of-year assets (at) of all firms 
operating in the same industry in a given year.  Industry definition is based on the 4-digit 
SIC code.  The data are from COMPUSTAT. 
Capital intensity 
Total assets (at) divided by total sales (sale) of all firms operating in the same industry in a 
given year.  Industry definition is based on 4-digit SIC-codes (Bhattacharyya and Nain 
2011).  The data are from COMPUSTAT. 
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Paper III: Corporate aging and lobbying expenditures 
 
Demian Berchtold* 
 
Abstract 
 
Creative destruction forces constantly challenge established firms, especially in competitive 
markets.  This paper asks whether corporate lobbying is a competitive weapon of established 
firms to counteract the decline in rents over time.  We find a statistically and economically 
significant positive relation between firm age and lobbying expenditures.  Moreover, the 
documented age-effect is weaker when firms have unique products or operate in concentrated 
product markets.  To address endogeneity, we use industry distress as an exogenous non-
legislative shock to future rents and show that established firms are relatively more likely to 
lobby when in distress.  Finally, we provide empirical evidence that corporate lobbying 
efforts by established firms forestall the creative destruction process.  In sum, our findings 
suggest that corporate lobbying is a competitive weapon of established firms to retain 
profitability in competitive environments. 
 
Keywords: lobbying expenditures, firm age, creative destruction 
JEL codes: G38; L20 
 
* Berchtold (corresponding author, demian.berchtold@ifm.unibe.ch) is from the Institut für Finanzmanagement, 
University of Bern.  I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Swiss National Science Foundation 
(SNF).  All errors are ours.  
 76 
 
1. Introduction 
When firms go public, incentives to innovate decline.  Instead, public firms focus on 
exploiting their existing innovations (Ferreira et al. 2012).  As a consequence, initial rents 
from successful innovation decrease due to imitation (Schumpeter 1934).  Especially in 
competitive markets, incumbent firms are constantly challenged by new entrants that 
aggressively find new ways to deplete the rents of incumbent firms (Schumpeter 1942).  
However, “established firms are not always on the cutting edge of new products and 
technology, but rather, they have a number of other competitive weapons at their disposal that 
allow them to fend off more innovative newcomers and to thereby forestall the process of 
creative destruction” (Stein 1997).  Various observers argue that one of those weapons is 
corporate lobbying (Marris and Mueller 1980; Miller and Friesen 1984).  Corporate political 
activity has attracted considerable attention in the literature.  Various empirical studies find 
that corporations influence political activity through appointing politicians to their board of 
directors (Goldman et al. 2009), making PAC contributions (Cooper et al. 2010), or through 
corporate lobbying expenditures (Chen et al. 2012; Hill et al. 2013).  In the United States, 
corporate lobbying expenditures are in dollar terms by far the largest form of political activity 
(Chen et al. 2012; Milyo et al. 2000).  For example, General Electric spent on average more 
than USD 20 million per year on corporate lobbying over the last 10 years.  Recent empirical 
studies show that lobbying expenditures have positive payoffs (Chen et al. 2012; Hill et al. 
2013).  Such payoffs may result from favorable legal treatment (Yu and Yu 2011), lower tax 
rates (Richter et al. 2009), lower compliance costs (Hochberg et al. 2009), trade protection 
(Lenway et al. 1996), securing government contracts (Goldman et al. 2013), or receiving 
stimulus funds (Adelino and Dinc 2013). 
In this paper we ask whether corporate lobbying is a competitive weapon of established firms 
to counteract the decline in rents over time and to forestall the creative destruction process.  
We argue as follows.  Firms go public to exploit existing opportunities.  Once a firm is public, 
the stock market’s focus on short-term profits makes long-term investments in exploring new 
options more costly (Asker et al. 2011).  Also, Loderer et al.  (2014) show that due to limited 
managerial attention public firms devote more efforts to managing existing assets in place.  
One manifestation of this process should be eventually declining profitability of assets in 
place in reaction to competition and therefore an increase in lobbying efforts to offset that 
decline.  We expect established firms to benefit from lobbying in several ways.  First, 
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lobbying may be a substitute for innovation as a means to increase product demand or lower 
production costs (Lichtenberg 1989).  Second, lobbying can be undertaken to fight off 
competitive threats through trade protection (Lenway et al. 1996) or entry regulation (Klapper 
et al. 2006).  The 1970 Clean Air Act is an example of how legislation limits entry by 
imposing stricter air quality standards on new firms (Maloney and McCormick 1982).  
Finally, lobbying helps firms avoid bankrupcty (Adelino and Dinc 2013). 
From a politician’s standpoint, one might also argue that established firms are better 
candidates for legislative support.  These are the firms that politicians may want to support in 
order to avoid large job cuts that could compromise re-election (Caballero and Hammour 
1996; Figueiredo and Richter 2013).  Also, these are the firms that are around in the long run 
(Loderer and Waelchli 2014).  Thus, in return for favorable legislation, incumbent politicians 
may receive continuing re-election campaign contributions.  This is consistent with the 
finding that lobbying firms are more likely to give to those in positions of power 
(Ansolabehere et al. 2003). 
Following these arguments, we reason that corporate lobbying allows established firms to 
contain the decline in rents over time.  This is consistent with the view that in the latter stages 
of the corporate life-cycle, lobbying becomes a potentially cheaper substitute for innovation 
(Marris and Mueller 1980).  Corporate lobbying may, thus, allow established firms to forestall 
the creative destruction process.8 
Our empirical analysis is based on publicly listed US firms over the period between 1998 and 
2012.  Starting with the year 1998, the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (LDA) requires 
lobbying firms to disclose semi-annual lobbying expenditures to the Secretary of the Senate’s 
Office of Public Records (SOPR).  We obtain the data from the Center of Responsive Politics 
(CRP), which compiles annual lobbying data at the firm-level.  The data include amounts 
spent to lobby Congress and federal agencies through lobbying firms or in-house lobbyists.  
In contrast to PAC contributions which are provided to fund politicians’ election campaign, 
corporate lobbying expenditures are meant to influence how incumbent politicians vote and 
shape legislation.  Included are all expenditures to contact policy makers or their staff 
regarding federal legislation.  It follows that corporate lobbying expenditures are not money 
transfers to politicians but rather costs incurred to hire a group of people for the purpose of 
                                                 
8 The literature offers various other ways of how incumbents’ may gain a competitive advantage over 
younger firms, such as distribution cost advantages like customer loyalty (Stein 1997) or increases in tech-
nical efficiency (Loderer et al. 2014). 
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influencing politicians with regard to specific federal legislation.  Not included are, by 
definition, grassroots activities and public relations efforts where companies address the 
public on political issues rather than legislators themselves.  We merge corporate lobbying 
expenditures with financial data from COMPUSTAT/CRSP database and get a final sample 
of 53,334 firm-year observations of 8,679 firms. 
We use firm age to identify established firms and find that corporate lobbying expenditures 
increase with the number of years listed.  Moreover, the effect is economically significant.  
Moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile of the firm age distribution increases corporate 
lobbying activity between 17 and 49 percent depending on how we measure lobbying.  Our 
documented age-effect is not driven by industries with a large fraction of lobbying 
expenditures, top lobbying spenders, concentrated lobbying activity in smokestack industries 
(Hochberg et al. 2009), or agency conflicts in established firms (Aggarwal et al. 2012). 
Looking across firms, we find that product market competition accentuates the increase in 
corporate lobbying activity as firms grow older.  This is consistent with the view that creative 
destruction forces are stronger in competitive environments (Schumpeter 1942).  In our 
empirical analysis, we explore the role of demand-side barriers to entry such as brand names 
or established reputations (Mueller 1997; Stein 1997) as well as product market 
concentration.  We use the concept of product uniqueness to capture demand-side barriers and 
use selling, general, and administrative expenses (SG&A) scaled by sales as a proxy for those 
barriers (Frank and Goyal 2009; Titman and Wessels 1988).  Our findings indicate that, 
holding everything else the same, established firms with unique products devote significantly 
less resources to corporate lobbying.  Because other studies suggest that SG&A expenditures 
capture overhead costs or bureaucracy (Stuart and Sorenson 2003) we also employ a product 
market concentration measure.  We use the text-based Herfindahl index provided by Hoberg 
and Phillips (2014).  We find that the increase in corporate lobbying activity over time is 
lower when firms operate in concentrated product markets.  We interpret these findings as 
showing that lobbying investments are a competitive weapon of established firms.   
One limitation of our product market competition measures is that they may be endogenous.  
According to the literature entry barriers reflect strategic choices (see Hou and Robinson 2006 
and the cited literature therein).  In our context one might argue that firms unable to offset 
competition through lobbying alternatively invest in unique products or brand management.  
Thus, SG&A expenditures may be a function of a firm’s lobbying power.  This argument also 
 79 
 
suggests that observed concentration in a product market may be driven by political activity.  
Recent empirical studies use industry reductions in import tariffs as an exogenous shock to 
product market competition (Frésard and Valta 2013).  Unfortunately, import tariffs and trade 
protection are legislative outcomes and, hence, likely to be endogenous to corporate lobbying 
activity as well (Lenway et al. 1996). 
An alternative way to test our hypothesis is to look at industry distress as measured in Opler 
and Titman (1994).  We believe that these shocks are exogenous to corporate lobbying.  
Empirically, we investigate whether established firms are more likely to seek government 
help when hit by industry distress.  We find supporting empirical evidence.  When being in 
distress, established firms spend significantly more resources on corporate lobbying than 
young firms.  This difference in lobbying activity during distress is not driven by lower 
financial constraints of established firms (Hadlock and Pierce 2010).  When we limit our 
sample to dividend-paying firms the result is even stronger.  Taken together, established firms 
increase efforts to influence legislation when facing product market threats or economic 
downturns. 
In the last section, we test whether established firms are successful in their lobbying efforts to 
forestall the creative destruction process.  We use industry-wide turnover rates in the top 
quintile of the distribution of market value of equity, operating income, and sales (Chun et al. 
2008; Comin and Philippon 2006).  The regression results reveal that established firms’ 
lobbying activity significantly reduces the turnover rate of incumbent firms within an 
industry.  Our empirical evidence, thus, coincides with the hypothesis that lobbying activity is 
a competitive weapon of established firms to retain their profitability in a competitive 
environment and to forestall the creative destruction process. 
Our study identifies an economically important determinant of corporate lobbying 
expenditures.  As Hart (2001) points out, the literature has focused on industry determinants 
of political activity and, thus, we still know little why firms choose to lobby and to what 
extent.  One of the few studies to do so is Hill et al.  (2013).  The authors show that firms with 
greater payoffs from lobbying spend more on corporate lobbying and that such expenditures 
increase shareholder value.  Bombardini (2008) argues that large firms are more likely to 
lobby.  We add to that literature by empirically highlighting lobbying motives related to the 
creative destruction process (Marris and Mueller 1980).  However, we are not the first to do 
so.  In their longitudinal study of 36 corporations, Miller and Friesen (1984) show that 
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lobbying activity is prevalent in the latter stages of the corporate life-cycle when firms focus 
on efficiency rather than novelty.  We extend their empirical finding to a large and broad 
sample of US firms.  More importantly, we relate established firms’ lobbying efforts to 
competitive threats and show that these efforts forestall the creative destruction process.  
Linking corporate lobbying to creative destruction might also help understand why few firms 
lobby (Ansolabehere et al. 2003).  In political equilibrium one would expect each firm to 
choose their lobbying effort depending on other firms’ lobbying choice and the policy 
makers’ objective function (Grossman and Helpman 1992).  Because large job cuts may 
worsen politicians’ re-election probability established firms should be more successful in 
lobbying for policies that will protect them from creative destruction forces (Caballero and 
Hammour 1996).  Young firms should have lower chances in shaping legislation to their 
needs and, thus, may efficiently decide not to lobby in the first place.  Such a view is 
supported by the study of Adelino and Dinc (2013) who provide evidence that distressed 
firms during the financial crises lobbied more than healthier firms and were more likely to 
receive stimulus funds. 
Our study is also related to the strand of literature examining obstacles to the creative 
destruction process.  According to Stein (1997) established firms have various competitive 
weapons at their disposal, one of them being customer retention.  Alternatively, established 
firms may gain a competitive advantage through superior technical efficiency (Loderer et al. 
2014).  We contribute to this strand of literature by showing that corporate lobbying is another 
way for established firms to fend off more innovative younger firms.  Using US data, Lenway 
et al.  (1996) find similar results for the steel industry.  We add to their study by showing in a 
much broader sample that lobbying seems to protect established firms from creative 
destruction forces.  Other related studies examine the so-called losers’ paradox describing the 
stylized fact that government trade policy often aims at protecting declining industries 
(Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud 2007).  Various explanations have been put forward.  Closest to 
our paper is Krueger’s (1990) “identity bias” implying that politicians prefer to use subsidies 
to save jobs in a declining industry rather than to create new jobs in an expanding industry 
(Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud 2007).  This is consistent with our view that policy makers may 
have a preference to support established firms. 
Another strand of literature argues that industrial incumbents may lobby against financial 
development because better access to finance breeds competition (Perotti and Volpin 2004; 
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Rajan and Zingales 2003).  We contribute by showing that in the US, where financial markets 
are developed and new entrants get financed, industrial incumbents may lobby to restore 
depleted profitability.  An example is large and mature US corporations’ push for job-creation 
tax breaks (Yang 2011). 
Finally, we help understand how firms age.  Various observers argue that listed firms 
rationally focus on exploiting available investment opportunities (Ferreira et al. 2012; 
Holmstrom 1989; Loderer et al. 2014).  As a consequence, listed firms lose the ability to 
explore new opportunities as they grow older and, thus, reduce capital expenditures, spend 
less on R&D, and payout more cash (Loderer et al. 2014).  Our study suggests that corporate 
lobbying is an effective competitive weapon for established firms to fend off younger and 
more innovative firms.  In the context of declining investment and R&D, our results imply 
that established firms shift from productive activities to rent-seeking activities.  This shift to 
lobbying might also help explain why established firms are less likely to fail and being taken 
over (Loderer and Waelchli 2014).   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, we describe the data 
sample.  In section 3, we outline the empirical regression model and provide sample statistics 
of our key dependent and control variables.  The empirical results are covered in section 4, 5, 
and 6.  In section 7, we conclude. 
 
2. Data sample 
We obtain data on lobbying expenditures from the Center of Responsive Politics (CRP).  CRP 
compiles lobbying data using the lobbying disclosure reports that firms have to file since 1998 
with the Secretary of the Senate’s Office of Public Records (SOPR).  Lobbying firms are 
required by the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (LDA) to report all expenditures that are 
spent in order to contact legislative staff (i.e., members of Congress, their staffs, and 
committee staffs) or high-level executive branch officials (i.e., president and white house 
staff) regarding formulation, modification, and adoption of legislation.  Thus, lobbying 
expenditures are not money transfers to politicians but rather incurred costs to transfer 
information to politicians.  For example, a firm may hire a lobbyist to meet with politicians to 
discuss their position on a new legislation.  The LDA requires firms to report semi-annual 
lobbying expenditures that are rounded to the nearest USD 20,000.  Following this rule firms 
 82 
 
that spend less than USD 10,000 on lobbying activities within a six-month period do not have 
to report their lobbying expenditures.  The semi-annual lobbying expenditures are summed up 
to an annual figure by CRP.  More importantly, lobbying expenditures by various entities of 
the same parent firm are combined to reflect total annual expenditures.9  We match the CRP 
database to the COMPUSTAT/CRSP merged database using historical company names.  
Specifically, we use a firm name matching algorithm and manually check all the matches. 
We start with all US public firms with available data on COMPUSTAT/CRSP and 
COMPUSTAT segment file between 1998 and 2012.  Using business segment data in a panel 
is a problem because since the introduction of SFAS 131 in June 1997 firms report business 
segments following a management approach (Berger and Hann 2003).  The management 
approach requires firms to report business segment in according to the internal organization.  
Thus, internal reorganizations lead to segment reporting changes over time even if a firm’s 
business remains unaffected.  We address this problem by aggregating our required segment 
accounting data of reported business and operating segments within a firm that share the same 
3-digit SIC code into a single segment (Gopalan and Xie 2011).  Thereby, we are able to more 
consistently measure our variables that are based on segment data.  After the aggregation 
procedure, we cross-validate the COMPUSTAT segment file with the COMPUSTAT 
industrial file and exclude firm-years where firm sales and total segment sales deviate by 
more than 1 percent (Berger and Ofek 1995).  For firm-years that meet the above criteria, we 
proportionally allocate any unallocated sales to each of its segments (Berger and Ofek 1995; 
Billett and Mauer 2003).  For example, if firm sales exceed the sum of segment sales by 0.5 
percent we increase each segment sales by 0.5 percent. 
Following the empirical literature, we exclude ADRs and firms operating in regulated 
industries such as utilities and financial firms (Fama and French (1997) industry category 31 
and 44 – 47 based on the 48-industry classification) (Hill et al. 2013).  Finally, we exclude 
firm-years with negative assets or sales.  Our final data sample consists of 53,334 firm-year 
observations of 8,679 firms. 
 
                                                 
9 Further information on the CRP data methodology can be found on their website 
(http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/methodology.php). 
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3. Empirical method and summary statistics 
3.1. Regression model 
We investigate the explanatory power of our hypothesis by regressing lobbying activity 
(Lobby) of firm i in industry j at time t on our main explanatory variable firm age (Age), 
industry fixed effects (α), year fixed effects (δ), and various control variables (X) that are 
measured in the previous fiscal year. 
ijt j t it 1 it 1 ijtLobby Age X           (1) 
In our main model specification we use the ratio of lobbying expenditures to assets reported 
by firm i in industry j and year t as dependent variable.  We also use two alternative lobbying 
expenditure measures as dependent variables, namely the ratio of lobbying expenditures to 
sales and the natural logarithm of one plus the annual inflation-adjusted lobbying 
expenditures.10  Finally, we estimate the regression equation (1) with a binary dependent 
variable indicating whether the firm i reports lobbying expenditures in year t or not.  The 
binary response model helps to understand the decision to lobby or not.  In that case we 
estimate the regression equation using a Logit specification.  In the former three cases where 
the dependent variable is a corner solution response we estimate the equation using a Tobit 
specification (Woolridge 2002).11 
The coefficient of interest is γ, the change in lobbying activity with respect to firm age.  We 
measure firm age as the natural logarithm of one plus the number of years listed (Loderer et 
al. 2014).  We control for various factors that are motivated by Hill et al.  (2013).  First, 
theoretical arguments suggest that larger firms are more likely to lobby.  According to the 
corporate lobbying literature high up-front costs12 to enter the lobbying process favor large 
firms that may spread those costs over a larger asset base (Kerr et al. 2011; Masters and Keim 
1985).  Also, larger firms have higher political visibility thereby increasing potential gains 
                                                 
10 We deflate our variables to real values using the consumer price index (CPI) with 2001 as the base year. 
11 Interestingly, Sigelman and Zeng (1999) criticize the use of Tobit models in the case of  corner solution 
responses.  The authors argue that a Tobit model is inappropriate if zero lobbying expenditure occur not 
because of data censoring but because firms decide not to engage in corporate lobbying.  We follow Wool-
ridge (2002) and use a Tobit model but address the critique of Sigelman and Zeng (1999) in the robustness 
section. 
12 Kerr et al. (2011) mention various costs such as learning the laws about lobbying, selecting and hiring 
corporate lobbyists, and investigating how to put lobbying expenditures to the best use. 
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from corporate lobbying (Agrawal and Knoeber 2001).  Finally, to the extent that legislation 
affects variable costs lobbying incentives increase with firm size (Hill et al. 2013).  Following 
these arguments we include the natural logarithm of inflation-adjusted book value of assets as 
a proxy for firm size.  Second, the empirical literature shows that investment opportunities are 
positively related to lobbying expenses (Hill et al. 2013; Yu and Yu 2011).  In their spirit we 
include Tobin’s Q as additional control variable.  Third, corporate lobbying spending is likely 
to be a function of available resources.  We follow Cooper et al.  (2010) and include annual 
cash flow as proxy for available resources and profitability.  Fourth, Taylor (1997) argues that 
the political and regulatory environment may lag behind technological innovation.  As a 
consequence, innovative firms may find it beneficial to lobby in order to permit the 
introduction of the new technology.  Moreover, innovative firms might engage in lobbying to 
prevent other firms from depleting the rents of their innovations.  In line with this argument 
Taylor (1997) finds that R&D expenditures and PAC contributions are complementary 
investments.  To account for their empirical finding we include annual R&D expenditures 
scaled by sales in our regression model.  Fifth, more highly levered firms may have less 
leeway to direct corporate resources towards policy-makers (Taylor 1997).  Empirical 
evidence thereof is provided by Cooper et al.  (2010) who study corporate PAC contributions.  
Hence, we account for financial leverage.  Sixth, a Herfindahl index of business segment sales 
is included as a measure of corporate diversification.  Diversified firms are expected to have 
more political interests and, hence, contribute more to corporate lobbying (Grier et al. 1994; 
Zardkoohi 1985).  Seventh, according to the literature industry concentration should affect a 
firm’s political behavior.  The theoretical argument is as follows.  Political favors, such as 
restraining trade, are public goods that affect all firms operating in an industry.  On the one 
hand, gains from political investment should decline with the number of industry participants 
because they are spread across all firms (Pittman 1976).  On the other hand, firms in 
concentrated industries should find it easier and less costly to collude with each other in 
seeking common political favors (Zardkoohi 1985).  The inclusion of a Herfindahl index of 
industry sales captures this hypothesized relation.  Eight, we follow Hill et al.  (2013) and 
account for the location of a firm’s headquarters.  Specifically, their empirical analysis shows 
that a firm’s decision to lobby is negatively affected by the number of electoral votes in its 
state of location as well as by the distance between its headquarter and the capital building in 
its state of location.  The authors argue as follows.  The number of electoral votes equals the 
number of representatives and senators the state has in Congress.   The greater the number of 
politicians that represent a firm in Washington the lesser is the need to lobby Congress.  
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Moreover, representatives and senators often have offices in Washington as well as in the 
state capitol building.  Proximity to the capital building may, thus, reduce fixed costs to lobby 
Congress.  We measure the variables accordingly and include the natural logarithm of one 
plus the number of electoral votes in a firm’s state of location as well as the natural logarithm 
of one plus the distance in miles between the firm’s headquarter and the state capitol building.  
Detailed variable definitions are in Table 10.  All control variables are measured in the year 
prior to the lobbying decision (Cooper et al. 2010).  Ninth, by including industry and year 
fixed effects we consider that the benefits of lobbying depend on industry characteristics such 
as regulatory oversight or degree of government purchases (Zardkoohi 1985) and that 
lobbying activities significantly increase over time (Hill et al. 2013; Yu and Yu 2011).  We 
use the Fama and French (1997) 48-industry classification (Cooper et al. 2010).  All 
continuous and unbounded variables are winsorized at the 1-percent level of the full sample.  
Also, we cluster standard errors at the firm level (Petersen 2009) because the corporate 
lobbying decision is highly persistent over time (Kerr et al. 2011). 
 
3.2. Summary statistics 
Summary statistics of our variables are shown in Table 1.  Panel A displays the descriptive 
statistics of the various corporate lobbying variables unconditional on lobbying.  The 
propensity to lobby equals 15.05 percent.  Mean annual lobbying expenditures in 2001 dollar 
values equal USD 59,200.  In unreported results we find that both the propensity to lobby as 
well as annual lobbying expenditure increase over our sample period.  Panel B shows the 
summary statistics of the various lobbying expenditure variables conditional on lobbying.  
Annual lobbying expenditures in 2001 dollar values on average equal USD 393,400 and range 
between USD 39,000 and USD 1.933 million.  Note that some firms have higher annual 
lobbying expenditure such as General Electric with USD 15.43 million in 2001.  However, in 
Table 1 we display winsorized variables.  The ratio of lobbying expenditure to assets or sales 
suggests that lobbying expenditures are rather small investments relative to other expenditures 
such as R&D.  On average, a lobbying firm spends 0.04 percent of assets or 0.07 percent of 
sales on corporate lobbying.  Although these figures seem trivial, they are not from the 
politicians’ perspective.  Because lobbyists are mainly paid to meet with politicians to discuss 
legislative issues, higher lobbying expenditures imply that politicians will spend more time in 
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private meetings.13  Given politicians’ limited available time, total corporate lobbying 
expenditures should have an upper bound.  Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that 
lobbying is an unproductive activity in the sense that no products or services are produced 
(Bhagwati 1982).  Following these arguments, it is difficult to compare the amount spent on 
lobbying with other corporate investments.  Panel C shows the summary statistics of our 
control variables that enter our main regression model. 
We further gauge differences in mean and median firm characteristics of lobbying and non-
lobbying firms.  The results are in Table 2.  Lobbying firms are older and larger, have higher 
growth opportunities and cash flows, are more levered and less focused, operate in more 
concentrated industries, and are located in states with lower number of Electoral College 
votes and closer to the state capitol building.  Differences in R&D expenditures are not 
conclusive.  The average lobbying firm has lower R&D expenditures but we find no 
statistically significant difference for the median lobbying firm.  Overall, the differences 
between lobbying and non-lobbying firms seem largely consistent with theoretical predictions 
from the literature. 
 
4. Firm age and corporate lobbying expenditures 
4.1. Univariate analysis 
As a first test of how lobbying expenditures vary with firm age we conduct a univariate 
analysis.  Specifically, we divide our sample firm-years in four age-cohorts of similar sample 
size.  For each age cohort, we show aggregate lobbying expenditures in million USD, percent 
of total lobbying expenditures, the mean ratio of lobbying expenditures to assets (multiplied 
by 1,000), and the propensity to lobby.  The results are shown in Table 3.  Unconditionally, it 
seems that the bulk of lobbying expenditures accrue from firms in the oldest age-cohort.  Of 
total lobbying expenditures in our sample 4.3 percent fall within the age-cohort of 1 to 4 
years, 10.5 percent within the age-cohort of 5 to 10 years, 16.3 percent within the age-cohort 
of 11 to 19 years, and 68.9 percent within the age-cohort of 20 years and older.  However, 
these numbers do not account for a size-effect.  When we look at the size-adjusted ratio of 
lobbying expenditures to assets we get a slightly attenuated picture.  On average, firms in the 
                                                 
13 Alternatively, lobbying expenditures could rise due to higher wages of lobbyists or because lobbyists’ 
required preparation effort for meeting with politicians increases. 
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youngest age-cohort (1 to 4 years) invest 0.0047 percent of assets and firms in the oldest age-
cohort (20 and more years) invest 0.0055 percent of assets in corporate lobbying.14  The 
propensity to engage in corporate lobbying increases gradually over all age-cohorts ranging 
from 7.7 percent in the youngest age-cohort to 25.4 percent in the oldest age-cohort.  Overall, 
the univariate analysis shows that lobbying expenditures as well as the propensity to engage 
in lobbying increases with the number of years listed.   
 
4.2. Regression analysis 
The empirical results of estimating our main regression equation relating lobbying activity to 
firm age are shown in Table 4 Panel A.  The dependent variables are denoted in the first row.  
We use the ratio of lobbying expenditures to assets in column (1), the ratio of lobbying 
expenditures to sales in column (2), the natural logarithm of inflation-adjusted lobbying 
expenditures plus one in column (3), and a binary variable indicating whether a firm lobbies 
in a given year or not in column (4).  In support of our hypothesis we find that the estimated 
coefficient on Firm age is positive and highly significant in all four columns suggesting that 
lobbying expenditures as well as the propensity to lobby increase as firms grow older.  Before 
we discuss the economic importance of firm age as a determinant of lobbying we briefly 
discuss the estimated coefficients of our control variables.  First, consistent with the literature 
we find that firm size is positively related to lobbying expenditures (see Hill et al. 2013 and 
the cited literature therein).  Second, the estimated coefficient on Tobin’s Q suggests that 
firms with higher growth opportunities lobby more.  This is in line with Hill et al.  (2013) who 
argue that firms in growth industries have higher incentives to lobby for favorable legislation.  
Third, our findings seem to suggest that higher cash flow reduces incentives to lobby.  
Reverse causality is unlikely to explain this result since lobbying expenditures are relatively 
small compared to available cash flows.  Our finding is consistent with the empirical literature 
showing that higher cash flow reduces the likelihood to lobby (Hill et al. 2013) and to 
contribute to political action committees (PAC) (Cooper et al. 2010).  Cash flow can also be 
viewed as a performance measure.  In that sense, the relation may be interpreted as that poorly 
performing firms lobby for favorable policies to improve subsequent performance.  Fourth, 
the estimated coefficient on R&D is only statistically significant in columns (3) and (4).  If 
                                                 
14 Note that the numbers in Table 3 are multiplied by 1,000. 
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anything, lobbying expenditures seem negatively affected by R&D expenditures suggesting 
that R&D and corporate lobbying are substitutes rather than complements.  However, 
according to the literature the relation between innovation and lobbying depends on the 
industry a firm is operating in.  For example, Taylor (1997) finds that the relation between 
R&D and lobbying is positive in “high-tech” industries but negative in “low-tech” industries.  
He reasons that firms in the computer and medical industry may lobby to permit the 
introduction of a new technology or to restrict other firms’ access to the new technology.  In 
“low-tech” industries, however, political activity seems to be a substitute for innovative 
capability.  For the US steel industry, Lenway et al.  (1996) find that older and less innovative 
firms were more likely to lobby for trade protection.  Moreover, when trade protection was 
put in place firms with high past R&D expenditures were more likely to exit the steel 
industry.  Given these considerations it is not surprising that the relation between R&D and 
lobbying expenditures is statistically weak across industries.  Fifth, we find that highly 
levered firms lobby less.  This is consistent with Hill et al.  (2013) but in contrast to the 
empirical literature on campaign contributions showing that more levered firms are more 
likely to have a corporate PAC (Cooper et al. 2010).  Moreover, the study of Faccio et al.  
(2006) suggests that debtholders may benefit from PAC contribution because they seem to 
increase the chances of a corporate bailout.  An important difference between campaign 
contributions and lobbying expenditures is that PAC contributions are raised voluntarily from 
managers as well as employees and do not come from corporate treasury (Zardkoohi 1985).15  
Because of this discrepancy debtholders may favor political activity in the form of campaign 
contributions that are essentially costless to them.  Sixth, our results show that Focus is 
negatively related to lobbying expenditures.  This is in line with theoretical considerations and 
the empirical literature (Cooper et al. 2010; Taylor 1997; Zardkoohi 1985).  Seventh, we find 
that firms in more concentrated industries are more likely to lobby.  However, statistical 
significance varies from column to column and, thus, seems to depend on how we measure 
corporate lobbying activity.  Finally, the number of electoral votes in a firm’s state of location 
and the distance to the state capitol building are negatively related to lobbying activity.  
Statistical significance is rather low though.  These results are similar to what Hill et al.  
(2013) get.  Overall, our regression results on corporate lobbying activity seem largely 
consistent with the literature.  More importantly, accounting for various confounding effects 
we find that corporate lobbying becomes more important as firms grow older. 
                                                 
15 Note that corporate funds can be used to establish or operate a corporate PAC but not to support a candi-
date’s election campaign. 
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In Panel B of Table 4 we gauge economic significance.  Using the regression results from 
Panel A we predict corporate lobbying activity at the mean of all control variables and at 
different percentiles of the sample firm age distribution.  We do so for all firms to get an 
understanding of how lobbying activity varies over time regardless of being politically active 
or not.  Specifically, we compute the so-called unconditional expected value, i.e.  E(y|x).16  
Moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile of the firm age distribution increases lobbying 
expenditures normalized by assets from 0.036 to 0.044 or by 22 percent, lobbying 
expenditures normalized by sales from 0.070 to 0.082 or by 17 percent, inflation-adjusted 
lobbying expenditures from USD 8,983 to 13,378 or by 49 percent, and the propensity to 
engage in corporate lobbying from 0.067 to 0.087 or by 30 percent.  These are large increases 
in lobbying activity over time.  We conclude that the change in corporate lobbying activity 
with respect to firm age is economically important. 
   
4.3. Robustness 
We conduct various robustness tests using the ratio of corporate lobbying expenditures to 
assets instead of a binary variable as dependent variable.  The choice is mainly motivated by 
our interest in the degree of lobbying activity rather than just the propensity to lobby.  The 
results are shown in Table 5.  First, we follow Hill et al.  (2013) and exclude the top five 
lobbying industries as measured by the fraction of aggregated lobbying expenditures in 
column (1) or firm-year observations with large lobbying expenditures (above USD 1 million) 
in column (2).  The estimated coefficient on Firm age remains positive and statistically 
significant in either case.  Also, the age-effect is similar in magnitude if we exclude top 
lobbying industries or firms. 
Second, Hochberg et al.  (2009) find that lobbying against Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) is most 
likely for firms operating in mature industries with low forecasted earnings.  They interpret 
the finding as that firms with free cash flow problems as described in Jensen (1986), i.e., 
firms with high profitability, low growth opportunities, and poor governance, are more likely 
to lobby with the aim of expropriating shareholders.  In column (3) we control for 
concentrated lobbying activity in mature industries by adding average firm age in a given 
                                                 
16 Alternatively, we could compute predicted lobbying expenditures given that lobbying expenditures are 
positive, i.e., E(y|y>0, x) or the so-called conditional expectation.  
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industry-year to our control variables.  Our results are robust to the inclusion of Industry age.  
However, according to Hochberg et al.  (2009) it might still be that we capture a governance-
effect especially because more dispersed ownership in established firms (Holderness 2009) 
may allow those managers to use excess free cash flows to lobby for personal rather than 
firm-specific interests (Aggarwal et al. 2012).  So far, our analysis assumes that the increase 
in lobbying with respect to firm age is driven by an increase in firm-specific lobbying.  An 
alternative interpretation is that managers of established firms are more likely to lobby for 
personal interests.  For example, a manager valuing the environment may lobby excessively 
for anti-pollution bills.  Since we do not observe whether lobbying efforts are related to firm-
specific interests, we account for such an explanation by including institutional ownership and 
its interaction with firm age to our regression model.  Because concentrated institutional 
holdings seem to matter more for monitoring (Chen et al. 2007), we use institutional 
ownership concentration as proxy for a firm’s level of monitoring.  The results in column (4) 
reveal that firms with more concentrated institutional holdings lobby less.  The negative 
estimated coefficient of the interaction term Institutional ownership × Firm age further 
suggests that established firms with concentrated institutional holdings lobby less.  This is 
consistent with the view that managers of established firms are inclined to lobby in excess of 
what is optimal to shareholders.  More importantly however, we continue to find a positive 
and statistically significant age-effect which is unrelated to institutional ownership 
concentration and similar in magnitude if we do not account for institutional ownership.  We 
conclude that our documented age-effect cannot entirely be explained by self-interested 
managers’ lobbying behavior in established firms with excess free cash flow problems. 
Third, Sigelman and Zeng (1999) imply that using a Tobit model to study lobbying 
expenditures is not be appropriate if the zero values are not due to censoring but due to the 
corporate’s decision to not engage in corporate lobbying.  In that case the authors argue that it 
might be more suitable to model the decision to lobby.  Building on that argument we assume 
that a corporation first decides on whether it engages in corporate lobbying in a given year 
and then, conditional on doing so decides on how much to spend.  The empirical approach is 
to estimate a two-step Heckman (1979) model.  Other studies have used the Heckman model 
to examine the amount of PAC contributions (Grier et al. 1994; Lichtenberg 1989).  In the 
first-stage regression we simulate the decision to lobby in a given year.  We therefore regress 
the binary variable bLobby on our set of control variables from Table 4.  In the second-stage 
regression we relate the amount of corporate lobbying expenditures to Firm age, Firm size, 
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Tobin’s Q, Cash flow, R&D, Leverage, Focus, Industry concentration and the Inverse Mills 
Ratio.  Note that we drop the variables Votes and Distance, since we use these variables as 
instruments in the first-stage regression (Hill et al. 2013).17  The regression results of the 
second-stage regression are shown in column (5).  We have 6,159 firm-year observations that 
enter the second-stage regression.  First of all, the estimated coefficient on the Inverse Mills 
Ratio is not statistically significant suggesting that there is no sample selection bias.  
Moreover, Firm age is positively related to corporate lobbying expenditures in the second-
stage regression.  We conclude that conditional on being an active lobbying firm established 
firms spend larger amounts on corporate lobbying.  We have to be careful with the 
interpretation of the coefficient because Firm age enters the selection model as well.  Thus, a 
change in Firm age will also affect the propensity of a firm to engage in lobbying and, thus, 
the Inverse Mills ratio in the second-stage regression.  Due to the overall robustness of our 
empirical result we conclude that young and established firms differ in their corporate 
lobbying behavior and that this difference is economically important. 
 
5. Corporate lobbying and the competitive environment 
So far, we have established that corporate lobbying expenditures increase as firms grow older.  
In this section we aim to shed more light on why established firms are more inclined to lobby 
the government.  We advocate that established firms use corporate lobbying as a competitive 
weapon to slow down the depletion of rents by young and innovative firms. 
 
5.1. Product market threat 
Product market competition is likely to accentuate the decline in rents from initial innovation 
due to imitation (Schumpeter 1934).  So, given that established firms lobby to retain rents we 
would expect higher political activity in established firms when product market competition is 
high.  We use two different measures to capture product market competition at the firm-level.  
The first measure we employ is product uniqueness and captures demand-sided barriers to 
                                                 
17 We conduct a 2SLS regression to check the validity of our instruments.  The F-value of the excluded 
instruments equals 6, which is below the often suggested critical value of 10.  Hence, our instruments are 
rather weak.   
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entry such as brand name (Mueller 1997; Stein 1997).  Looking across established firms, we 
would expect those with unique products to engage in less lobbying because their rents are at 
lower risk.  We follow the literature and use SG&A expenditures as a proxy for product 
uniqueness (Frank and Goyal 2009; Titman and Wessels 1988).  To account for time-varying 
industry differences in SG&A expenditures we construct a binary variable bUnique that 
equals one if a firm’s SG&A expenditures are in the top tercile of its industry-year 
distribution and zero otherwise.  A drawback of this measure is that entry barriers may reflect 
strategic choices by firms (see Hou and Robinson 2006 and the cited literature therein).  
Using measures of entry barriers may, thus, introduce potential endogeneity with political 
activity.  Moreover, other studies relate high SG&A expenditures to high overhead costs or 
bureaucracy (e.g. Stuart and Sorenson 2003) rather than unique products.  Our second 
measure is a consequence of entry barriers and focuses on the number of firms that compete 
in the same product market.  Specifically, we employ a Herfindahl index using text-based 
network industry classifications which is provided by Hoberg and Philips (2014). 
To empirically test whether the increase in corporate lobbying expenditures over time is 
related to product market competition we re-estimate our main regression model with an 
additional interaction term between Firm age and one of the two competition measures.  The 
dependent variable is either Lobby-to-assets, LnLobby, or bLobby.  The results are shown in 
Table 6.  For brevity we only report the estimated coefficients of Firm age, the respective 
competition variable, and the interaction variable.  In column (1) to (3) we display the 
empirical results using the product uniqueness approach.  The estimated coefficient on the 
interaction term Firm age × bUnique is negative and highly significant in all three columns.  
Moreover, the magnitude of the estimated coefficient on the interaction term in column (1) 
suggests that for firms with unique products the age-effect is about 62 percent lower relative 
to other firms operating in the same industry.18  The economic magnitude is similar in 
columns (2) and (3).  The estimated coefficient on product uniqueness itself is positive and 
statistically significant suggesting that, on average, firms with unique products lobby more.  
According to Titman (1984) firms with unique products lose customers when failure 
probability is high.  Following that argument, high bankruptcy costs may induce firms with 
unique products to lobby more.  Nevertheless, the increase in lobbying activity over time is 
lower for firms with unique products.  Thus, we interpret our evidence as that firms with less 
imitable products do not need government to help slow the decline in rents related to 
                                                 
18 -0.058 / 0.093 = -0.62. 
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competitor imitation.  In column (4) to (6) we show the regression results when Firm age is 
interacted with the product market concentration variable HHI.  Note that a concentrated 
product market with a low competitive pressure translates into a high value for HHI.  First, we 
find that firms operating in more concentrated product markets, on average, spend more on 
corporate lobbying.  This is consistent with the literature arguing that lobbying activity has 
public goods characteristics as the outcome may affect all firms in a product market (Pittman 
1976).  Firms operating in more concentrated product markets are more likely to lobby for 
industry-wide legislation such as import tariffs because the lobbying gains per dollar spent are 
higher (Pittman 1976) and it is less costly to collude lobbying efforts (Zardkoohi 1985).19  
Second and more importantly, the regression results show that the rise in corporate lobbying 
expenditures over time is lower in more concentrated industries.  Looking at the regression 
results in column (4), a one-standard deviation increase in HHI (0.23) reduces the age-effect 
on corporate lobbying by 56 percent.20  These results suggest that established firms’ attempt to 
influence legislation depends on how strong product market threats are.  Established firms 
facing high product market threats spend significantly more on corporate lobbying.  Overall, 
our empirical results are consistent with the idea that firms invest in corporate lobbying to 
counteract creative destruction forces.   
An alternative interpretation of our results is that corporate lobbying expenditures impact the 
competitive environment as firms grow older.  Firms with high corporate lobbying 
expenditures may be successful in putting protective legislation in place, thereby, leading to 
lower entry rates of competitors over time and lessening the need to invest in selling, general, 
and administrative expenses.  In other words, our competitive measures may be endogenous 
to political activity.  A related issue is that an omitted variable may impact product market 
competition as well as corporate lobbying expenditures.  For example, high policy risk, i.e., 
uncertainty about future legislation, may deter firms from entering a business and increase 
incumbents’ lobbying activity (Bradley et al.  2013).  To address endogeneity we require an 
exogenous shock to a firm’s competitive environment.  A common approach in the literature 
is to use industry-specific reductions in import tariffs (Frésard and Valta 2013; Guadalupe and 
Wulf 2010).  This approach is problematic in our setting because import tariff reductions are a 
                                                 
19 Note that Industry concentration in our main regression model in Table 4 is not statistically significant.  
It seems that the variable provided by Hoberg and Philipps (2014) is a less noisy measure of industry con-
centration.  Due to multicollinearity issues we drop the variable Industry concentration in unreported anal-
ysis and find that the regression results remain the same. 
20 (0.23×-0.164) / 0.067 = -0.56. 
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legislative outcome and, thus, likely to be endogenous to corporate lobbying expenditures 
(Lenway et al. 1996).  Moreover, such a change in legislation is likely to impact future 
lobbying activity beyond discontinuing lobbying expenditures related to the legislation put in 
place.  For those reasons, competitive shocks using changes in legislation may introduce 
potential endogeneity with corporate lobbying. 
 
5.2. Industry distress 
As an additional test of our hypothesis, we therefore look at industry distress.  Industry 
distress is an economic shock to future rents caused by a decline in revenues or increase in 
production costs.  Such an economic shock due to a change in the market is more likely to be 
exogenous to lobbying activity.  Moreover, we reason that industry distress decreases 
incumbents’ future rents and increases the probability of liquidation.  This induces managers 
to work hard for improving profitability in order to avoid an industry-shakeout.  According to 
Loderer et al.  (2014) established firms will find it more difficult to counteract industry 
distress with new innovations or simply by switching industry.  As a consequence, we would 
expect them to try to retain profitability by seeking political and regulatory support. 
We follow Opler and Titman (1994) and classify an industry in year t as distressed if the 
median sales growth of all firms in that industry is negative and the median stock return is 
less than -30 percent.  Industry classification is based on 3-digit SIC codes.  We compute 
sales growth and stock return over a two-year period from beginning of year t to end of year 
t+1 and require at least 5 firm-years to compute our industry measures.  Gopalan and Xie 
(2011) use the same classification and find that in their sample distressed industry-years seem 
to coincide with drops in revenues or increases in input prices.  This industry distress 
identification suits our research purpose in the sense that it is more likely to be exogenous to 
corporate lobbying than changes in legislation.  We further investigate endogeneity of 
industry distress by asking whether industries with high lobbying activity have a lower 
distress probability.  In Table 7 we report the probability of industry distress and the 
percentage of active lobbying firms for each Fama and French (1997) 48-industry.  In the 
entire sample we classify 6.2 percent of firm-years as distressed which is higher than what 
other studies find (Gopalan and Xie 2011; Opler and Titman 1994).  The difference can be 
explained by our more recent sample that covers a period with more distressed industries 
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(Gopalan and Xie 2011).  When looking across industries, we do not find that industry 
distress is clustered in a few industries.  Moreover, in unreported analysis we find that the 
correlation between percentage of active lobbying firms and probability of distress using 
2,362 industry-year observations equals -0.052.  The correlation coefficient is negative but 
rather low in magnitude.  Overall, it does not seem that industry distress is endogenous to 
lobbying.  Although firms may successfully lobby for higher demand or lower costs it seems 
unlikely that large industry-wide downward shocks can be contained through lobbying.  A 
case in point is the defense industry that experienced industry distress despite the large 
fraction of government demand which can be directly influenced through corporate lobbying. 
To empirically test whether lobbying investment is more important to established firms during 
industry distress we re-estimate our main regression model and include an interaction term 
between firm age and industry distress.  The results are shown in Table 8.  The dependent 
variable is Lobby-to-assets in odd-numbered columns and bLobby in even-numbered 
columns.  In column (1) the interaction term bDistress × Firm age is positively related to 
Lobby-to-assets but the p-value of 0.152 is below statistical significance.  In column (2) we 
find that industry distress significantly increases the probability of established firms to engage 
in corporate lobbying.  Economically, industry distress approximately doubles the age-effect 
on lobbying propensity, which seems to support the hypothesis that established firms lobby as 
a means to avoid industry shake-out.  The estimated coefficient on bDistress itself is negative 
and statistically significant.  This is consistent with the notion that firms face higher financial 
constraints during distress.  Similarly, Gopalan and Xie (2011) find that distressed firms 
reduce R&D expenditures.  In column (3) and (4) we take into account that the fraction of 
politically active firms is slightly negatively related to industry distress and explore whether 
our results are driven by industries with no distress during our sample period.  Our results are 
not affected by this sample restriction.  In unreported analysis, we also use industry dummies 
based on 3-digit SIC codes and find that our results are not driven by unobserved industry 
characteristics. 
An alternative interpretation of the empirical evidence is that established firms are less 
financially constrained and, thus, more likely to lobby when industry distress reduces 
available funds for investment.  Rather than a lower ability to cope with a decline in demand 
or increase in production costs it may simple be that higher cash levels, more collateral, or 
longer bank relations allow established firms to continue their lobbying activity even during 
 96 
 
economic downturns.  Our hypothesis, however, postulates that during industry distress 
established firms are more likely to lobby than their younger counterparts with similar 
financial constraints.  To control for cross-sectional differences in financial constraints we re-
estimate our regressions in Table 8 and limit our sample to firms with positive dividend 
payout.  Thereby, we ensure that all firms per se have enough available funds to engage in 
corporate lobbying.  The results are in column (5) and (6).  Both estimated coefficients on the 
interaction term bDistress × Firm age are positive and statistically significant.  Thus, it does 
not seem that our empirical results are merely driven by differences in financial constraints 
between established and young firms.  Overall, the empirical results in Table 8 suggest that 
established firms are more inclined to seek government support when an industry is in 
distress.  This finding is consistent with corporate lobbying being a competitive weapon of 
established firms that seem unable to create new opportunities or to reorient themselves by 
exiting a distressed industry. 
 
6. Corporate lobbying and creative destruction 
In the final section we investigate whether established firms’ lobbying activities slow down 
the creative destruction process.  There are various ways that legislation can protect 
established firms.  First, established firms may lobby Congress for trade protection (Lenway 
et al. 1996).  Second, they may lobby for subsidies like government contracts (Goldman et al. 
2013), favorable legal treatment (Yu and Yu 2011), lower compliance costs (Hochberg et al. 
2009) or lower tax rates (Richter et al. 2009).  Third, established firms in distress may use 
lobbying to receive stimulus funds (Adelino and Dinc 2013) or increase the likelihood of 
government bailout (Faccio et al. 2006).  Finally, established firms may also lobby for entry 
regulation through minimum standards that handicap younger and smaller competitors 
(Devinney 2009). 
There are therefore several ways that established firms can benefit from their lobbying efforts.  
The assumption, however, is that policy makers respond to established firms’ protective 
lobbying efforts.  According to Caballero and Hammour (1996) “ongoing creative destruction 
[…] often entails distressing job losses, and can therefore result in political responses to 
protect those jobs.”  Given that politicians are mainly interested in how policies and 
regulation affect their chances of re-election (Figueiredo and Richter 2013), we expect 
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established firms to be successful in lobbying for legislation that thwarts or hinders the 
creative destruction process in a competitive economy.  If so, lobbying should reduce 
industry-wide churn rates. 
Table 9 tests this prediction using industry turnover rates as proxies for creative destruction 
(Chun et al. 2008; Comin and Philippon 2006).  For each industry-year, we compute the 
conditional probability that an incumbent firm will fall out of the top quintile of the 
distribution of value proxies within the next 5 years.  The value proxies of relevance are 
market capitalization, operating income, and sales.  Our main explanatory variable is average 
industry lobbying expenditures scaled by assets.  Because turnover rate is a fractional 
dependent variable we estimate the regression equation using a fractional logit generalized 
linear model (Papke and Woolridge 1996).  We control for various industry characteristics 
such as corporate demographics, competition, technology, and financing (Chun et al. 2008).  
Year fixed effects are used to control for unobserved economy wide shocks.  We require at 
least 5 firm-year observations to compute our industry variables (Chun et al. 2008).  The final 
sample consists of 419 industry-year observations for which we have data to compute all of 
our variables. 
Consistent with our prediction, the estimated coefficient of Lobbying is negative and 
statistically significant regardless of how we measure turnover.  Higher industry lobbying 
activity diminishes the turnover of incumbent firms in terms of market value (column 1), 
operating income (column 2), and sales (column 3).  The estimated coefficient of the control 
variables are in line with the findings of Chun et al.  (2008).  In particular, industry firm size 
is negatively related to turnover rate and industry leverage is positively related to it.  In 
contrast to their empirical results, we also find that higher industry concentration reduces 
turnover rate.  This is consistent with the view that product market competition accentuates 
idiosyncratic return volatility (Irvine and Pontiff 2009), another proxy for creative destruction 
(Chun et al. 2008). 
In column (4) to (6), we differentiate between lobbying by established and young firms in a 
given industry.  We define Lobbying by established firms as the average lobbying-to-assets 
ratio of firms older than the median firm age in a given industry-year, and Lobbying by young 
firms as the average lobbying-to-assets ratio of younger firms.  On average, industry lobbying 
expenditures are higher for established firms than for younger firms (0.061 vs.  0.054).  The 
regression results reveal that lobbying by established firms significantly diminish within-
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industry turnover rates.  The estimated coefficient is negative and highly significant if we 
measure turnover rate based on market value of equity in column (4) or sales in column (6).  
In contrast, the estimated coefficient of Lobbying by young firms is positive in all three 
columns.  This result, however, is statistically fairly weak. 
One might argue that unobserved industry characteristics are responsible for our findings.  For 
example, in more regulated industries we would expect lobbying efforts to be higher due to 
the higher government involvement.  At the same time, industry turnover will naturally be 
lower in regulated industries.  To address this issue we exclude the top 5 lobbying industries.  
Again, we rank industries according to the percentage of total industry-specific lobbying 
expenditures.  The results are shown in column (7) to (9).  We find no evidence that our 
results are driven by industries with overall high lobbying activity and, presumably, a lower 
turnover rate caused by a more stable environment.  A more direct way to account for 
unobserved industry characteristics is to include industry year fixed effects.  The problem 
with industry fixed effects is that they are likely to absorb a great deal of variation due to the 
rather short panel of 11 years.  The results are in columns (10) to (12).  The estimated 
coefficient of Lobbying by established firms remains negative in all three columns.  
Moreover, the effect is highly significant if we measure turnover rates based on market value 
of equity in column (10).  In column (12) the estimated coefficient of Lobbying by established 
firms is no longer statistically different from zero.  Interestingly, other important determinants 
of industry turnover, namely Firm size and Leverage, lose their statistical significance in all 
three columns.  This questions the validity of these regression specifications.   
Overall, we interpret our regression results in Table 9 as showing that lobbying by established 
firms is effective at reducing the turnover rate of incumbent firms.  Our empirical findings, 
therefore, are consistent with the hypothesis that established firms use lobbying as a means to 
forestall the creative destruction process. 
 
7. Conclusion 
We aim to address the question of whether corporate lobbying allows established firms to 
fend off younger and more innovative firms.  According to the literature established firms 
have various competitive weapons at their disposal to forestall the creative destruction 
process.  For example, established firms may gain a competitive advantage over new entrants 
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through customer retention (Stein 1997) or improving technical efficiency (Loderer et al. 
2014).  In our study we argue that corporate lobbying is another effective way that established 
firms may gain such a competitive advantage. 
We find empirical support for our hypothesis.  First, we show an economically and 
statistically significant relation between firm age and corporate lobbying.  Second, the age-
effect is stronger for firms operating in competitive product markets where the decline in rents 
over time is likely to be greater.  Third, using industry distress as an exogenous shock to 
future rents we find that established firms are relatively more inclined to lobby when being in 
distress.  Finally, we find that corporate lobbying by established firms reduces top industry 
turnover rate, a common proxy for creative destruction.   
We conclude that corporate lobbying is another competitive weapon that established firms 
have at their disposal to protect their future profitability and, thereby, forestalling the creative 
destruction process.  A question left unexplored in this study is whether corporate lobbying by 
established firms affects innovative output by younger firms and subsequent economic 
growth.  We leave that to future research. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for our variables.  Variable definitions are shown in Table 10.  The data refer to firms 
from 1998 to 2012.  Panel A shows the descriptive statistics of the lobbying variables of all firms and Panel B of lobbying 
firms only.  In Panel C we display the descriptive statistics of the control variables measured in the fiscal year prior to the 
lobbying decision.  All continuous and unbounded variables are winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile of their pooled 
distribution. 
 Mean Median Std. Min Max N 
 
Panel A: Lobbying variables 
bLobby 0.1505 0.0000 0.3576 0.0000 1.0000 53,334 
Lobbying expenditures (million) 0.0592 0.0000 0.2532 0.0000 1.9330 53,334 
Lobbying expenditures (log) 0.0415 0.0000 0.1557 0.0000 1.0760 53,334 
Lobby-to-assets 0.0001 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.0020 53,260 
Lobby-to-sales 0.0001 0.0000 0.0005 0.0000 0.0046 52,044 
       
Panel B: Lobbying variables conditional on lobbying 
Lobbying expenditures (million) 0.3934 0.1540 0.5426 0.0039 1.9330 8,028 
Lobbying expenditures (log) 0.2759 0.1432 0.3103 0.0039 1.0760 8,028 
Lobby-to-assets 0.0004 0.0001 0.0006 0.0000 0.0020 8,022 
Lobby-to-sales 0.0007 0.0002 0.0012 0.0000 0.0046 7,941 
       
Panel C: Control variables 
Firm age (in years) 14.604 11.000 13.484 1.0000 75.000 47,271 
Firm size 5.1643 5.0698 1.9243 0.9257 10.058 47,252 
Tobin’s Q 2.3062 1.5729 2.1638 0.5161 13.909 47,178 
Cash flow -0.0342 0.0585 0.3027 -1.8837 0.2971 47,078 
R&D 0.4804 0.0065 2.2798 0.0000 18.894 46,620 
Leverage 0.1989 0.1293 0.2263 0.0000 1.1437 47,241 
Reported industries (log) 0.9413 1.0000 0.1503 0.1765 1.0000 47,268 
Industry concentration 0.0742 0.0557 0.0752 0.0139 0.8506 47,271 
Votes 2.9739 2.9957 0.7325 1.0986 4.0073 43,845 
Distance 4.1858 4.4644 1.3185 0.0000 6.1335 41,702 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of lobbying and non-lobbying firms 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the control variables for lobbyists and non-lobbyists separately.  Variable 
definitions are shown in Table 10.  The data refer to firms from 1998 to 2012.  All the control variables are measured at the 
fiscal year ending prior to the lobbying decision.  All continuous and unbounded variables are winsorized at the 1st and the 
99th percentile of their pooled distribution.  The significance of difference in means is based on a two-tailed t-test.  The 
significance of difference in medians is based on a two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test.  Asterisks denote 
statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level. 
 Lobbyists Non-lobbyists  Difference in 
 N Mean Median N Mean Median  Means Medians 
           
Firm age (in years) 7,054 22.46 16.00 40,217 13.23 10.00  9.233*** 6.000***
Firm size 7,053 7.032 7.272 40,199 4.837 4.802  2.195*** 2.470***
Tobin’s Q 7,052 2.431 1.738 40,126 2.284 1.539  0.146*** 0.199***
Cash flow 7,026 0.021 0.078 40,052 -0.044 0.054  0.065*** 0.023***
R&D 6,982 0.363 0.009 39,638 0.501 0.006  -0.137*** 0.003 
Leverage 7,053 0.232 0.198 40,188 0.193 0.114  0.039*** 0.084***
Focus 7,054 0.894 1.000 40,214 0.950 1.000  -0.055*** 0.000***
Industry concentration 7,054 0.080 0.057 40,217 0.073 0.056  0.007*** 0.002***
Votes 6,832 2.891 2.708 37,013 2.989 3.045  -0.098*** -0.336***
Distance 6,254 4.039 4.441 35,448 4.212 4.464  -0.173*** -0.023***
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Univariate analysis 
Table 3 shows the results of the univariate analysis.  All firm-years are divided into four age-cohort of similar sample size.  
The percentage of firm-year observations in each age-cohort is shown in column (1).  In column (2) are aggregate inflation-
adjusted lobbying expenditures in USD millions and its percentage of total spending in column (3).  The distribution of size-
adjusted lobbying expenditures is displayed in column (4).  For illustration purposes, we multiply the ratio of lobbying 
expenditures to assets by 1,000.  Column (5) shows how the propensity to lobby varies with firm age.  The data refer to firm-
year observations between 1998 and 2012. 
 Percent of firmyear observations 
Lobbying expendi-
tures (millions) 
Percent of total 
lobbying expendi-
tures 
Lobby-to-assets 
ratio 
(multiplied by 
1,000) 
Propensity to lobby
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All firm-years 100.0% 4,522 100% 0.056 15.1% 
      
1 to 4 19.7% 195 4.3% 0.047 7.7% 
5 to 10 28.4% 472 10.5% 0.058 10.9% 
11 to 19 26.4% 739 16.3% 0.062 15.0% 
20 or more 25.5% 3,116 68.9% 0.055 25.4% 
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Table 4: Main regression results 
Panel A of Table 4 shows the estimation results of the main regression equation relating lobbying activity to firm age.  The 
dependent variable is the ratio of lobbying expenditures to assets in column (1), the ratio of lobbying expenditures to sales in 
column (2), the natural logarithm of inflation-adjusted lobbying expenditures plus one in column (3), and a binary variable 
indicating whether a firm lobbies in a given year or not in column (4).  We estimate the equation in column (1) to (3) using a 
tobit specification and in column (4) using a logit specification.  We multiply all coefficients in column (2) and (3) by 1,000.  
All independent variables are measured at the fiscal year ending prior to the lobbying decision.  Variable definitions are 
shown in Table 10.  All continuous and unbounded variables are winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile of their pooled 
distribution.  All specifications include year and industry fixed effects.  Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and 
reported in parentheses.  Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level.  The economic 
significance is gauged in Panel B.  We show predicted values for our lobbying variables at the mean of all independent 
variables and at various percentiles of the age distribution. 
Panel A: Regression results 
 Lobbying-to-assets Lobbying-to-sales Lnlobby bLobby 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Firm age (log) 0.067*** 0.095*** 0.045*** 0.205*** 
 (0.018) (0.034) (0.008) (0.042) 
Firm size 0.228*** 0.474*** 0.172*** 0.810*** 
 (0.009) (0.022) (0.007) (0.028) 
Tobin’s Q 0.062*** 0.113*** 0.028*** 0.143*** 
 (0.007) (0.015) (0.003) (0.014) 
Cash flow -0.482*** -1.129*** -0.250*** -1.103*** 
 (0.070) (0.145) (0.026) (0.141) 
R&D -0.011 0.000 -0.007*** -0.025* 
 (0.007) (0.015) (0.002) (0.013) 
Leverage -0.193*** -0.383*** -0.126*** -0.559*** 
 (0.067) (0.135) (0.029) (0.155) 
Focus -0.354*** -0.590*** -0.178*** -0.924*** 
 (0.092) (0.167) (0.040) (0.219) 
Industry concentration 0.603** 1.270** 0.234* 1.750** 
 (0.298) (0.620) (0.121) (0.719) 
Votes -0.053* -0.088 -0.017 -0.120* 
 (0.029) (0.058) (0.012) (0.063) 
Distance -0.028* -0.071** -0.009 -0.061* 
 (0.014) (0.030) (0.006) (0.033) 
     
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 40,767 40,416 40,804 40,804 
Pseudo-R2 0.155 0.130 0.410 0.285 
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Panel B: Economic significance 
 Percentile of age distribution within regression sample 
 5th 25th 50th 75th 95th 
Firm age (years) 2 5 11 19 39 
Lobbying-to-assets (× 1,000) 0.031 0.036 0.041 0.044 0.050 
Lobbying-to-sales (× 1,000) 0.063 0.070 0.077 0.082 0.089 
Lobbying expenditures (USD) 6,742 8,983 11,397 13,378 16,422 
Propensity to lobby 0.056 0.067 0.078 0.087 0.099 
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Table 5: Robustness tests 
Table 5 shows the results of the robustness tests.  The dependent variable is the ratio of lobbying expenditures to assets.  We 
estimate the equation using a tobit specification in column (1) to (4).  In column (5) we estimate a two-stage Heckman model.  
In the first-stage we estimate our main regression model where the dependent variable is a binary variable indicating whether 
a firm lobbies in a given year or not.  We use a Probit specification.  The second-stage regression is an OLS regression where 
the dependent variable equals the ratio of lobbying expenditures to assets.  Note that ecollege and distance are instruments in 
the first-stage regression.  All independent variables are measured at the fiscal year ending prior to the lobbying decision.  
Variable definitions are shown in Table 10.  The Adj-R2 in column (5) is based on an OLS regression.  All continuous and 
unbounded variables are winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile of their pooled distribution.  All specifications include 
year and industry fixed effects.  Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses.  Asterisks denote 
statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level. 
 Lobbying-to-assets 
 
Exclude top 5 
lobbying-
industries 
Exclude lobbying 
expenditure > 1 
million 
Full sample Full sample Heckman two-stage model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Firm age (log) 0.063*** 0.073*** 0.064*** 0.068*** 0.033*** 
 (0.022) (0.019) (0.018) (0.022) (0.006) 
Firm size 0.209*** 0.236*** 0.228*** 0.192*** -0.178*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.006) 
Tobin’s Q 0.082*** 0.065*** 0.062*** 0.055*** 0.004 
 (0.011) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.003) 
Cash flow -0.484*** -0.497*** -0.486*** -0.494*** -0.607*** 
 (0.085) (0.073) (0.070) (0.087) (0.029) 
R&D -0.006 -0.010 -0.012* -0.026*** -0.006** 
 (0.013) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.003) 
Leverage -0.258*** -0.201*** -0.196*** -0.211*** -0.112*** 
 (0.088) (0.071) (0.067) (0.077) (0.024) 
Focus -0.227*** -0.388*** -0.354*** -0.449*** 0.067** 
 (0.088) (0.101) (0.092) (0.110) (0.028) 
Industry concentration 0.611** 0.729** 0.645** 0.014 0.339*** 
 (0.275) (0.326) (0.300) (0.385) (0.057) 
Votes -0.015 -0.052* -0.053* -0.061*  
 (0.032) (0.031) (0.029) (0.032)  
Distance -0.033** -0.031** -0.028* -0.022  
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016)  
Industry age   0.202**   
   (0.091)   
Institutional ownership    -0.270*  
    (0.139)  
Institutional ownership × 
Firm age 
   -0.218**  
   (0.105)  
Inverse Mills ratio     -0.013 
     (0.018) 
      
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations 25,099 40,104 40,767 24,710 6,159 
Pseudo-R2 / Adj-R2 0.183 0.135 0.155 0.154 0.544 
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Table 6: Unique products and product market concentration 
Table 6 shows how the age-effect varies with product uniqueness and product market concentration.  We estimate the main 
regression equation from Table 4 and interact firm age with product uniqueness in column (1) to (3) and product market 
concentration in column (4) to (6).  The dependent variable is the ratio of lobbying expenditures to assets in column (1) and 
(4), the natural logarithm of inflation-adjusted lobbying expenditures plus one in column (2) and (5), and a binary variable 
indicating whether a firm lobbies in a given year or not in column (3) and (6).  We estimate the equation using a tobit 
specification or a logit specification when the dependent variable is a binary variable.  Firm age and product market 
concentration are demeaned at their pooled distribution.  We include all control variables from Table 4, but due to simplicity 
we only report the estimated coefficients of the age covariates.  All independent variables are measured at the fiscal year 
ending prior to the lobbying decision.  Variable definitions are shown in Table 10.  All continuous and unbounded variables 
are winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile of their pooled distribution.  Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and 
reported in parentheses.  Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level. 
 Lobby-to-assets LnLobby bLobby 
Lobby-to-
assets LnLobby bLobby 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Firm age 0.093*** 0.059*** 0.264*** 0.067*** 0.043*** 0.206*** 
 (0.021) (0.009) (0.052) (0.020) (0.008) (0.046) 
Firm age × bUnique -0.058** -0.037*** -0.140**    
 (0.027) (0.012) (0.065)    
bUnique 0.092*** 0.032** 0.230***    
 (0.032) (0.014) (0.076)    
Firm age × HHI    -0.164** -0.100*** -0.255 
    (0.074) (0.026) (0.162) 
HHI    0.388*** 0.163*** 0.804*** 
    (0.085) (0.032) (0.180) 
       
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 40,767 40,804 40,804 33,630 33,665 33,665 
Pseudo-R2 0.156 0.411 0.286 0.157 0.408 0.281 
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Table 7: Probability of distress and percentage of lobbying firms across industries 
Table 7 shows for each industry the number of firm-year observations in column (1), the probability of industry distress in 
column (2), and the percentage of politically active firms in column (3).  We use Fama and French (1997) 48-industry 
classification. 
FF48-Industry Observations Probability of distress Fraction of lobbying firms
 (1) (2) (3) 
Overall 37,463 0.062 0.147 
Agriculture 60 0 0.25 
Food Products 667 0.006 0.168 
Candy & Soda 114 0 0.114 
Beer & Liquor 140 0 0.386 
Tobacco Products 15 0 0.533 
Recreation 396 0.071 0.040 
Entertainment 565 0.057 0.164 
Printing & Publishing 212 0.179 0.184 
Consumer Goods 564 0.071 0.165 
Apparel 557 0.036 0.047 
Healthcare 827 0 0.248 
Medical Equipment 1,933 0 0.189 
Pharmaceutical Products 3,209 0 0.188 
Chemicals 638 0.013 0.257 
Rubber & Plastic Products 324 0.040 0.071 
Textiles 89 0.494 0.056 
Construction Materials 513 0.037 0.115 
Construction 370 0.103 0.105 
Steel Works etc. 427 0.136 0.208 
Fabricated Products 116 0.069 0 
Machinery 1,367 0.083 0.086 
Electrical Equipment 719 0.113 0.166 
Automobiles & Trucks 441 0.098 0.156 
Aircraft 166 0 0.289 
Shipbuilding, Railroad Equipment 73 0.164 0.397 
Defense 63 0.048 0.603 
Precious Metals 76 0 0.197 
Non-Metallic and Industrial Metal Mining 107 0 0.271 
Coal 66 0 0.409 
Petroleum and Natural Gas 1,595 0.039 0.118 
Communication 1,194 0.044 0.305 
Personal Services 444 0.025 0.214 
Business Services 6,201 0.087 0.128 
Computers 2,159 0.148 0.115 
Electronic Equipment 3,175 0.143 0.078 
Measuring and Control Equipment 1,184 0.078 0.097 
Business Supplies 310 0.045 0.119 
Shipping Containers 92 0 0.207 
Transportation 1,005 0.010 0.303 
Wholesale 1,469 0.040 0.065 
Retail 2,441 0.034 0.122 
Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 881 0.006 0.100 
Almost Nothing 499 0 0.188 
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Table 8: Industry distress 
Table 8 shows how lobbying activities are related to industry distress.  We estimate the main regression equation from 
Table 4 and interact firm age with industry distress.  The dependent variable in odd-numbered columns equals the ratio of 
lobbying expenditures to assets and in even-numbered columns is a binary variable indicating whether a firm lobbies in a 
given year.  We estimate the equation using a tobit specification in odd-numbered columns and a logit specification in even-
numbered columns.  Firm age is demeaned at its pooled distribution.  We include all control variables from Table 4, but due 
to simplicity we only report the estimated coefficients of the age covariates.  All independent variables are measured at the 
fiscal year ending prior to the lobbying decision.  Variable definitions are shown in Table 10.  All continuous and unbounded 
variables are winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile of their pooled distribution.  Standard errors are clustered at the firm 
level and reported in parentheses.  Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level. 
 Full sample Industries with at least one distress 
Non-financially constrained 
firms 
 Lobby-to-assets bLobby 
Lobby-to-
assets bLobby 
Lobby-to-
assets bLobby 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Firm age 0.066*** 0.193*** 0.063** 0.163** 0.084*** 0.356*** 
 (0.019) (0.044) (0.030) (0.068) (0.023) (0.088) 
bDistress × Firm age 0.055 0.190** 0.062 0.209*** 0.102* 0.446** 
 (0.038) (0.086) (0.038) (0.081) (0.053) (0.216) 
bDistress -0.185*** -0.455*** -0.148*** -0.378*** -0.133*** -0.559*** 
 (0.041) (0.093) (0.049) (0.109) (0.047) (0.185) 
       
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 37,463 37,384 19,148 19,129 8,940 8,883 
Pseudo-R2 0.154 0.284 0.150 0.258 0.202 0.339 
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Table 9: Creative destruction 
Table 9 shows how lobbying activities are related to creative destruction.  The dependent variable is turnover rate of incumbent firms based on market value of equity, operating income, or sales 
as indicated above each column.  We estimate the equation using a glm specification.  We follow Chun et al.  (2008) and include industry-year observations with at least five firm-year 
observations to compute our industry variables.  We use the full sample except in column (7) to (9) where we exclude the top 5 industries in terms of percentage of lobbying expenditures.  
Variable definitions are shown in Table 10.  Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and reported in parentheses.  Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 
10% (*) level. 
 Full sample Full sample Exclude 5 top lobbying industries Full sample 
 Market value Operating income Sales Market value
Operating 
income Sales Market value
Operating 
income Sales Market value
Operating 
income Sales 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Lobbying -2.081* -1.371** -1.763**          
 (1.112) (0.632) (0.823)          
Lobbying by established 
firms 
   -4.282*** -1.954 -3.236*** -4.365*** -2.027 -3.207** -2.283** -0.524 -1.857 
   (1.185) (1.237) (1.253) (1.292) (1.259) (1.334) (0.913) (1.280) (1.880) 
Lobbying by young firms    1.004 0.185 0.614 1.087 0.219 0.594 0.647 0.944 1.546 
    (1.016) (0.847) (0.846) (1.029) (0.835) (0.863) (2.218) (1.594) (1.480) 
Firm age -0.202 0.087 0.084 -0.291 0.052 0.019 -0.200 0.211 0.127 -0.213 1.260* 1.066** 
 (0.232) (0.253) (0.220) (0.197) (0.246) (0.206) (0.246) (0.304) (0.240) (0.495) (0.727) (0.522) 
Firm size -0.403*** -0.360*** -0.416*** -0.368*** -0.346*** -0.390*** -0.388*** -0.381*** -0.404*** -0.390 -0.203 -0.279 
 (0.119) (0.088) (0.117) (0.121) (0.090) (0.120) (0.135) (0.099) (0.134) (0.275) (0.235) (0.216) 
Industry concentration -0.919** -0.747** -0.737** -0.723* -0.657** -0.581* -0.737* -0.625* -0.570 -3.402** -0.036 -1.522 
 (0.449) (0.344) (0.372) (0.393) (0.326) (0.322) (0.415) (0.347) (0.361) (1.633) (1.793) (1.905) 
R&D intensity 0.124 0.052 0.142** 0.085 0.033 0.112* 0.067 -0.019 0.079 -0.091 -0.171 -0.108 
 (0.090) (0.072) (0.065) (0.082) (0.072) (0.062) (0.117) (0.098) (0.098) (0.146) (0.149) (0.176) 
Leverage 2.296** 1.747** 3.417*** 1.815* 1.502* 3.046*** 1.820 1.331 3.283*** -2.080 1.285 0.256 
 (1.052) (0.879) (0.871) (0.968) (0.848) (0.869) (1.221) (1.027) (1.026) (2.217) (2.499) (2.705) 
Liquidity -0.021 0.028 0.058 -0.009 0.032 0.066 -0.007 0.030 0.083 0.036 0.244* 0.213** 
 (0.049) (0.056) (0.045) (0.051) (0.058) (0.044) (0.062) (0.070) (0.053) (0.106) (0.143) (0.091) 
             
Industry fixed effects No No No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
             
Observations 418 419 419 418 419 419 367 368 368 418 419 419 
Log likelihood -189.06 -190.70 -186.24 -187.54 -190.41 -185.40 -165.19 -167.76 -163.33 -177.69 -181.28 -178.34 
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Table 10: Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
Lobbying variables  
Lnlobby 
The natural logarithm of annual inflation-adjusted lobbying expenditures plus one.  Nomi-
nal values are deflated with the consumer price index (CPI) using 2001 as base year.  The 
data are from the Center of Responsive Politics (CRP) and Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS). 
Lobby-to-assets The ratio of annual lobbying expenditures to assets (at).  The data are from the Center of Responsive Politics (CRP) and COMPUSTAT. 
Lobby-to-sales The ratio of annual lobbying expenditures to sales (sale).  The data are from the Center of Responsive Politics (CRP) and COMPUSTAT. 
bLobby A binary variable indicating whether a firm lobbies in a given year or not.  The data are from the Center of Responsive Politics (CRP). 
Firm characteristics  
Firm age 
The natural logarithm of firm age.  Age is computed as one plus the difference between the 
year under investigation and the firm’s year of birth.  The year of birth is computed as the 
minimum value of: (a) the first year the firm appears on the CRSP tapes; (b) the first year 
the firm appears on the COMPUSTAT tapes; and (c) the first year for which we find a link 
between the CRSP and the COMPUSTAT tapes. 
Firm size 
The natural logarithm of one plus inflation-adjusted book value of assets (at).  Nominal 
values are deflated with the consumer price index (CPI) using 2001 as base year.  The data 
are from COMPUSTAT and Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). 
Tobin’s Q 
The ratio of a firm’s market value of assets to the book value of assets (at).  The market 
value of assets equals the sum market value of equity (csho × prcc_f) and the market value 
of debt (at – ceq – txdb).  The data are from COMPUSTAT. 
Cash flow 
Firm cash flow normalized by book value of assets (at).  We follow Hill et al.  (2013) and 
compute cash flow as operating profits before depreciation and amortization (oibdp) minus 
interest expenses (xint), total income taxes (txt), and common dividends (dvc).  The data 
are from COMPUSTAT. 
R&D 
Firm R&D expenditures (xrd) normalized by beginning-of-year assets (at).  We set missing 
observations to zero and include a binary variable indicating missing observations.  The 
data are from COMPUSTAT. 
Leverage The ratio of a firm’s long-term debt (dltt + dlc) to assets (at).  The data are from COM-PUSTAT. 
Focus 
Focus is measured with a Herfindahl index, HI, based on the sales (sale) in the firm’s dif-
ferent business segments:  
N 2
ii 1HI p  , 
where N is the number of reported segments with distinct 3-digit SIC codes, the subscript i 
identifies the segments, and pi is the fraction of the firm’s total sales in the segment in question.  We aggregate segment sales of reported segments with the same 3-digit SIC 
codes.  After the aggregation procedure, we proportionally allocate the difference between 
firm sales (sale) and the sum of segment sales (sale) to each of its segments.  The data are 
from COMPUSTAT. 
Votes 
The natural logarithm of one plus the number of electoral votes in a firm’s state of location 
(state).  The data are from COMPUSTAT and from National Archives and Records Admin-
istration. 
Distance 
The natural logarithm of one plus the number of miles between a firm’s headquarter and the 
state capitol building in a firm’s state of location (state).  We follow Bouwman (2011) and 
measure the distance in miles using ZIP codes of the location (city) of a firm’s headquarter 
and the location of a state capitol building.  We then assign latitude and longitude to ZIP 
codes using the Census 2000 U.S.  Gazetter file and compute the distance using the haver-
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Variable Definition 
sine formula: 
HCd R 2 arcsin(min(1,sqrt(a)))    
where R equals 3,959 (earth radius in miles), a = (sin[(latC – latH)/2])2 + cos(latH) × cos(latC) × (sin[(lonC – lonH)/2])2, subscript H identifies a firm’s headquarter and subscript C identifies the capitol building of a firm’s state of location.  The data are 
from COMPUSTAT and the Census 2000 U.S.  Gazetter file. 
Institutional ownership 
A concentration measure of institutional ownership (instown_hhi).  Concentration is meas-
ured with a Herfindahl index, HI, based on individual institutional holdings of a firm’s 
various institutional investors.  The data are from 13F INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP. 
bUnique 
A binary variable indicating whether a firm-year observation is within the top tercile of 
SG&A expenditures (xsga) normalized by sales (sale) within a given industry-year or not.  
We use Fama and French (1997) 48-industry classification.  The data are from COM-
PUSTAT. 
HHI The industry concentration measure (tnic3hhi) provided by Hoberg and Phillips (2014). 
Industry characteristics  
Industry concentration 
Industry concentration is measured with a Herfindahl index, HI, based on the sales (sale) of 
all firms operating in a given industry-year:  
N 2
ii 1HI p  , 
where N is the number of firms operating in a given industry-year, the subscript i identifies 
the firm, and pi is the fraction of the firm’s total sales in the industry in question.  We use 
Fama and French (1997) 48-industry classification.  The data are from COMPUSTAT and 
from Kenneth R.  French’s webpage. 
Industry age The natural logarithm of the average firm age in a given industry-year.  We use Fama and French (1997) 48-industry classification. 
bDistress 
A binary variable indicating whether a firm’s industry is in distress in a given year or not.  
We follow Opler and Titman (1994) and classify an industry in year t as distressed if the 
median sales growth of all firms in that industry is negative and the median stock return is 
less than -30 percent.  We compute sales growth and stock return over a two-year period 
using sales (sale) at the end of year t-1 and t+1 and annualized stock return (ret) during year 
t and t+1.  We use SIC 3-digit industry classification.  The data are from COMPUSTAT 
and CRSP. 
Creative destruction variables  
Turnover rate 
We follow Comin and Philippon (2005) and measure turnover rate as the probability of an 
industry’s incumbent firms in year t to fall out of the top quintile until year t+5.  We rank 
firms according to market value of equity (prcc_f × csho), operating income (oibdp), or 
sales (sale).  We use Fama and French (1997) 48-industry classification.  The data are from 
COMPUSTAT. 
Lobbying Average industry lobbying expenditures scaled by assets (at).  We use Fama and French (1997) 48-industry classification.  The data are from CRP and COMPUSTAT. 
Lobbying by established firms 
Average lobbying expenditures scaled by assets (at) by an industry’s established firms.  A 
firm is classified as established if its number of years listed is above the median of the age 
distribution within a given industry-year.  We use Fama and French (1997) 48-industry 
classification.  The data are from CRP and COMPUSTAT. 
Lobbying by young firms 
Average lobbying expenditures scaled by assets (at) by an industry’s young firms.  A firm 
is classified as young if its number of years listed is equal or below the median of the age 
distribution within a given industry-year.  We use Fama and French (1997) 48-industry 
classification.  The data are from CRP and COMPUSTAT. 
Firm age The natural logarithm of an industry’s average firm age (Chun et al.  2008).  We use Fama and French (1997) 48-industry classification.  The data are from CRSP and COMPUSTAT.
Firm size The natural logarithm of an industry’s average market capitalization (prcc_f × csho) (Chun 
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Variable Definition 
et al.  2008).  We use Fama and French (1997) 48-industry classification.  The data are from 
COMPUSTAT. 
R&D intensity 
Average R&D intensity within an industry.  We follow Chun et al.  (2008) and measure 
R&D intensity as the ratio of R&D capital to net property, plant, and equipment (ppent).  
R&D capital is the sum of past R&D expenditures (xrd), which are depreciated by an annu-
al rate of 20 percent: 
 t t 1 t 2 t 3 t 4R & D xrd 0.8 xrd 0.6 xrd 0.4 xrd 0.2 xrd .             
We use Fama and French (1997) 48-industry classification.  The data are from CRSP and 
COMPUSTAT. 
Leverage Average debt (dltt + dlc) scaled by assets (at) within an industry (Chun et al.  2008).  We use Fama and French (1997) 48-industry classification.  The data are from COMPUSTAT. 
Liquidity 
Average ratio of current assets (act) to current liabilities (lct) within an industry (Chun et al. 
2008).  We use Fama and French (1997) 48-industry classification.  The data are from 
COMPUSTAT. 
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